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This research investigates the processes which determine how Chinese workers develop 
their understanding of the pay system under which they are governed at the workplace. By 
introducing a labour process perspective which is complementary to existing economic and 
organisational behavioural approaches, I examine the influence of management-labour 
relations in China in the shaping of workers’ pay understanding, which is fundamental to 
their capacity to formulate pay demands and contribute to pay determination in the 
workplace. In particular, I look at the role of managerial control on the shop floor in 
constraining workers’ access to pay information, as well as the workers’ capacity to contest 
pay under the social contexts of urbanisation and industrial development. Data was collected 
in a number of auto parts factories in Town S, southern China in 2016-2017 by interviewing 
workers and factory management; by undertaking participant observations in an auto part 
factory and a consultancy firm; and by conducting document reviews on pay-related 
statistics, labour laws and regulations on pay and the local context of Town S. 
 
It is found that workers’ perplexity over the pay system was an outcome of managerial 
control, and their compliance with managerial interests regarding reward management. 
Managerial control was manifested in different forms across factories with different types of 
production regimes. This resulted in varying processes in which workers were obscured from 
pay and developed responses to pay opacity in different factories. 
 
This research has, in empirical terms, contributed to deepening the understanding of the 
variety of pay systems in Chinese companies with various capital sources, and pay 
communication practices in China. It has also contributed to the re-examination of the 
existing literature on the social and political dimensions of pay determination which tend to 
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1.1. Research background 
 
The issue of pay started to intrigue me in 2012, when I was working in a labour organisation 
in northeast Shenzhen, China. As a special economic zone of the country, Shenzhen was in 
the forefront of the market reform since the late 1970s. Here, one of the biggest export-
oriented manufacturing hub in the coastal region had developed predominantly thanks to 
foreign direct investment. The vacancies in factories were filled by migrant workers from all 
over the country. In spite of the gradual shift of the focus of economic development from 
manufacturing to service industries, in the early 2010s Shenzhen was still notorious for 
sweatshop-like working conditions in labour-intensive factories.  
 
The labour organisation had been running a workers’ centre inside an industrial zone for 
almost a decade. It did not look remarkable from the outside, but here a lot of my fond 
memories with factory workers took place. It was a gathering point for migrant workers 
coming to Shenzhen mostly on their own looking for a higher income to support their family 
at home, working long hours in the week but finding life outside work absolutely boring and 
meaningless. The workers’ centre organised leisure and educational activities for migrant 
workers during weekends. More importantly, it cultivated a sense of solidarity among 
workers, such that their experiences of being exploited at work were actually shared 
amongst them, instead of being kept to themselves, despite not knowing each other well at 
that time.  
 
One of my main duties in the workers’ centre was to conduct labour education workshops 
on labour laws and regulations. The legal compliance by employers was not guaranteed in 
most factories. It was subject to the workers’ own awareness of their legal entitlement, so 
that they could raise concerns about non-compliance and fight for their entitled rights. 
Regarding pay, a key area which workers commonly got confused about was overtime pay. 




pay. Some of them were not paid for overtime work at all even if they did work overtime. 
We showed workers how overtime pay was stipulated in law, but it always took a while to 
convince them that the law applied to them too. They said that employers would either state 
that they were not eligible for overtime pay, or that amount that they got was accurate. 
Eventually, some of them might realise that this situation was problematic and ponder over 
it, but they still tended to believe that every factory had their own way of paying them. 
 
Two implications can be drawn from this experience. On the one hand, workers were 
apparently sceptical about the coverage of labour laws. They thought the legal regulations 
did not apply to them, because the system governing them in the workplace overrode the 
law. On the other hand, it was interesting to reflect on the ways in which employers control 
workers’ understanding of pay. What had they told workers about payment? How would 
they rationalise their version of the pay system in the workplace? I could vaguely see that 
something must have happened in the workplace, to which I did not have full access to but 
could only learn about it from workers’ patchy descriptions of their experiences at work. 
 
Another key aspect of my work was to learn about workers’ living needs in the industrial 
zone and re-construct the desirable level of a living wage. I learnt about their pay levels, what 
they had to spend money on to live in Shenzhen, and how they coped with a tight budget to 
survive in the city and feed their family in their hometown at the same time. The area where 
I worked in was still largely industrial in the early 2010s, but it was already haunted by the 
spectre of gentrification. In the following years, factories were gradually relocated to make 
way for real estate development. Steady increases in rent and food costs were thus 
observed, while the growth rate of workers’ pay had often stagnated or developed at a much 
slower pace. As a result, even though they were already living on a shoestring, the workers 
still had to prioritise daily necessities either of themselves or their families’ in order to survive. 
 
The living wage project, which ran on and off from the late 2000s to 2017 in Shenzhen, 
stressed the importance of being paid enough for the production and reproduction of labour 
power within normal working hours. In a survey conducted in 2012 on workers in the 




wage level, which stood at ¥1,500 at that time.1 The monthly pay of an average worker in 
the industrial zone in Shenzhen was somewhere between ¥2,000 and ¥3,000, including 
overtime pay. By costing out a basket of goods and services, the organisation aggregated the 
monthly expenditure of a worker whose every aspect of daily needs in the city was fulfilled. 
In 2012, a worker required a monthly income of around ¥2,890 to support a decent living 
standard in Shenzhen, covering essential daily needs of food, accommodation, groceries, 
communication, transportation, leisure activities, skill training and healthcare for themselves 
and their family members who also lived with them in the Shenzhen (Shenzhen Dagongzhe 
Migrant Workers’ Centre, 2013). These figures demonstrated that without working overtime, 
workers would not be able to afford every aspect of their essential needs. 
 
To me, the fact that workers did not earn enough to support themselves and their families 
sounded reasonable enough for them to make pay demands. However, many workers were 
reluctant to do so. They found it unimaginable to earn ¥2,890 without the condition of 
excessive overtime work. In other words, they found it unreasonable to ask for that much 
without fulfilling their ‘duties’ or being a ‘good’ worker first by working overtime as their 
employers demanded. According to them, their dissent would only be justified, and it would 
be right to voice out pay demands, only when they had done what they were required to do 
within the employment relationship but their effort did not pay off, and there was no 
improvement. Another common sentiment was along the lines of, ‘if I were not that useless, 
I could have earned more, been promoted, got a better job, rather than complaining here 
about getting similar pay levels all the time’. This shows that they were fully aware of a 
certain system, or of the existence of the ‘rules of game’ which governed their work. In order 
to excel in pay, identifying the rules and following them was an essential part of the game. 
This made me wonder under what were the circumstances that had established in the 
workers’ mind the deep-rooted idea of boosting earnings by working overtime. Since the 
workplace played such a big part in their life in the city, there had to be something to do with 









1.2. Research question 
 
The extent to which workers contribute to the process of pay determination has been 
debated for long in the existing literature. The neo-classical economics literature argues that 
pay levels were an outcome of labour market mechanisms, where changes in labour demand 
and supply resulted in the fluctuation in optimal pay levels. Workers, or trade unions as a 
collective body of labour, contribute to pay setting with their leverage in the bargaining 
process. Meanwhile, recognising the power dynamics between employers and workers, the 
industrial relations literature acknowledges the social factors that determine the degree of 
leverage of workers and employers over pay determination, which is also underpinned by 
their respective interests. This then leads to the question of what actually equipped workers 
with the leverage to contest or challenge certain pay levels. How would they know what to 
fight for and how they could fight for it? If I were an employer, I would use all means to keep 
workers ignorant, so that workers would not know where to start complaining, or would 
have to accept the fact that it is how it works. Yet how can this be achieved? What are the 
micro-control mechanisms behind this? 
 
During my work in Shenzhen I observed that workers did not necessarily possess the 
knowledge to challenge the ways in which they are paid in the workplace. At that time, 
factory-level trade unions had a very limited presence in the workplace. While trade unions 
and collective bargaining mechanisms were considered to be important institutions of wage 
setting in the existing literature on capitalist economies, trade unions in the Chinese context 
do not take responsibility for articulating pay demands and organising workers by default. 
Instead, the workers’ centre becomes a platform for workers to discover problems regarding 
pay, and to encourage workers to think otherwise. The coverage of the workers’ centre, run 
by individual efforts in the civil society, was absolutely unremarkable in contrast with the 
large population of migrant workers in the city. What if workers had to deal with these issues 
in their individual capacity? There also seemed to be a communication process and an 
imperceptible influence on how workers should be paid which had penetrated the 
workplace. How did they learn, or how had they developed a particular way of understanding 





This emerged as the issue I would like to examine in this thesis. By navigating the process in 
which workers accumulated knowledge about pay, I seek to understand the circumstances 
they were in, and the constraints that they faced. I will argue that the circulation of pay 
information and the accumulation of pay knowledge are an outcome of power dynamics in 
the labour process embedded in the employment relationship. Workers’ capacity to break 
through the limits set by management to deter them from understanding the system and 
make meaningful pay demands are subject to the resources, such as personal competencies 
and social networks, which they possess and manage to mobilise in the workplace. 
 
1.3. Studying pay determination in the Chinese context 
 
The Chinese context makes this issue particularly relevant. Since the late 1970s, China 
achieved economic success by attracting foreign capital to fuel its industrial development. 
Until recently the manufacturing industry was characterised by its labour intensive nature 
and sustained by relatively low pay for workers (Yang et al., 2010). A joint effort by the state 
and capital to keep pay level low had been a major driver behind the maintenance of a 
competitive manufacturing sector with low labour costs in comparison to its Western 
counterparts. Yet, with the emerging labour shortage and the initiatives of the state to 
cultivate the domestic consumer market in recent years, employers face stronger pressure 
to raise workers’ pay. On the one hand, product market competition compels them to remain 
conservative in pay increase. On the other hand, workers’ demand for pay rise is also strong 
to the extent that recruitment and production may be interrupted. 
 
In unionised circumstances, trade unions as collective entities play a major role in 
aggregating pay demands at the industry and organisational levels. However, in China, this 
role cannot be taken for granted. The Chinese industrial relations system, overshadowed by 
the strong influence of the party-state, displays the following characteristics. First, the state 
has gradually retreated from decision-making of labour allocation at an organisational-level 
since the market reform, especially in the private sector which accounts for over 80% of 
workers in China in 2017. However, its presence still remains strong in terms of regulating 
employment relationships by controlling labour mobility, implementing labour laws and 




collective labour relations’ under the state’s efforts to promote collective negotiation on top 
of individual-based conflict resolution mechanisms has also been observed (Chang and 
Brown, 2017). 
 
Second, without complying to international conventions for freedom of association (Pringle, 
2011), the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) retains its monopoly as the ‘sole 
legal trade union’ in the country (Chang, 2017:47). Its dual nature stems from its Soviet root 
and shapes its role in worker representation, but this role is constantly undermined by its 
other function as a transmission belt of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – a unilateral link 
between the ruling party and ‘the masses’ (Ng and Warner, 1998). Regardless of recent 
observations of its efforts in expanding the membership base and promoting participation at 
the enterprise and sectoral levels (C. Chang, 2017), fighting for workers’ rights by organising 
social movements is not within its scope of responsibility as stipulated by the party (C. Chang, 
2017). The aforementioned collective negotiation is led by the ACFTU, but largely falls under 
the framework laid down by the state, and remains formalistic in its nature (Lei, 2017). 
 
Third, workers’ right to strike is not explicitly protected by labour laws and regulations. The 
issue of whether Chinese workers have the right to strike is controversial, since the absence 
of the right in the Chinese constitution provides neither the grounds to criminalise nor to 
legitimise strike actions (Taylor et al., 2003). The ACFTU is also unable to call strike on due to 
the state and party control it is subject to (Meng, 2017). Workers going on strike is still quite 
common anyway, usually in the form of wild-cat strikes (Chan and Hui, 2014). Nevertheless, 
following the observation of recent strikes which were resolved through state-led collective 
negotiation procedures, Meng (2017) argues that the extent to which existing collective 
conflict resolution mechanisms contribute to accumulating workers’ power to sustain longer-
term control over the workplace remains questionable.  
 
Therefore, despite emerging efforts of the state to promote collective negotiation in a 
regulated manner, little is known about how exactly workers formulate pay demands at the 
organisational level, not to mention the factors deterring them from doing so. The peculiar 
development of the commodification of labour and gradual marketisation of the economy 




the Chinese context. To what extent are pay levels governed by labour market mechanisms? 
How do workers manage to contest pay in their individual capacity under the Chinese 
industrial relations system, which is characterised by the lack of collective representation? 
These remain the underlying questions which have yet to be addressed. 
 
1.4. Organisation of the thesis 
 
Against this background, this thesis will be structured in the following manner. Chapter Two 
will be a review of the existing literature on pay determination and on workers as drivers in 
shaping pay levels. I will demonstrate the insufficiency of economic laws in explaining 
employers’ incentives to provide a pay level above the market equilibrium. To what extent 
workers can identify and utilise opportunities in the employment relationship to maximise 
their own pay is subject to how well they know about the system and their leverages over 
the employers. The literature in pay transparency sheds some light on the availability of pay 
information and on how workers potentially benefit from the pay disclosure policies of the 
employers to accumulate knowledge of the pay system on the shop floor. However, the 
methodological approach underpinning this category of research tells us little about how the 
managerial practices of disclosing pay information selectively may empower workers in 
terms of their leverage in making pay demands. In this regard, I will introduce a labour 
process approach to the study of pay understanding on the shop floor. How China serves as 
an ideal research site to examine labour process in a contextualised manner will also be 
explained in these sections. Drawing from existing literature on China studies, I will describe 
the how management-labour relations are currently contested under state influence in 
shaping the labour market and the regulatory framework of industrial relations, as well as 
the complex dynamics between the state, capital and labour. 
 
In Chapter Three, I will develop the methodological approach adopted in the research, and 
the processes of data collection and analysis. Embracing a critical realist epistemological 
stance, the use of the extended case method enabled me to look at individual workplaces 
against the historical, social and political background, including the geographical location and 
the wider social system in which workplaces are situated. Since data was mainly collected 




process of negotiating access to data, approaching research subjects and conducting 
observations. Since fieldwork was conducted in China where the research environment has 
become increasingly unfriendly to labour studies researchers in recent years, key decisions 
made in the field will also be evaluated. 
 
Chapters Four to Six will present the empirical findings of the research. Chapter Four will 
include an account of the urban and industrial development of Town S where my data was 
primarily collected. The automobile industry, which included a Sino-European assembly plant 
and a number of auto parts manufacturers, was introduced and established in Town S within 
a decade under strong state support. Since the local labour market could not meet the newly 
created labour demand in these factories, the measures taken by local governments to 
attract workers and settle them in the greenfield sites will also be examined. Regardless of 
the state efforts to provide the infrastructure needed for the clustering of labour, Town S 
had yet to become an appealing destination for migrant workers. Therefore, the factories 
still heavily relied on pre-existing relationships to draw workers to the town and the industry. 
This resulted in particular ways in which workers lived and got by in Town S, as well as how 
they established their social networks and local know-hows, which would in turn significantly 
affect their way of navigating the job market, the factory-level pay systems and the choice 
of responses to dissatisfaction, as illustrated in later chapters. 
 
In Chapter Five, I will provide a detailed examination of pay practices in auto parts factories 
in Town S, particularly Factories H, F and D where I gained access to more data. By delineating 
working conditions and pay systems adopted in these factories, I will show how workers 
there were remunerated for their labour. Apparently, strong state support to the automobile 
industry was not reflected in the meagre pay that auto parts workers received in these 
factories. In spite of different reward principles manifested in pay systems in different 
factories, it was common for workers to be prevented from achieving a comprehensive 
understanding of their pay. It was not merely because the factory management explicitly 
barred workers from learning about the pay system. Instead, managerial control over the 
form of pay information to be circulated, or the withholding of key information for workers 
to make sense of their pay and the bureaucratic hurdles to make pay enquiries kept workers 




floor, different pathways leading to the sustenance of workers’ ignorance of their pay 
stemming from various timeframes of the employment relationship will be outlined. 
 
Chapter Six will be about the consequences of workers being kept away from understanding 
the pay system. It was apparent that pay caused a high labour turnover in the auto parts 
factories – more specifically, this was not only about pay levels, but also related to the dim 
prospect of receiving higher pay without a concrete understanding of the rules of the game. 
In spite of the prevalent use of exit to resist against pay opacity, I will examine to what extent 
exit empowered workers in the labour market in the automobile industry and in Town S. In 
addition, I will also examine the social institutions which bounded Town S workers from the 
use of voice as a strategy, and their capacity to challenge the pay system without sufficient 
knowledge of the pay system. 
 
The findings of the study will be discussed in Chapter Seven. I will first refer to the research 
questions laid out in Chapter Two and examine the accumulation of knowledge of the pay 
system at the factory level. Then I will justify the use of the labour process approach as an 
analytical tool to trace how workers’ understanding of pay was determined by their 
leverages in the social dynamics on the shop floor, rather than imposed by the management 
in a linear manner. In Chapter Eight, I will give an overall summary of the key findings. I will 
also discuss the contributions that this research has made, as well as its limitations, in order 






2. Literature Review: Introducing a Labour Process 





Economic forces are long regarded as major drivers behind the determination of pay. This is 
especially so under the growing dominance of private sector and informal employment, 
where the determination of pay levels is left in the realm of labour market (Emmott, 2015). 
This view has been continuously challenged by scholars who have attempted to develop a 
sociological approach of pay determination on the basis of Marx’s work (e.g. Brown, 1973). 
However, pay determination as a research focus no longer receives as much scholarly 
attention as it did in this field in the past decades. This may be due to the observable 
declining trend in collective bargaining coverage worldwide, although it is less drastic in some 
countries and sectors than in others (Visse et al., 2015), which results in the fading 
significance of long-recognised subject of political struggle. Meanwhile, this trend also 
implies that the subject of struggle may have shifted from the collective to the individual 
level, which is so far under-researched. The particular socio-economic context of the political 
struggles investigated in previous studies is another aspect which should also be more 
rigorously scrutinised.  
Labour is a peculiar factor of production due to the agential power embodied in its providers, 
which are the workers. In the industrial relations literature, pay level is regarded as the 
outcome of the bargaining effort on top of the operation of market forces. For example, 
regarding the contributions of the industrial relations literature on the subject of pay, 
Edwards (2012) argued that it is unfair to conclude that industrial relations has not 
contributed much on a theoretical understanding of pay determination as suggested by 
Bryson and Forth (2008), since according to him and the research tradition traced back to 
Brown (1973) at least, pay is as much an outcome of political struggles as of economic 
exchanges. Research on bargaining mechanisms in developed and unionised economies is 
voluminous. Yet, further complexities can be foreseen in other countries and sectoral 
contexts when workers and employers are not the only actors involved in the pay setting 




Under these circumstances, the extent to which workers can foster and mobilise their 
agential power, not only in terms of the leverage in an employment relationship, but also of 
the knowledge of pay governance, is crucial for our understanding of how individual workers 
contribute to the pay determination process. Post-socialist China is an example of such 
scenario, and for these reasons a comprehensive framework is required to study the 
determination of pay at the workplace level.  
 
Recent research in the field of organisational behaviour demonstrate a renewed scholarly 
interest in pay transparency (e.g. Colella et al., 2007; Marasi and Bennett, 2016), which 
delves into the conveyance of pay information in the workplace and its motivational effects 
(e.g. Belogolovsky and Bamberger, 2014; Marasi et al., 2018; Smit and Montag-Smit, 2018). 
Employers need solid reasons to convince them of the benefits of pay transparency, such as 
advantages in terms of organisational development, so that they are more willing to adjust 
their pay disclosure strategies and fulfil requirements from labour laws and regulations on 
pay transparency (Gely and Bierman, 2003; Friedman, 2014; Trotter et al., 2017). Workers 
and the general public also recognise the potential in pay transparency to narrow pay gaps 
and fight against pay injustice (Andersson-StrÅberg et al., 2007; Castilla, 2015). Nevertheless, 
current research tends to decontextualise pay from workplace relations, and also fails to 
recognise the potential of pay transparency as an outcome of power dynamics between 
employers and workers with conflicting interests. 
 
Under these circumstances, this chapter will review the current literature on the nature of 
pay determination and the understanding of pay from the workers’ perspective. By 
introducing a labour process perspective to the current field of pay understanding, I will seek 
to lay out an analytical framework of how pay knowledge can be accumulated at the 
workplace and utilised by workers to formulate pay demands.  
 
The rest of the chapter consists of six sections. First, I will provide a critique on the economics 
literature, which attributes the determination of pay levels primarily to the influence of 
labour market mechanisms. In particular, I will evaluate the notion of efficiency wage, which 
suggests that employers are willing to provide pay levels above market price without 




literature regarding pay transparency, a mechanism which equips workers with the 
knowledge to position themselves in the labour market and build up leverage to make pay 
demands. Critiques on the two bodies of literature will then lead to the third section, in which 
I argue that a unitarist view of employment relations embedded in the existing literature on 
pay communication is insufficient in unveiling the conflicts driven by pay communication, 
which is also a point of contention on its own between employers and workers. The fourth 
section will introduce the labour process approach as an analytical tool to situate pay 
understanding in the context of workplace relations. In the fifth section, I will justify China as 
a research site which can accommodate the examination of the labour process interacting 
with factors external to the workplace. Research questions which enable an empirical 
examination of pay understanding at the workplace level in China will be presented in the 
last section.  
 
2.2. Critique of pay determination by market forces 
 
The study of pay is of paramount importance in employment relations, since the 
establishment of an employment relationship is defined by the fact that a worker receives 
pay from an employer in exchange for his or her labour (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2010). Apart 
from compensating the expenditure of labour in monetary terms, pay also serves the 
functions of signalling changes in labour demand and supply, of consolidating social 
stratification and of serving motivational purposes from the perspective of management 
(Rubery, 1997).  
 
The Neo-classical economics literature views labour market mechanisms as the guiding 
principle for pay determination. The equilibrium for the price of labour is set by the 
interaction between labour demand and supply (Hicks, 1935; Marshall, 1961), and 
constitutes the pay level that employers are willing to pay and workers are willing to accept. 
In the conceptualisation of Kerr (1950, 1954), the labour market is not simply the totality of 
jobs, but it consists of separate labour markets, given that jobs are differentiated by 
occupation, skill level and region. Labour markets as such are conceptualised as ‘job 
markets’, complementing ‘wage markets’ which set the price for jobs in different sectors and 




best, but their choice is often confined by the skills and requirements specific to the 
occupation, industry and location in which they are based. The market serves as the 
mechanism which allocates labour within these labour markets. Knowledge about market 
conditions allows workers to move within their respective labour markets. 
 
According to this perspective, in unionised circumstances, trade unions represent workers in 
the collective bargaining mechanism as a ‘wage-fixing institution’ (Ross, 1947). Since a union 
itself is an institution with its own goal of survival and maintaining legitimacy for the union 
members, its efforts to determine pay levels are driven by wealth maximisation, and give 
little attention to the general state of employment (Kerr, 1977). Bargaining is constrained by 
the ‘range of practicable bargain’ (Pigou, 1929), which is subject to the union’s understanding 
of its own bargaining strength and negotiation skills, as well as to the cost to which the 
opponent (i.e. the management) is willing to incur (Chamberlain, 1965). From this 
perspective, pay is the outcome of the dynamics between employers and workers as 
opposing sides which aim at maximising their own interests. The union, as an agent of 
workers’ voice, monopolises the aggregation of pay demands in the collective bargaining 
mechanism (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Market conditions, albeit not essentially ignored, 
are reduced to considerations in the calculation of bargaining strength and opportunity costs 
of concession. 
 
The bargaining of pay is not necessarily a brutal struggle between management and workers. 
Regardless of the union as an active agent on the workers’ side to strive for higher pay, there 
are times when employers are willing to pay a wage level which is higher than the optimal 
wage level determined by the equilibrium between labour demand and supply, while 
keeping a certain level of involuntary unemployment (Yellen, 1984). Employers are willing to 
pay an efficiency wage, which is positively related to economic gains (Reynolds, 1978; 
Dunlop, 1984; Katz, 1986), in particular to productivity growth. The dual role of pay is 
recognised, not simply as an outcome of labour allocation, but also a tool to stimulate the 
qualities desired by the management, such as productivity, morale, work efforts and general 
alignment with the employers’ interests (Romaguera, 1991). Different models are thus 





The shirking model is the most commonly discussed model for efficiency wage (Calvo, 1979; 
Eaton and White, 1982; Stoft, 1982; Miyazaki, 1984; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Bowles, 1985; 
Gintis and Ishikawa, 1987). Its advocates propose that higher pay provides more of an 
economic incentive for workers not to shirk at work. If the pay level remains the same as the 
market equilibrium, there would be no opportunity cost for workers to shirk or change jobs. 
To make sure that their opportunity cost to shirk is greater than zero, it is necessary to pay 
them higher than the market equilibrium, which results in involuntary unemployment 
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). 
 
The efficiency wage is regarded as an alternative for employers to pay for the costs of 
monitoring workers, as well as to discipline them for underperformance. As described by 
Stiglitz (1981), pay is simply part of the total price that employers pay for labour, alongside 
other labour costs, such as costs for recruitment, training, productivity boosting, and the 
compensation of low productivity. Paying workers less may compress the total wage bill, but 
side effects such as low incentives and motivation of workers may also arise. In this sense, 
pay becomes a trade-off with other monitoring costs, as employers tend to pay higher wages 
to eliminate other costly means to monitor workers.  
 
Other efficiency wage models follow a similar logic to the shirking model, accounting for the 
employers’ opportunity costs of sticking to the optimal pay level, as well as for those of 
workers seeking actively other jobs which pay better and provide them with incentives to be 
more productive. On the one hand, efficiency wage creates a cost for workers to seek 
alternative jobs in the labour market rather than staying with their current employer or 
another employer who is willing to pay efficiency wage. For instance, in the labour turnover 
model, if the pay level for a certain job is higher than what workers can get elsewhere in the 
market, they tend to be more reluctant to leave the job, which helps maintain the stability 
of the workforce at the company level (Katz, 1986). The union threat model also stresses the 
economic incentive that efficiency wage carries to deter workers from resorting to collective 
actions against their employers. If workers realise that they receive pay as high as what they 
could obtain under a collective bargaining agreement, there would be no point to demand 
for a collective agreement or to organise it from the outset (Dickens, 1986). Then employers 





On the other hand, efficiency wage also helps employers with maintaining the quality and 
morale of the workforce. The adverse selection model acknowledges the heterogeneity 
among workers, that is that not all of them possess the same qualities (Yellen, 1984). Paying 
workers more enables employers to attract workers with better qualities, which in turn 
benefits production. The sociological model proposed by Akerlof (1982, 1984) emphasises 
the function of pay also in boosting loyalty and the level of effort workers, given that workers 
who receive higher pay tend to associate their own interests with the employers’. Efficiency 
wage is thus paid to workers as an act of rent-sharing, so that they feel important enough to 
commit to the employers’ production goals, especially when teamwork and work groups are 
essential features of a company (Katz, 1986). In short, apart from preventing workers from 
behaving in ways that lower the productivity of the company, employers might also manage 
to save costs in recruitment, building morale within the workforce, as well as providing 
positive incentives for workers to work hard by paying an efficiency wage. 
 
The variety of models of efficiency wage implies that different companies may decide on 
whether to pay an efficiency wage by taking their own circumstances into consideration, 
which at the end leads to company-specific wage effects (Katz, 1986). However, these 
models pay little attention to why and how individual companies realise the need to impose 
an efficiency wage in their own situation in the first place. More work has to be done to 
explain how employers begin to realise the need to pay workers more instead of using other 
means which do not cost them in monetary terms to retain and motivate workers.  
 
Some scholars have already criticised the efficiency wage thesis, which assumes that shirking 
or any other opportunities for workers to take advantage of the employer by getting paid 
while not performing their duties are universal. As Spencer (2002:317) points out, efficiency 
wage advocates take shirking as ‘an axiomatic feature of human nature’. It is assumed that 
workers would definitely shirk if the opportunity cost of not shirking is zero, or if alternative 
jobs are always available. Facing such a ‘moral hazard problem’ in which workers would shirk 
and avoid fulfilling work responsibility, it is seemingly inevitable for employers to cope with 
it by paying workers more, namely efficiency wage (Screpanti, 2000). Yet, in reality, two 




tendency to resist work without exploring its historical specificity (Spencer, 2002). In many 
cases, work is not simply a transaction between workers and employers, in which labour is 
traded in exchange for monetary rewards. Other values, work ethics and social relations are 
embedded into the transaction process, and they determine whether workers shirk just 
because of dissatisfaction with the monetary reward. At the same time, whether a higher 
wage margin is perceived by workers as an opportunity cost if they shirk or look for 
alternative employment is also subject to the non-monetary elements that a certain job 
embodies, such as the creation of workers’ consent (Spencer, 2002). Without dealing with 
the nature of individual jobs and workplaces, it is hard to explain under what circumstances 
the management believe that their workforce needs motivation, as well as how material 
rewards becomes the last resort for management or the most effective means in motivating 
workers in exchange for their cooperation. 
 
Current efficiency wage models also overemphasise the upper hand that the management 
plays in determining the size of wage margin to be paid to workers as an efficiency wage. 
Built on the basis of existing wage data, these models show that a certain amount of pay 
higher than the equilibrium pay is able to prevent circumstances of shirking that employers 
would like to prevent, and how the amount could have achieved that. However, little is done 
to testify what would happen if a lower amount was imposed instead. Are workers fully 
aware of the imposition of an efficiency wage? If so, what makes them willing to stop shirking 
instead of taking full advantage of it? To delve into these questions, not only do dynamics 
within a company need to be addressed, but also the driving force behind managerial 
decisions, particularly the production relations within a company. 
 
Such political and social dimensions of pay determination are recognised by scholars as 
complementary to the supremacy of market factors. For example, Doeringer and Piore 
(1971) elaborated on the concept of internal labour market, in which employers and unions 
set boundaries to the allocation of labour within an industry or an organisation. With the 
purpose of sustaining permanent employment and avoiding abruption in labour supply, 
employers manipulate pay administration as an instrument to maintain the internal pay 
structure, which is composed of pay differentials between workers of different ranks and 
occupations (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Market forces can still play a role in the 




of workers on a collective level. Therefore, pay level is not a purely economic outcome, but 
it carries its own political and social dimensions. It is also a political process in which 
institutions emerge as a result of competition between competing interests (Gouldner, 
1954). 
 
The range of indeterminacy left by economic forces provides room to explore how bargaining 
opportunities and efforts manage to influence pay levels (Brown and Sisson, 1975), especially 
when the fluctuation of labour market demand and supply does not play a significant role in 
determining pay levels in comparison with institutional forces, such as custom and practice 
(C&P) rules and collective bargaining structures (Brown and Sisson, 1975; Nolan and Brown, 
1983). Pay levels for factory workers in engineering factories in Coventry, as found by Brown 
(1973), were eventually determined by individual piecemeal bargaining efforts on the shop 
floor on top of the nationally bargained pay rate. This did not mean that these factories were 
poorly managed. Rather, it showed that management simply had little incentive to maintain 
an effective control over the consistency of wage payment with a factory  (Brown, 2008), 
thus allowing tacit deviants to the established pay system. Brown et al. (1984) suggest that 
companies facing lower product market competition tend to demonstrate more company-
specific effects on pay through a more lenient execution of managerial control. Loose 
managerial control over the internal pay structure creates room for wage bargaining by 
workers, resulting in company-specific wage effects. That said, the presence of loose 
managerial control only delineates an opportunity that can or cannot be taken on by 
workers. Whether workers take the chance to bargain, or remain satisfied or succumb to the 
pay rates offered unilaterally by employers, are subject, however, to other presuppositions. 
 
2.3. Accumulation of pay knowledge 
 
The need to draw our attention back to factors at the workplace level which relate to pay 
determination leads us to the next questions: what facilitates workers to make sense of the 
pay level that they receive in relation to the input of labour on the job, and what informs 
them of the opportunities to bargain? On an individual basis, the availability of information 
and the capacity to accumulate knowledge on pay are key. Existing research recognises that 




differences and mechanisms of pay adjustment (Shields et al., 2012). Scott (2018:4) further 
specifies pay understanding as ‘the knowledge employees possess regarding the pay 
structure, pay policies and how decisions are made’. Workers should also understand the 
criteria and objectives of the pay system (Williams and Levy, 1992), how their pay levels can 
be advanced (Lee et al., 1999), and more importantly, how their pay is compared with the 
others hired by the same employer (Scott, 2018). 
 
Managerial attempts to control the circulation of pay information is researched the most 
extensively in the field of organisational behaviour, which looks at the direct communication 
of pay between employers and workers. In this respect, the body of literature on pay 
communication investigates different patterns of pay communication practices in 
workplaces. According to Marasi and Bennett (2016:51), pay communication practices are 
adopted by individual companies to ‘[determine] if, when, how and which pay information 
(such as pay range, pay raises, pay averages, individual pay levels, and/or the entire pay 
structure) is communicated to employees and possibly outsiders.’  
 
To maintain the closeness or secrecy of pay, pay secrecy and confidentiality rules, often 
unilateral requirements from the management to workers (Edwards, 2005), are in place to 
bar wage discussion among workers, and are presented either in written or verbal forms, at 
the early or later stages of an employment relationship (Gely and Bierman, 2003; Bierman 
and Gely, 2004). In some countries such as the US, managerial policies to keep pay secret 
among workers are indeed illegal, but they are still commonly found in workplaces (O’Neill, 
2010; Rosenfeld, 2017). Workers in the private sector tend to be bound by pay secrecy 
policies even more, especially when they are not affiliated to a trade union (Rosenfeld, 2017). 
 
Under the umbrella of pay communication, practices in different companies lie along a 
spectrum of transparency, of which secrecy and transparency are the two extremes. Moving 
from pay secrecy to pay transparency involves a gradual process of a company loosening its 
control over the communication of pay matters between individual employees, and in some 
circumstances also between employees and the general public (Patten, 1978). Castilla (2015) 
defines transparency in pay, especially performance-related, when organisations observe 




He further elaborates on the transparency in terms of processes and outcomes, which focus 
on the transparency of pay distribution and the feasibility of intra-organisational pay 
comparison, respectively. Patten (1978) suggests four stages a company can go through to 
achieve a more open pay communication system, from disclosing data on pay ranges and 
average pay levels, to publicising the payroll to employees on request. Colella et al. (2007) 
elaborate on the selective nature of disclosure of pay information in terms of the access to 
pay information, scope of pay information available, and measures taken by employers to 
restrain the ways in which pay information is circulated. These factors bring significant 
impact to the accumulation of pay knowledge, because they not only dictate how much 
workers are able to learn about the pay system, but also how they could further discuss and 
deepen their understanding with a third party, as well as the extent to which the 
conversation about pay can be initiated and sustained.  
 
The pay communication literature has provided explanations on the emergence of different 
pay communication practices and their impact on workers’ accumulation of pay knowledge. 
A key focus of the literature is on how the practices would benefit management in terms of 
achieving their organisational and motivational goals. Furthermore, there is also a growing 
body of literature providing further arguments on how managerial practices promoting pay 
transparency enrich workers’ understanding of pay. In the two sub-sections below, I will 
provide an overview of: first, what the existing literature says about the drivers behind 
employers’ voluntary disclosure of pay information; and second, what researchers have 
found about workers’ accumulation of pay knowledge when pay is transparent to them. 
 
2.3.1. Efforts of employers to make pay more transparent 
 
Some employers disclose pay information to workers and the wider public, although to 
different degrees (e.g. Lee et al., 1999; Sweins et al., 2009). The current literature delves into 
why employers do this voluntarily, and the circumstances under which they are compelled 
to do so (Colella et al., 2007). It should first be noted that pay transparency is not the default 
in some countries, such as the United States, due to social and cultural norms on pay 
discussion behaviour. Bierman and Gely (2004) suggest that openly discussing pay and other 




US. Conversations on pay are even more a taboo than a discussion of one’s private life 
(Edwards, 2005). The revival of concerns over personal privacy in recent years has also 
encouraged the persistent advocacy of pay secrecy (Colella et al., 2007). In these 
circumstances, some researchers consider keeping pay secret as a responsibility of 
employers to protect employees’ personal privacy (Patten, 1978; Burroughs, 1982). 
Nevertheless, current research has identified the drivers behind employers’ attempt to make 
pay information more transparent. 
 
The first driver is the pressure from the state (Trotter et al., 2017). The attitude and 
behaviour of employers towards the issue of pay transparency is often determined by legal 
requirements. Legal regulations and governance codes requiring the disclosure of executive 
pay, especially in listed companies, are found in a number of regions, such as the US, UK, 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Thailand (Ganu, 2014). The disclosure mainly serves shareholders’ 
interests from a corporate governance perspective. However, regulations on pay 
transparency are also extended to lower-ranking employees, as observed in recent years. For 
example, 2016 is considered a milestone year in the US, when a presidential executive order 
came into effect to compel contractors and subcontractors of the federal government to lift 
bans on pay discussion among employees (Trotter et al., 2017); as well as on limiting access 
to pay information, such as market research on pay, pay surveys, job evaluation and union 
agreements (Schoenfeld, 2015), so that employees can cross-check their pay with different 
sources (Friedman, 2014). Individual states also issue mandates to disclose pay information 
of public service employees (Mas, 2017). Meanwhile, the Equality Act 2010 enacted by the 
UK Parliament does not bar employers from practising pay non-disclosure measures in the 
workplace, but has made sacking workers who reveal or discuss pay among themselves 
unlawful (Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, n.d.). 
 
The second driver is given by the potential motivational benefits that pay transparency brings 
to the organisation. Existing research finds that pay disclosure practices are connected to 
strategic decisions of individual companies in relation to human resource management, and 
also the efforts to achieve certain organisational goals (Colella et al., 2007). One of the 
considerations commonly discussed in the literature is pay satisfaction. Existing literature 
gives us a glimpse of both how pay secrecy can contribute to lower pay satisfaction, as well 




Lawler (1965, 1967) focus on the negative impact of pay confidentiality on pay satisfaction 
and self-worth at work. By studying managers in organisations with strict pay secrecy 
policies, he finds that not knowing how much other colleagues earn leads to inaccurate 
estimations of each other’s pay level, which results in turn in workers’ tendency to 
undermine how their performance is valued in the organisation and consequently the 
development of pay dissatisfaction. Milkovich and Anderson (1972) conducted a parallel 
study to see whether the same phenomenon takes place in companies which encourage 
greater pay transparency. It has been found that the availability of more pay information, 
such as median pay level and pay range, does not lead to a more accurate estimation of the 
wage level of one’s colleague, but the gesture itself may still improve pay satisfaction.  
 
Further studies are dedicated to exploring the benefits of pay transparency in fostering pay 
satisfaction. For example, Thompson and Pronsky (1975) confirm that greater pay 
transparency is correlated to higher pay satisfaction for managers, since it is easier for them 
to compare pay levels within and across companies and realise that their company pays 
more. Futrell and Jenkins (1978) find that when more pay information (pay level 
corresponding to seniority in the company) is disclosed to employees, this results in better 
job performance, job satisfaction and pay satisfaction. A more recent experiment conducted 
by Greiner et al. (2011) also shows that pay differentials, which are meant to illicit workers’ 
efforts, bring changes in workers’ performance only if the differentials are made clear to 
higher-earning workers. The satisfaction towards pay may even transcend pay level, which 
means that employees may find pay levels less important than the pay process (Brown and 
Huber, 1992; Mulvey et al., 2002; Sweins et al., 2009). 
 
To what extent pay transparency fulfils just the motivational purposes is in question. Apart 
from pay satisfaction, other benefits of pay transparency from a managerial perspective are 
more disputable. For example, the potential effect of pay transparency on collaboration 
among workers and their effort-making behaviour has been widely discussed (Opsahl, 1967; 
Nosenzo, 2013; Işgın and Sopher, 2015; Bamberger and Belogolovsky, 2017). The greatest 
concern is on how pay transparency encourages or facilitates pay comparison among 
workers. Zenger (2016: Paragraph 4) points out that the disclosure of performance pay, 




to ‘an expanded playground for our comparisons, potentially heightening our attention and 
obsession with it and elevating the negative emotions and behaviours that result.’  
 
Furthermore, the level of information symmetry brought about by pay transparency makes 
it harder for employers to exercise managerial control over the workplace. On the one hand, 
the symmetry of pay information enabled by pay transparency makes it harder for employers 
to adopt a passive retention strategy and constrain employees’ mobility (Danziger and Katz, 
1997) just by controlling the disclosure of information, which binds workers to the current 
job and reduces their likelihood to identify better-paying jobs elsewhere in the labour market 
(Bergh et al., 2019). On the other hand, pay comparing behaviour among workers thanks to 
the availability of pay information challenges management’s capacity to conceal negative 
signals from workers (Park, 2016), as well as maintaining control over workers (Patten, 1978; 
Rosenfeld, 2017). They would face more backlash from workers when mistakes in the pay 
system are found, rather than being able to rectify them without having workers realise what 
was going on and consequently stirring up controversies (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992).  
 
2.3.2. Workers being more informed under pay transparency 
 
For employees, their prime concern is to make sure that they are compensated for their 
labour. According to the existing literature, pay transparency benefits workers in terms of 
the empowering effect on them, so that they can make more informed judgements about 
their pay and the prospects of pay adjustment (Estlund, 2014). Their empowerment is 
reflected in the following areas. 
 
First, workers can confirm whether their pay level is reasonable or acceptable by comparing 
their peers’ pay levels with their own (Ramachandran, 2012; Estlund, 2014). If a worker only 
knows about his or her own pay level, whether the level is perceived to be appropriate or 
not may be subject to his or her own personal preferences or circumstances. Nevertheless, 
the knowledge on peers’ pay level provides them with extra resources to compare their own 
pay with the others, and make sense of it. Even under a pay secrecy regime in which asking 
for other people’s earnings is considered as socially inappropriate, the comparison among 




and Mahoney and Weitzel (1978) find that workers generally make incorrect estimations of 
their peers’ pay level, thinking that others must have been paid more than themselves. 
Greater pay transparency alleviates workers’ sense of uncertainty of whether their pay level 
sounds right (Smit and Montag-Smit, 2018a). 
 
Second, workers could have a more comprehensive understanding of the degree to which 
they are treated justly and fairly in the organisation. Prior research has examined the 
relationship between pay understanding and the perception of organisational justice and 
fairness (Day, 2011; Hartmann and Slapničar, 2012). There are different dimensions of justice 
that workers may care about. For instance, some research focuses on the distributive and 
procedural dimensions of their sense of fairness and justice (e.g. Andersson-StrÅberg et al., 
2007; Cloutier and Vilhuber, 2008; Dulebohn and Martocchio, 1998). Informational justice, 
which focuses on the justification of pay procedures and distributive outcomes, as well as 
interpersonal justice focusing on the conduct of the organisation in treating employees 
(Colquitt, 2001) are also relevant to understanding how pay communication is 
complementary with the sense of organisational justice (Marasi and Bennett, 2016). 
 
The sense of justice is not limited to the workplace level, but can also apply to the wider 
societal level. The availability of pay information results in the exposition of pay gaps, which 
individuals who are conventionally more disadvantaged in pay tend to benefit from. Edwards 
(2005) identifies the idea that the degree of pay transparency not only provides benefits to 
individual workers’ well-being but also results in societal welfare. In recent years, statistical 
analyses of company- and regional-level wage data illustrates the effect of pay transparency 
in reducing pay differences between top and low earners. For example, Mas (2017) shows 
that pay levels at the top of the city-level pay distribution tend to be lower in localities with 
mandatory pay transparency measures than in those without. The analysis by Castilla (2015) 
on company-level pay data before and after the introduction of transparency measures 
further shows the narrowing down of racial and gender pay gaps. Kim (2015) also proves that 
the elimination of pay secrecy is beneficial to individuals who are often more vulnerable to 





Other academics have also proposed that pay transparency is beneficial for eliminating 
discrimination at work (Ramachandran, 2012; Canales, 2018). As employers utilise 
opportunities created by pay secrecy to cover up and rectify mistakes without provoking 
workers’ reactions, individual workers often fail to challenge workplace injustice created by 
inequitable pay with proof of discrimination, since pay information is not transparent to 
them (Ramachandran, 2012). By disclosing more meaningful pay information, employees 
become more informed of labour market conditions, which helps alleviate discrimination, 
favouritism and pay discrepancies (Estlund, 2014).  
 
Workers’ appreciation of pay transparency has been examined in studies on employee 
preferences on how far pay transparency should go in an organisation (Smit and Montag-
Smit, 2018b). The study by Schuster and Colletti (1973) found that personal characteristics, 
such as prior work experiences, do not play a significant role in determining whether 
employees like to have their pay information disclosed. However, Scott et al. (2015) provide 
a more comprehensive perspective on how employees’ preferences are nowadays. 
According to their survey on postgraduate students of eight different nationalities, younger 
respondents with lower earnings favour more pay transparency than their older and higher-
earning counterparts. It has also been found that German respondents prefer pay 
transparency more strongly than individuals of other nationalities, including Australian, 
British, American, Canadian, Polish, Spanish and Chinese (Scott et al., 2015). In any case, pay 
information is considered to be more transparent and accessible nowadays due to the rise 
of technology and online platforms, which are distant from the employers’ jurisdiction and 
which supply information that was previously not open to workers or was limited to a 
selected group of individuals. This brings greater concerns for employers to execute pay 
secrecy policies than before (Ledford, 2014). In other words, employers no longer retain the 
absolute upper hand of controlling the circulation of pay information, since workers who are 
inclined to share pay information and show preferences or even demands towards pay 








2.4. Limitations of the current literature on the accumulation of pay knowledge  
 
The pay communication literature is not without flaws. As outlined below, the scope of 
research is limited; Colella et al. (2007) identify the fact that most research so far limits the 
dimension of pay disclosure to the pay level, while there are other dimensions, such as pay 
structure, and the rationale behind pay system designs to be taken into consideration. A 
decade later, Rosenfeld (2017) highlights that the claim of lack of research in this area is still 
valid. Marasi and Bennett (2016:56) also pinpoint the lack of understanding on ‘the specifics 
of pay information being communicated’, including the channel used, the subject of 
communication and the communication arena. However, the shortcomings are not only 
given by the scope of research, as there are also methodological and theoretical issues. 
When it comes to deepening the understanding of how workers accumulate pay knowledge 
at work, simply identifying ‘good’ or ‘bad’ practices in pay communication is far from 
sufficient. It is true that there may be times when employers are willing to release pay 
information which seems to be for the workers’ good, but at the end of the day, 
organisational efficiency remains their main concern. Therefore, in the following section, I 
will illustrate limitations that the research field currently faces in terms of empirical, 
methodological and theoretical dimensions. 
 
From an empirical perspective, there is a lack of understanding of pay communication 
practices in a global context. It is true that the body of literature on pay communication 
practices has been growing in recent years. In the US where pay secrecy is considered a 
practice by default and employers are exposed to substantial needs to evaluate their own 
pay communication strategies due to new legal regulations in the recent decade, researchers 
are particularly keen to examine the practical implications of different pay communication 
strategies (e.g. Marasi et al., 2018; Mas, 2017; Rosenfeld, 2017; Smit and Montag-Smit, 
2018b). However, the issue is left largely unexplored in other country settings in which social 
norms on pay discussion are more lenient, or where are other actors are involved in the 
employment relationship (such as trade unions and employers’ associations) with regard to 
the negotiating the access of pay information. It is also evident that concerns over how pay 
information should be communicated or disclosed are not exclusive to American employers. 




inappropriate as in the US, what drives employers to deter employees from talking about 
pay?  
 
The literature also leaves the degree to which workers, who actually work for and receive 
the pay, hold the pay information of their own unchallenged. The research on intra-
organisational pay transparency hitherto has taken the assumption that employees have full 
knowledge on their own pay for granted (Estlund, 2014). The talking point is largely on how 
they are bound by rules to share or keep something they own, and how extra knowledge 
about the others would change their perception on their current understanding. In other 
words, it emphasises the relational dimension of pay, meaning that the effect of pay 
transparency or secrecy occurs only when opportunities to compare pay among workers or 
organisations come up. Nevertheless, little is conveyed about the process in which workers 
are informed of their own pay, not only in terms of the amount but also how the amount 
emerges. 
 
From a methodological perspective, empirical studies regarding pay communication 
practices are restrained by the choice of research methods, which prevents researchers from 
looking at the formation of pay communication practices and workers’ preferences at the 
workplace level and in the organisational context (Burns, 2000). Researchers are more 
inclined to a positivist enquiry and emphasise survey and experiment as research methods 
(e.g. Bamberger and Belogolovsky, 2017; Işgın and Sopher, 2015; Marasi et al., 2018; 
Nosenzo, 2013). In surveys, key variables are measured in a self-reporting manner, which 
means that participants are required to assess their own understanding on the pay system 
and the degree of transparency of pay in their company in a quantitative nature (e.g. Lee et 
al., 1999; Scott, 2018). This makes learning about the full picture of what has exactly been 
communicated to workers, what workers have understood about the pay system, as well as 
conflicting perspectives between them and the management difficult.  
 
Experiments also fail to capture workplace dynamics involved in pay communication. Among 
recent studies on pay transparency using experiments to collect data (e.g. Bamberger and 
Belogolovsky, 2010; Belogolovsky and Bamberger, 2014; Greiner et al., 2011; Nosenzo, 




required to be in an employment relationship to participate in the experiment. This choice 
of research method takes workers as individuals independent of organisational and social 
contexts, assuming that they can make decisions according to given imaginary 
circumstances. By recruiting non-workers as participants, experiments also fail to capture 
the reasoning behind the decisions made under power relations embedded in a workplace, 
and also the personal circumstances of workers which in turn shape their preferences and 
their degree of acceptance of a pay system. 
 
The methodological decisions of a majority of existing studies underpins a unitarist 
perspective of employment relations, which assumes that employers and workers have 
shared interests in an employment relationship (Edwards, 2003). According to these 
scholars, the rationale of studying pay transparency is to see how a purposeful control over 
the circulation of pay information can be helpful for employers to manage the organisation. 
Assuming that both employers and workers benefit from an efficient organisation and a well-
managed employment relationship, conflict is regarded as pathological (Crouch, 1982) and 
needs to be eliminated with deliberation. That is why the research direction of pay 
communication lies largely on how it contributes to achieving organisational goals, such as 
increasing the job and pay satisfaction of workers for the sake of retention and motivation; 
as well as avoiding conflicts arising from pay comparison, be it conflicts among workers or 
conflicts directed at the management.  
 
It is not my intention to challenge the validity of this line of research on pay transparency 
here. Nevertheless, embracing alternative frames of reference for employment relations can 
enable us to uncover other dimensions of pay communication or pay understanding to be 
further studied. No matter whether it be in a pluralist or radical frame of reference, conflicts 
resulting from the availability of pay information, or pay in general, are inevitable (Edwards, 
2003). Instead of a pathology, pluralist and radical frames of reference consider conflicts as 
the result of intrinsic contradiction or antagonism between employers and workers (Edwards, 
2003). In this regard, the study of pay knowledge accumulation should not be confined to its 
utilitarian functions and effects, but should look more towards its process of emergence and 
the power dynamics underpinning in the process. It is not merely a solution to organisational 
conflicts, but a point of contention in its own right. By recognising knowledge as a source of 




pay information available to them to pursue their respective interests, and more importantly, 
how the contestation of pay knowledge actually empowers them in an employment 
relationship. 
 
Therefore, there needs to be a better understanding of how pay communication practices 
are implemented in the workplace where social dynamics are embedded. This includes the 
administration of pay, its communication process and the mechanisms behind workers’ 
formation of knowledge regarding the pay system. 
 
2.5. Understanding the pay system in the labour process 
 
Before going into the details of how the accumulation of pay knowledge or pay 
understanding can be studied, the nature of the availability of information in a workplace 
should be discussed. The availability of information can be spread along the spectrum of 
transparency and secrecy. Absolute transparency, referring to the complete availability of 
information, indicates a complete control over the means of production from both workers 
and employers, which is indeed incompatible with the capitalist mode of production. In a 
capitalist production system, employers dominate the control over means of production and 
information related to the exploitation of surplus value. That means that for workers, 
information related to the remuneration of their labour is exposed to them without any 
struggle only when employers find it to be harmless. Under this circumstance, the study of 
the scope of available knowledge should also be complemented by the study of the scope of 
unavailable knowledge, that is the scope of ignorance or non-knowledge (Gross, 2007) as an 
antithesis. 
 
The development of ignorance or non-knowledge is by no means linear and deterministic. 
Rather than focusing on secrecy as a consequence of certain practices and its actual content, 
Costas and Grey (2014) suggest focusing on the social process in which secrets emerge. This 
is related to the notion that secrecy is ‘constituted through social interactions and, 
specifically, needs to be understood in terms [of] its conditions and consequences for identity 
and control’ (Costas and Grey, 2014:1424). In this sense, secrecy should be understood as an 




through the interaction of formal and informal mechanisms  (Costas and Grey, 2014:1424). 
In the workplace setting, pay information and the knowledge of the pay system hidden from 
workers can be comprehended by different conceptions of non-knowledge according to Beck 
(1996): on the one hand, it can be something that workers proactively refuse to know or do 
not find the need to look into; on the other hand, it can also be something that workers are 
barred from knowing about (Gross, 2007). Gross (2007) further conceptualises that non-
knowledge is built on the basis of ignorance – ignorance acknowledges the boundary of what 
one could know, but non-knowledge frames ‘the unknown so that the unknown can be taken 
into account for future planning’ (Gross, 2007:751). In other words, there is the possibility 
that workers learn about how the pay system works and acquire information on pay in the 
workplace. Throughout the process, they can also get an idea of the scope of pay knowledge 
that they are unaware of and would not be able to find out more about. 
 
How capable are workers of achieving an informed account of pay? The first conception of 
Beck (1996) assumes that workers possess the agency to decide their agenda on pay 
knowledge, such as identifying what information is relevant to them and worth their time 
and effort to conduct further enquiry. However, this may be subject to the antagonistic 
relationship between workers and employers. In order to direct workers away from delving 
into pay, it is possible that employers would encourage the emergence of employee silence 
regarding pay-related issues. Donaghey et al. (2011) challenge the notion that workers 
choose to remain silent on certain issues in the workplace by identifying the mechanism 
through which employers block the channel to voice, so that workers do not raise the issues 
at all. With managerial control being dominant in the contested terrain over pay, silence over 
pay is henceforth penetrated among the workforce. Hence, silence is an outcome of 
managerial deliberation, rather than an active choice of workers. Following this logic, the 
phenomenon according to which certain types of pay information are not circulated, 
discussed, or highlighted as relevant or valuable ‘knowledge’ that workers should be aware 
of could also be an outcome of managerial control rather than a contingency. 
 
In this regard, a labour process approach can provide some insights on how managerial 
control in the workplace leads to the formulation of pay knowledge, as well as non-
knowledge, and subsequently the ways in which how workers understand and legitimise the 




accumulation through the extraction of surplus value, focuses on the capital-labour relations 
within companies to examine the nature of managerial control, the alignment of the 
interests of capital and labour, and the resistance from labour in response to managerial 
strategies (Thompson and van den Broek, 2010). The labour process, abstractly defined by 
Burawoy (1985) as the social relations into which humans enter as they transform raw 
materials into useful products with instruments of production, is about the organisation of 
work, in which ‘a frontier of control is created and sustained’ (Edwards, 2010:33). It is 
because the prime aim of capitalists, who avoid paying for all the labour power, in obscuring 
the extraction of surplus value during production (Marx, 1990) is ultimately incompatible 
with the notion of labour as a peculiar factor of production with its own free will (Rubery, 
1997). Workers’ responses triggered by managerial practices to maintain control over them 
can be categorised along a spectrum of acceptance, from resistance at one end and consent 
at the other, intermediated by accommodation and compliance (Thompson and Vincent, 
2010). The degree to which certain types of reactions are dominant depends on the principal 
form of subordination underpinning in the production regime. Burawoy (1985) categorises 
production regimes into despotic regimes, in which the relations in production are 
characterised by coercive control; and hegemonic ones, in which the consent of workers is 
also cultivated, so that the interests of capitalists are recognised and internalised by workers, 
while resistance also exists but can be absorbed by the management (Burawoy, 1979). 
Labour process research strives to investigate the formation of different types of control 
regimes, in which the nature of managerial control, consent and resistance, as well as the 
conditions under which these would occur are covered (Burawoy, 1985; Nichols et al., 2004; 
Thompson and van den Broek, 2010). Practices of managerial control are identified and 
situated in the wider structure of ever-changing occupational structures and work relations 
(Frenkel et al., 1995). 
 
The documentation of labour processes in previous studies on workplace studies through 
the lens of the control, consent and resistance imperatives of labour process analysis 
(Thompson and Smith, 2010) sheds light on how a pay system used in a production regime 
is consolidated or challenged throughout the time when workers are at work. For example, 
the account of Burawoy’s work experience in Hungary, which was drastically different from 
the norm in his home country, demonstrates the acquisition and accumulation of the 
knowledge of pay system by learning from trial and error (Burawoy and Lukács, 1992). 




he only learnt about how exactly his earnings would be affected on the job. Only by observing 
the social dynamics on the shop floor and positioning himself in the context, did the rationale 
behind the pay system and how it motivated workers at different times become more 
apparent. 
 
The three mechanisms suggested by Burawoy (1979), namely game-playing, internal labour 
market and internal state which help create workers’ consent and obscure the extraction of 
surplus value in the labour process, are useful to illustrate the drivers behind workers’ 
understanding and legitimisation of pay system. Apparently these mechanisms do not mean 
to obscure the pay system itself. Instead, they actually expose workers to the practicalities 
of the pay system in order to persuade them that they are in the same boat as management 
striving for organisational survival and profitability. They also embody management’s 
attempts to maintain control over workers by keeping them in the ‘fragmenting and 
individuating life on the factory floor’ (Burawoy, 1985:33). 
 
Game playing, the first mechanism, refers to the process in which workers are persuaded 
into the delivery of labour and are materially compensated in a pre-set manner throughout 
the labour process. By being driven into so-called games of production, which reproduces 
‘not only voluntary servitude but also greater material wealth’ (Burawoy, 1979:81), workers 
accumulate knowledge of the reward system and evaluate it with individual and collective 
rationalities. Gradually, an impression of the extent to which following the rules is in the 
workers’ favour, as well as how workers can manipulate the pay system so that it works in 
favour of their interests, emerges throughout the labour process. Workers may not be part 
of the mechanism by which the rules of a game are established, but they are presented with 
a limited variety of outcomes deriving from different strategies, and then encouraged to 
‘rationally’ pursue an outcome in order to achieve relative satisfaction. What becomes more 
and more important is the prospect of discovering and making the most from the loopholes 
of the pay system under management’s tacit approval (Brown, 1973; Burawoy, 1979). 
Breaking the limits of the reward system to maximise their own earnings while ensuring that 
a game is sustainable (i.e. the company keeps profiting) makes exploitation more tolerable, 
not to mention that it also gives workers a sense of escapism from their routines, as well as 
of self-determination (Burawoy, 1979). Under this circumstance, knowing about the rules, 




of the rules can better equip workers for the so-called games, even though whether their 
participation in the games would empower them or put them into further exploitation is not 
guaranteed. 
 
Being exposed to the opportunity to learn about and contemplate the pay system is one 
thing, but finding the space to challenge it is another. This takes us to the second mechanism 
of the internal labour market which sets up the boundaries to enter the production game. 
As defined by Doeringer and Piore (1971), an internal labour market consists of ‘a set of 
administrative rules and procedures’, which manifest the rights and privileges exclusive to 
the labour force of an administrative unit. One function of an internal labour market which 
is directly related to pay is given by the creation of an internal wage structure, which 
delineates both inter-company and intra-company pay differentials, so that individuals 
holding different positions and ranks can be differentiated (Doeringer and Piore, 1971).  
 
A stable internal pay structure is an important tool for companies to motivate workers, since 
it serves as a parameter of career prospects for workers in a permanent employment 
relationship, and allows workers to envision the potential increase in pay that they can 
achieve in relation to the advancement of skills, productivity and performance. What is more 
important to Burawoy (1979) is that the establishment of an internal labour market sets 
more limits and higher costs for mobility, as well as consolidating the ideology of competition 
within the workforce and the alignment of capital-labour interests. In line with this notion, 
to what extent workers would be aware of the impact of different dimensions of the pay 
system on them is subject to the rules imposed on them by the institution of the internal 
labour market in the employment relationship. 
 
The third mechanism is given by an internal state which engages workers with a framework 
of practices within the production system or organisational structure for disputes to be 
resolved, or for the taming of disputes related to the pay system. The internal state 
mechanism is realised primarily by means by collective bargaining systems, which establish 
a ‘social contract’ defining the rules and obligations of capital and labour, as well as 
guaranteeing ‘industrial justice’ to ‘reconstituting conflict in a framework of negotiation’ 




competition and grow, the discrepancy in conflicting interests between capital and labour 
should eventually converge by means by arbitration and negotiation (Burawoy, 1979).  
 
In a collective bargaining system, workers as a collective entity, such as a trade unions, 
participate in setting the rules governing their pay, and supervising the implementation of 
these rules. It should be noted that formal collective bargaining structures are multi-layered 
by nature, as cross-country analysis shows that collective bargaining at the regional, sectoral 
and company levels have impacts in varying degrees on the specific pay level that workers 
eventually receive in different country settings (Du Caju et al., 2008). Even so, the existence 
of a collective bargaining system facilitates the understanding of pay systems for unionised 
workers mainly in two ways. On the one hand, the availability or circulation of pay 
information disclosed as required by collective agreements, or under the coordination of 
trade unions, encourages pay comparison among workers, sometimes across companies and 
industries, and also leads to the discovery of problems and grievances (Brown and Sisson, 
1975). On the other hand, a collective bargaining structure enables the cultivation of workers’ 
bargaining awareness or, at the very least, the intention to discuss pay and exchange 
information, for the sake of achieving a common understanding of pay. Collective bargaining 
itself also serves as a formal arena for such articulation.  
 
Therefore, from a labour process perspective, pay transparency actually contributes to the 
intensity of managerial control, since the knowledge of the pay system serves the function 
of attaching workers to the relations of production and aligning their interests with the 
management. Nevertheless, how workers get to know about pay is also an outcome of social 
relations at the workplace, involving the management, workers and unions as the actor of 
workers’ collective representation, rather than a strategy or policy unilaterally determined 
and executed by the management. How workers are exposed to the pay system and survive 
the power struggle in order to achieve agency over pay information on an individual or 
collective basis contributes to the determination of their understanding of the pay system, 







2.6. The diffusion of pay knowledge in social networks 
 
Apart from controlling the nature and scope of pay knowledge that workers possess, 
managerial control may also contribute to the development of social networks in which 
workers are embedded. The analysis of social networks, first advocated by Granovetter 
(1973, 1983), emphasises the importance of the organisation and impact of interpersonal 
relationships at various levels and of different levels of strength for individuals. These 
connections supposedly provide individuals with a sense of trust, obligation to support 
others, availability of someone or some kind of resources to fall back on, as well as reciprocity 
(Burt, 2000) 
 
Social network theorists have distinguished different types of interpersonal ties, namely 
strong ties and weak ties. These ties serve different functions for individuals. Strong ties are 
relations between individuals connected by close friendship, kinship or other types of local 
relations, which constitute high-density networks; while weak ties are those between 
acquaintances, thus constituting low-density networks (Granovetter, 1983). Low-density 
networks consisting of acquaintances give individuals an advantage in collecting information 
about the job market and also about opportunities for job and social mobility (Granovetter, 
1973). Weak ties are also considered to be critical gateways to other high-density networks 
(Granovetter, 1983). When market information is not transparent to workers, the network 
of social relations in which individuals are situated provides them with access or even 
represents a substitution to the best information available (Burt, 2000), such as private 
information or easy access to bureaucratic procedures (Chen, 2011). High-density networks 
are more useful for individuals who are economically insecure and lack access to social 
services, as these networks are readily available and robust (Ericksen and Yancey 1980). 
However, it is also argued that poor and insecure people, who are already inclined to rely 
more on strong ties than on weak ties, would be confined to their own cohesive communities 
where poverty self-perpetuates (Granovetter, 1983). 
 
In the Chinese context, the studies of guanxi highlight the importance of social networks in 
economic and social life. Guanxi is defined as ‘a dyadic, particular and sentimental tie that 
has potential of facilitating favour exchanges between the parties connected by the tie’ 
(Bian, 2011:312). Recognising the nature of guanxi as a source of local knowledge (Bian, 




(Bozionelos and Wang, 2007), research has been conducted on guanxi and its practices in 
China extensively. To what extent guanxi and its practices are intrinsic to the cultural context 
or are products of local institutions is debatable (Nolan, 2011), but what is clear is that the 
mobilisation of guanxi affects the decision making of both entrepreneurs and workers in 
China in the areas of migration, career mobility, organisational commitment and knowledge 
diffusion (e.g. Hu, 2008; Zhai et al., 2013; Davison et al., 2018).  
 
How pay knowledge is accumulated and diffused within social networks is yet to be 
examined, but it is reasonable to consider social networks or the ‘work milieu’ (Mrozowicki, 
2011:147), in which workers are embedded within and beyond the workplace, as a source of 
pay knowledge. Apart from pre-existing social networks that workers have due to both 
kinship (Fei, 1992) and non-kinship (Liang, 1986; Lin, 2001), social networks may be formed 
at the workplace level in two ways. The first way is via collective representative bodies 
among workers such as trade unions, in which workers develop internal solidarity (Lee, 2011) 
by mutual association (Fantasia, 1988) and mutual support (Doellgast et al., 2018). The 
involvement in union activities enables workers to establish ties, be it strong or weak ties, 
with the others who are in the same workplace and potentially face similar circumstances. 
When such institutions are absent or workers do not engage in these collective activities, 
interpersonal relationships may also be cultivated on the shop floor on an individual basis 
through communication and collaboration which are formally required by the job and also 
tend to informally emerge (Haythornthwaite and Wellman, 1998). However, as Edwards 
(1990) argues, external social formations may be mediated under the relative autonomy of 
the labour process, in which they are shaped by the capital-labour relations. Managerial 
control may play a role in these processes to intervene with both the orientation of social 
networks and the strength of the ties workers manage to establish in the workplace. 
 
2.7. The study of managerial control on pay transparency in a wider social context 
 
The labour process does not simply take shape within the remit of a workplace. Rather, it 
perpetually develops under the influence of the wider social context where it is situated. 
Smith and Meiksins (1995) propose to take the effects of system, society and dominant 
economies into consideration while studying organisational practices and the formation of 
capital-labour relations. Under the system, society and dominance effects framework, 




resistance at the workplace; but at the same time they fall under the influence of the political 
economic system and country-specific institutional settings (Elger and Smith, 2005). The 
distinctive features of the state and society accommodating a certain set of ‘standard’ 
practices may result in the practices taking different shapes locally, due to the different 
context in which specific issues are dealt with and the social dynamics which employers and 
workers are exposed to (Smith and Meiksins, 1995). As further elaborated by Russell et al. 
(2017:430), ‘forces and relations of production, including labour processes, are embedded in 
concrete social formations with their own unique histories, institutional rules and norms and 
cultures’. 
 
It should also be recognised that the state serves as a major driving force behind the system 
effects. Clarke (1991:2) argues that the state plays a key role in setting the scene for social 
and political struggle, since the latter is, on the one hand, subject to the ‘will and 
determination of the forces in play’; and on the other hand, ‘circumscribed by the economic, 
political and ideological framework within which they were fought out’. In the case of the 
accumulation of pay knowledge as a contested arena in the workplace, the shape of the 
antagonism between workers and employers is determined by the resources that they can 
mobilise at the workplace level. However, the formation of these resources and the 
corresponding practices are also intertwined with other social relations at the local and 
national state levels which may feed into the (dis)empowerment of workers and their 
organisations (Thompson, 1990). This results in the consequence that the possession of 
resources does not only originate from one’s position on the shop floor, but also from the 
underlying processes in which they transform labour power into labour and undergo the 
reproduction of labour power.  
 
Therefore, in order to take the interactions between individuals, institutions and state into 
account, ideally the analysis should also include different levels of social relations evolving 
around a workplace-based labour process. Studying Chinese workplaces enables us to take 
closer scrutiny of the influence of the state on the labour process, since state intervention in 
the formation of labour processes remains strong in China in comparison to other country 
settings. As observed by Thompson (2003), the state has seemingly conceded from the 
formation of a production regime in neoliberal economies in recent years, in face of the 




and bureaucratic controls to cultural coordination, internalized commitment and self-
discipline among employees’ (Thompson, 2003:359). However, in post-socialist China, the 
state is still a crucial actor and not a marginalized one (Smith and Liu, 2016). The complex 
interplay between state, capital and labour in China may shed light on new shop floor 
dynamics where ‘cost-cutting measures associated with lean production proliferate’ in the 
globalized economy (Zhang, 2015a:167). 
 
The changing role of the state in shaping the labour process in China can be observed in the 
evolution of the Chinese industrial relations system. During the socialist era, regional, 
sectoral, and company-level work systems were stipulated by the state under the planned 
economy. Remuneration and non-wage social welfare were centrally coordinated for most 
urban workers, who were employed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and work units. Pay 
levels and differentials were centrally determined by the state based on the principle of 
‘distribution to each according to one’s work’ (Takahara, 1992:2). 
 
The rapid development of China since the economic reform in 1978 has had strong 
implications on changes to industrial relations in China. Over the past decades, industrial 
relations have also undergone marketisation in different stages, in which the state’s 
influence is observed in selective dimensions. On the one hand, the state gradually 
withdraws from plant-level managerial decisions. Under market reform, pay in the non-
public sector has been formally detached from state control. On the other hand, the state 
remains influential in coordinating employment relations, regardless of fluctuating intensity 
over the years. What is also important here is that the state mobilises the resources of 
human labour and shapes the labour market. The notion of unfinished proletarianisation 
(Pun and Lu, 2010) reflects how the state mobilises migrant labour for industrial 
development in urban areas while restraining the provision of social welfare and security by 
means of the household registration system (hukou). 
 
The outcome of the state’s efforts in shaping the labour market results in specific features 
labour relations at the workplace level. For instance, the dormitory labour regime is 
identified as an arena where managerial control and labour resistance intersect in Chinese 




control over the physical and social space for labour reproduction (Harvey, 2001), to prevent 
migrant workers’ interacting with local cultures and practices (Kim, 2016); on the other hand, 
it also nurtures a certain resistance potential deriving from shared living experiences and the 
congregation of individuals with similar backgrounds (Smith and Pun, 2006). Siu (2015) 
observes that migrant workers are in the process of moving away from a coercive dormitory 
labour regime as they increasingly take the opportunity to live outside of factories and 
benefit from the social support and security net provided by localistic networks. This fits with 
the notion that the labour regime in China is ‘contested’ (Chan, 2010) and not simply coercive 
or hegemonic. 
 
Regardless of the strong presence of the state, its relationship with capital and labour 
remains of dynamic nature. Witt & Redding (2014) argue that the lack of an effective 
independent representation of labour interests due to the state’s control over worker 
representation and the vested business interests of state officials differentiates China from 
its northern European and Anglo-Saxon counterparts, regardless of their convergence in 
employment protection de jure. In the past decades, scholarship on Chinese industrial 
relations has paid significant attention to the state-sponsored ACFTU. As the only recognised 
trade union in China, it is not much different from its former Soviet counterparts in terms of 
being a ‘transmission belt’ of the state (Chen, 2003). Workers’ trust towards the trade unions 
remains low, since it is believed that the unions are just there to facilitate state and 
managerial agendas, which do not necessarily echo workers’ interests (Taylor and Li, 2007). 
Lee et al. (2011) document the existence of a tripartite framework involving the state, 
employers and trade union, but this has been hardly effective due to the hostile attitude of 
employers. This has changed recently when some employers finally realised that collective 
bargaining might be helpful in achieving industrial order (Wen, 2017). Regardless of the lack 
of formal representation, there are sporadic incidents in which workers could bargain with 
the management under state support. It has been observed that the Chinese state 
demonstrates a tendency to switch from coordinating employment relations in 
individualistic labour contract systems, to introducing more legal regulations and gradually 
incorporating worker representation into the collective bargaining framework (Chang and 
Brown, 2017). In some cases of state-led wage collective negotiation initiatives, collective 
bargaining is also sporadically conducted at different levels in a fragmented manner (Lee et 
al., 2011). The ACFTU is found to be an agent of the state pressurising employers in improving 




extent this is a prevalent phenomenon remains unknown. In face of workers’ resistance, 
other scholars, such as Chan and Hui (2012), downplay the leading role of the state by 
emphasising the active involvement of rank-and-file workers along with the management 
and trade union officials (at both provincial- and plant- levels in wage bargaining processes). 
Company-level pay systems – including pay components, pay rates, fringe benefits etc. – 
have also become the primary target of workers’ interests in pay-related contentions on the 
shop floor. Given the agency of workers as demonstrated by their collective action, the 
proactive role that the state takes to shape collective negotiation mechanisms and its 
capacity in intervening into the formation of workplace dynamics should also be considered. 
 
It is true that the nature of labour regimes in China remains dynamic. The fact that Burawoy 
(1979)’s work was inspired by fieldwork in the 1970s in a unionised workplace in the US may 
also have caused disputes on the extent to which his analysis is sufficient in revealing the 
control imperative of management (Littler, 1990; Thompson and van den Broek, 2010). 
However, the mechanisms of manufacturing consent in the workplace may still be relevant 
to how workers understand pay, or at least a certain version of pay in the management-
labour antagonism in Chinese factories nowadays due to the following reasons. First, the 
diversifying nature of capital ownership among Chinese employers may indicate some signs 
of shifting from despotic to hegemonic labour regimes. Second, collective bargaining as a 
form of internal state may have declined in Western economics, but a sign of growth in this 
sense is still observed in China. Assuming that the same institution may have arisen in a 
different background, whether and how it has a role in shaping workers’ understanding of 
pay and their aligned interests with the management should be further explored. Third, the 
formation of an internal labour market and internal state in Burawoy’s analysis is largely 
within the realm of the workplace, but it should not be taken for granted. The Chinese 
context can be complementary to the examination of the extent to which these external 
factors (i.e. state and society) play an enabling role in these mechanisms. 
 
The study of pay transparency can also benefit from the Chinese context which is 
conventionally more collective-oriented, and where privacy is taken less seriously. Some 
recent cases of dismissal due to unauthorised circulation of pay information in China provide 
us with a glimpse of how pay transparency has emerged as an issue in China, which is 




In the first case in 2014, a worker of an engineering company in Suzhou was accused by the 
company of ‘leaking pay information and enquiring about the pay of other colleagues’; he 
was then dismissed for ‘breaking company-level regulations, thus bringing serious 
consequences to the company and the workforce’ (Cheng, 2014). In the same year, a worker 
of another company was also dismissed because she had her payslip posted online. 
According to the company, the worker ‘has broken the non-disclosure agreement with the 
company’, which she signed when she was recruited (Deng, 2018). In both cases, workers 
took legal action against their employer and received financial compensation for ‘unlawful 
termination of the labour contract’, but the legality of restricting the circulation of pay 
information was left unchallenged by the courts. These cases show that the intention of 
Chinese employers to limit pay information within a controllable scope, and that the drivers 
behind the phenomenon should be further explored. 
 
2.8. Research questions 
 
As illustrated in previous sections, a labour process approach to the research on pay 
understanding at work represents a useful lens to understand the dynamics of Chinese 
industrial relations. In this regard, this research primarily seeks to understand how workers 
develop their understanding of pay in the context of Chinese workplaces. Recognising that a 
workplace is an arena of contestation of power relations between management and workers, 
the influence of actors external to the workplace, namely the social context in which the 
state plays a significant role in facilitating the formation of the labour market, should also be 
considered in the Chinese context. Therefore, the central research question is as follow: how 
do the management-labour relations in China contribute to the shaping of workers’ 
understanding of pay? 
 
Subsequently, this central research question will be guided by the following sub-questions. 
The first concerns the emergence of pay knowledge throughout an employment relationship. 
Considering that this is a process which evolves over time, how does pay knowledge build up 
in different stages of the employment relationship for workers? What is the process of 
navigating the pay system like? Second, to what extent the power dynamics between 




the workplace? Third, how are workers affected by the way in which pay knowledge is 
accumulated according to the pathways identified? I will look at the consequences of 
managerial control over pay understanding, in terms of workers’ organisational commitment 
and employee retention. Fourth, how do industrial development and the labour market 
surrounding the workplace provide resources for workers to make sense of or challenge their 
understanding of the pay system? Under the opportunities and constraints created by the 
industrial environment and labour market, workers position themselves and evaluate their 
strength of power in an employment relationship accordingly. Therefore, I will look at the 
circumstances under which workers managed to contest the governance of the pay system 




This chapter reviewed the existing literature regarding the understanding of pay at the 
workplace level. It first showed that economic approaches alone are insufficient in explaining 
the drivers behind the pay setting at the workplace level. To understand better the 
respective leverage of employers and workers in pay setting, the social relations embedded 
in the workplace which enable both sides to possess pay knowledge as a source of power 
should also be looked at. The existing literature on pay communication provided a bleak and 
linear picture of how workers receive pay information reactively and accumulate knowledge 
up to the upper hand of the management, neglecting the power struggle behind the scene. 
Therefore, I argue that a labour process approach is beneficial to revealing the circulation of 
pay information as an outcome of the power dynamics on the shop floor. 
 
The emergence of China as a research site enables the re-examination of the notions 
proposed in a labour process approach to pay understanding. Rather than taking the 
existing literature on the accumulation of pay knowledge for granted, I argue that the 
dynamic nature of labour regimes open new grounds for looking at the form and role of 
managerial control in exposing workers to knowledge regarding the pay system, as well as 
the drivers behind managerial control strategies. In the rest of the thesis, these notions will 
be examined by an empirical study of Chinese workplaces. The next chapter will lay out the 









As illustrated in the previous chapter, in order to examine how workers’ understanding of 
pay is shaped on the shop floor it is necessary to look into the labour process of individual 
workplaces. It is also important to take the context in which workplaces are situated into 
consideration. To achieve this aim, the following research design has thus enabled me to 
collect data at different levels, including the shop floor, organisational, industrial and local 
levels. 
 
This chapter consists of four sections. First, I will justify the research design by elaborating 
on the critical realist stance that I take. Second, I will explain the research strategy and the 
reasoning behind the choice of data collection methods, which include interviews, 
participant observations and document research. Third, I will provide a detailed account of 
how the data was collected at different stages of the fieldwork. I will also reflect on the 
shortcomings of the data, which was collected in a contingent manner, and explain the 
measures that I adopted to mitigate the weaknesses. The last section will be dedicated to 
my approach to handle and analyse the research data. 
 
3.2. Epistemological stance: a critical realist approach 
 
In this research, I adopt a broadly critical realist approach to study the conception and 
implementation of pay systems at the factory level, which is in line with the methodological 
approach adopted by a sizeable body of industrial relations literature. Edwards (2006) 
recognises that the tradition of industrial relations to draw from history and context, as well 
as unveiling the social dynamics behind the establishment of workplace institutions 
governing an employment relationship makes the discipline compatible with critical realism. 
This is especially true for those industrial relations researchers who aim to achieve policy 




2015:287). Their effort to engage all parties involved in an employment relationship, critically 
assess and expose the depth of interests of different parties and strive for policy solutions 
through research (Edwards, 2015) indeed reflects how critical realists look at the production 
of knowledge in general. 
 
Critical realism considers the world as an objective existence, but as filled with subjective 
interpretations which shapes how the objective world is understood and experienced 
(O’Mahoney and Vincent, 2014). How humans perceive the objective world as a structure 
affects their choice of action, and the process of conditioning is fluid, following temporal and 
geographical changes and is hardly predictable (Danermark et al., 2001; O’Mahoney and 
Vincent, 2014; Decoteau, 2017). It is often posed as a rival of positivism, as well as social 
constructionism to a lesser degree (Danemark, 1997; Al-Amoudi and Willmott, 2011). 
Positivism reduces the functioning of the social world into a universal law-like, predictable 
and controllable laboratory based on theory-neutral observation of events (Sayer, 2004), 
while social constructionism takes the study of discourses into priority (Kitsuse and Spector, 
2000) although there are later efforts which take the social context into the consideration of 
the claims made (Thibodeaux, 2014). In response to the two epistemological stances, critical 
realists regard knowledge as produced in an ‘open’ social system (O’Mahoney and Vincent, 
2014). This view also poses itself against belittling the validity of non-observable events 
(Ackroyd, 2004). By specifying the conditions or factors under which certain actions take 
place, as well as how the causal powers between events emerge and interact, a critical realist 
approach seeks for an explanation of how human actions are generated under certain 
structures in an open manner (O’Mahoney and Vincent, 2014). To achieve this, a flexible use 
of multiple research methods is allowed for the sake of triangulation. By gathering 
information from different sources, the richness of a social phenomenon can be uncovered 
(Ackroyd and Karlsson, 2014; Edwards et al., 2014). In this way, the power relations 
supporting the emergence and sustainment of actions and discourses against the context 
within which they are situated could be unfolded and articulated. More importantly, this 
perspective enables researchers to expose the emancipatory potentials of the knowledge 
produced (Bhaskar, 1986).  
 
This research focuses on managerial control, but it also takes a worker-centred perspective, 




break through the control are the ultimate concern of this study. Therefore, why workers 
take certain decisions and deliver specific actions in a particular environment could be better 
understood only when taking their ‘structurally and culturally underprivileged positions’ in 
the social system into consideration (Mrozowicki, 2011:58). 
 
3.3. Research strategy and data collection methods 
 
This research aims at exploring the shaping of workers’ understanding of pay in the 
management-labour relations, involving a ‘how’ question and the process of the circulation 
of pay information and of the articulation of pay demand. In order to trace the operational 
links between events, rather than merely how frequently an incident occurs (Yin, 2003), a 
qualitative case study has been considered as an appropriate research strategy. In this way, 
the dynamics between the management and workers can be unpacked (Elger and Smith, 
2005), and how the production regime in the workplace exactly affects workers’ 
understanding of and behaviour related to pay can be unveiled. 
 
Eisenhardt (1989:534) defines case study as a strategy focusing on the ‘understanding the 
dynamics present within single settings.’ Apart from collecting information of a social 
phenomenon in the remit of where it takes place, the case study method also allows for 
multiple levels of analysis (Yin, 2003), which enables the examination of the collected data 
in a wider context (Kitay and Callus, 1998), and the underlying causal mechanisms which 
explain the processes or outcomes of the events (Kessler and Bach, 2014). For this particular 
research question, the setting of individual workplaces as the unit of analysis of the case 
study research allows for the study of not only the process of which pay knowledge 
formulates on the shop floor, but also how the process is affected by the societal context 
which is shaped by actors outside the workplace, such as the governments of different levels. 
 
Recognising these benefits, the adoption of the case study method as a research strategy for 
this study implied the selection of cases as a first step of the research. Case selection involved 
multiple phases. Firstly, I identified Town S as a site where I could station and further filter 
workplaces for in-depth research. As will be explained in later sections of this chapter, the 




auto parts workers took place in 2010 and made the town nationally known, was primarily 
driven by the failure to secure access in other areas and by pure luck. The decision of studying 
factories in Town S was considered as a passive selection process as I did not reject the 
opportunity when it was offered, but the town itself did manifest the potential to be an 
appropriate site for studying workers’ pay understanding in the following ways. First, the 
industrial development and urbanisation which had taken place in Town S facilitated the 
emergence of an automobile supply chain, leading to significant opportunities to study a 
variety of workplaces and the inflow of internal migrant labour. Second, the town hosts 
companies of different capital sources, including both foreign and domestic capital. The 
variation of capital influence on company-level practices implies the existence of different 
managerial strategies leading to the shaping of different labour processes across factories. 
Third, its history of labour conflicts at the factory level also demonstrates the potential of 
studying the extent to which institutional memory derived from previous incidents affects 
workers’ contention and responses from factory management, local governments and 
ACFTU branches. More specifically, the strike in 2010 broke out from the onset due to low 
pay and subsequently led to workers’ demand in company-level union re-election. It was 
later observed that managerial and state responses to workers’ collective action included 
pay rise and the introduction of collective wage negotiation in the province, involving a 
number of auto parts factories. Provincial regulations were enacted and became a basis for 
later union involvement in collective negotiation procedures. Due to the presence of these 
practices contributing to the shaping of institutional memory (Corbett et al., 2018), I 
envisaged that auto parts workers in Town S would care about pay and would have been 
exposed to the formal channels which were available to contest pay. Being based in Town S 
would allow me to observe whether and how the contention took place. This led to the 
decision of focusing on the auto parts industry as the sector where the workers’ articulation 
of pay demands had previously been observed. Subsequent efforts in focusing exclusively on 
the auto parts sector was also due to the fact that snowballing was the only feasible sampling 
strategy in the field. The preliminary selection of cases was significantly restricted by the 
primary gatekeeper’s network of informants, which were concentrated in one particular 
sector. 
 
After settling down in Town S, more purposeful sampling was conducted to select factories 
for in-depth research. Purposeful sampling is understood as taking a ‘calculated decision to 




space, identity or power) which are worked out in advance of the study’ (Glaser, 1992; cited 
from Goulding, 2002). Researchers narrow down the scope of sampling with a prior 
understanding of the potential samples and the extent to which resourceful and articulate 
informants can be found (Palinkas et al., 2015). Different purposeful sampling strategies 
accommodate needs to emphasise the similarity of the selected cases to a general 
phenomenon as well as their peculiarity (Palinkas et al., 2015). This round of selection of 
auto parts factories led to a comparative case study design, following the principle of 
selection for similarity which strives for convergence by sector (Kessler & Bach, 2014). It is 
true that the factories selected for focused scrutiny in the case study research are largely 
homogenous in terms of sector, year of establishment, geographical location, size, position 
on the supply chain and clientele. However, they are distinctive in their respective capital 
source and relationship with their parent company, resulting in different managerial styles 
and practices in remuneration including pay levels, incentive structures and employee voice 
mechanisms. These differences became the basis to understand the role of shop floor 
dynamics at the factory level, rather than merely the sectoral level. 
 
The decision to prioritise interviews over participant observations as the primary data 
collection method was informed by the peculiar context of China. It is true that ethnography 
is used to collect data in a number of scholarly works on labour process or managerial control 
(e.g. Burawoy, 1979; Delbridge, 1998; Lupton, 1963). By getting into the workplace in person, 
the researchers situated themselves in the mechanisms of control and subordination that 
workers faced on a daily basis. Of course, as long as the researchers fulfilled the recruitment 
criteria of the company examined, they could attempt to gain access to the company by 
applying for a job and work there for an extended period of time. They could also contact 
the management as a researcher or an academic who is interested in the operation of the 
company, so that a position for them could be ‘arranged’ in the company, be it an apprentice, 
an observer, or a regular worker whose research purpose is acknowledged by the 
management. Nevertheless, I was aware that both ways would trigger methodological and 
ethical concerns. For the former, the researcher’s perspective might be constrained by his or 
her own position, such that the whole picture of the company could possibly not be seen. He 
or she might also experience identity and ethical crisis as an ‘undercover’. Establishing 
trustful relationships with subjects, especially workers, might be difficult due to the 
perceived linkage with the management in superiority. Under the management’s shield 




by the researcher. Whichever way would pose challenges to the researcher in different 
degrees, but in-situ adjustment and response would be helpful in striking a balance between 
external constraints and the researcher’ own integrity. 
 
Researching in China, especially on Chinese workers, is always challenging for ‘outsiders’. 
Using primarily participant observations drew two concerns in the planning stage of the 
research. The first is given by time constraints. To be fully immersed in the working 
environment of one factory would easily take months, not to mention multiple factories of 
different nature. Yet, to complete the fieldwork in one year it would be too demanding for a 
PhD-scale project. The second concern was around identity deception. As someone from 
Hong Kong without Chinese citizenship with no particular skill or craft, it would be highly 
unlikely for me to enter a factory in China as a jobseeker or a formal employee without 
looking suspicious.2 Gaining access to the factories would then inevitably be pre-arranged, 
involving communication with the management to create a role for myself in the workplace, 
be it an observer, intern or a temporary helper. Although this research aims to be worker-
centred, perspectives of both management and workers need to be taken into consideration. 
This implies that building trustful relationship with both sides was necessary. In this case 
confusion and doubt from both sides may emerge if I observe occasions when 
representatives from both sides are present.  
 
Therefore, interviews stand out as a more feasible method to collect workers’ accounts on 
work and pay. These unofficial accounts are often under-documented in archives, not to 
mention in a systematic way, such as by factory or by locality. Interviews enable direct 
interactions with the informants to collect verbal data. Rather than merely a method to 
collect interesting facts from informants in a verbal manner, the social interaction that 
 
2 At least until the time before I commenced the fieldwork, it was rare for young people from Hong 
Kong to look for lower-rank employment in the manufacturing sector across the border. This was 
mainly due to the differences in pay level and living standards between Hong Kong and China, the 
incompatibility of the social welfare systems of the two, as well as the complicated procedures for 
Hong Kong citizens to be settled as residents in China. In the industrial zone in Shenzhen where I used 
to work as staff of a labour organisation, factory workers mentioned having people from Hong Kong 
occupying senior managerial roles as expatriates in their factories, but those occupying shop floor 




interview enables also unveils perspectives and attitudes of interviewees (Meardi, 2000). 
From a critical realist perspective, interviews should be undertaken in a ‘theory-driven’ 
manner with a ‘division of expertise’, in which the interviewer asks questions informed by 
theory and obtain resources to validate and refine the theory from interviewees (Pawson, 
1996). As suggested by Smith and Elger (2014), interviews should be complemented by other 
research methods to contextualise what informants have said, meaning that the accounts 
that informants provide should be comprehended under their particular social contexts and 
constraints. Therefore, for the sake of time utilisation, quality of data and adherence to 
ethics requirement of the university, interviews were prioritised, supported by document 
reviews and participant observations on the shop floor once access was granted. In 
accordance with what proposed by Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), potential bias were also 
mitigated by supplementing workers’ interviews with accounts from other organisational 
actors within and beyond the workplaces, such as management, recruitment agencies and 
HR consultants . 
 
3.4. Data Collection 
 
The following sub-sections describe the process of data collection. I will first delineate how I 
happened to come across Town S as the primary research site and the main challenges in 
gaining access. Second, I will explain the procedures of collecting data and the type of data 
which I eventually collected. Third, I will reflect on the shortcomings of the data due to 
precarious circumstances in the field, and elaborate on what I did to mitigate the potential 
hazards.  
 
3.4.1. Gaining access 
 
Given all prior considerations of the choice of research strategy, it should be noted that the 
selection of Town S was more by contingency than by choice. The lengthy process of 
negotiating access with various parties, establishing rapport and trust, as well as conducting 
the interviews and observations (Brown, 2019) was indeed a result of turns, rejections and 
strategic compromises. Especially under an intensifying authoritarian governance in China 




number of obstacles regarding the conduct of fieldwork (Fuchs et al., 2019), and mine was 
no exception. 
 
Fieldwork officially began when I departed for China from the UK in March 2016. Born and 
bred in Hong Kong and with prior working experience in southern China, I was familiar with 
the country context. I decided to focus on Guangdong Province for three reasons. First, given 
that it is located just on the other side of the border from home (Hong Kong), I was well-
informed of the geography of province and was familiar with getting around the area. 
Cantonese, my native language, is spoken in some parts of the Province as a local dialect. 
From a financial perspective, my research budget also did not allow me to be based in 
another province where I had never been and where I would lose access to (non-)material 
support from my family and friends, at least before securing data access. Second, Guangdong 
has a long history of accommodating foreign direct investment for industrial development 
since the market reform in the late 1970s. This is concentrated in electronics and automobile 
(auto parts included) factories, which happens to be the two industries I had targeted from 
the start. It is also home to the most prominent Japanese automobile industrial cluster 
(Sasuga, 2013). Third, Guangdong was a key battleground for emerging collective wage 
bargaining arrangements. Following a wave of pay-related strikes in Japanese auto parts 
factory in 2010, the area had attracted substantial public attention and support. Factory-
level collective wage bargaining had been gradually introduced in the province, especially in 
Guangzhou, the capital city. Collective wage bargaining had become less of a formality, but 
more of a political task for provincial and municipal branches of the ACFTU, as well as for the 
provincial government to take care of. The presence of strikes directly derived from plant-
level collective wage negotiations had also been identified there, although they had largely 
been left unreported in the state-controlled mainstream media. Therefore, the social 
atmosphere in Guangdong looked positive with a view to undertake research on how the 
state-capital-labour dynamics had influenced pay setting at company and industry levels.  
 
For the examination of company-level pay systems, I considered both managerial and worker 
perspectives as essential in light of the research objectives. I was aware of the possibility that 
companies would be reluctant to opening a process of access negotiation once they had 
learnt that my research would be about pay, worrying about the negative impact of pay 




their formal participation in the research, which would involve both the management and 
workers. I also adopted a more bottom-up approach by interviewing auto parts workers 
introduced to me by friends and former colleagues, hoping that they could refer me to more 
workers, and ideally mid-rank managers who could lead to me to opportunities to obtain 
formal approval in their factories. My initial target was to gain access to four auto parts 
factories. 
 
Most of my initial attempts in getting access to auto parts factories through both workers 
and the management were unsuccessful. First, I emailed the HR department of over eighty 
auto parts manufacturers in Guangzhou, but received no reply at all. I also phoned them to 
follow up, but most of the calls were picked up by the main reception, who asked for a phone 
extension number connected to a particular person. Only one factory receptionist put me in 
touch with someone from its HR department, but my request for interview was rejected 
upfront. It was an expected outcome, since other researchers had already proven that direct 
cold-calling does not work in China (Hutchings, 2004). A mid-rank manager in an auto parts 
factory whom I interviewed later mentioned that the series of strikes due to pay-related 
issues in the area not long ago had made factory management exceptionally cautious of 
discussing pay or collective negotiation with third parties. Local authorities had also 
maintained surveillance over union chairpersons involved in factory-level collective 
negotiation. For this reason, the fact that I got constantly rejected or ignored by factories 
was hardly surprising to him.  
 
Second, I contacted academics who had conducted research on the Chinese automobile 
industry or had connections with automobile factories for referral. My UK-based supervisor 
sent an official request to a British carmaker, who had collaborated with the university 
closely for many years and had recently set up a production site in China, as well as a 
Japanese carmaker in Guangzhou. Unfortunately, both factories rejected the request. During 
my stay in Guangzhou, I was introduced to Guangdong-based academics who were 
connected with automobile companies, as well as trade unions at plant, municipal and 
provincial levels by friends and acquaintances. Most of them were welcoming and 
encouraging, but tacitly declined my research request to pass on invitations to their factory 
contacts. One mentioned that it was not easy to introduce me to his informants if I was not 




instance) or to other Chinese institutions. The only way would be to keep my identity and 
research purpose as vague as possible, but deception was not allowed by the research ethical 
code that I had adhered to. I found a deceived identity unfavourable to the negotiation of 
further access. It might also create trouble for the gatekeeper. One academic passed my 
research invitation letter to a handful of automobile companies which she had studied 
before, but all companies declined for the political sensitivity generated by receiving a 
researcher from ‘outside the border’ (jingwai).  
 
Thirdly, I made friends with as many people as I could in Guangzhou. My accommodation in 
Guangzhou was close to a prestigious university, which is research-intensive and is known 
for student activism in recent years. My past participation in labour activism enabled me to 
make friends with university students and social activists, who were happy to introduce me 
to auto workers in their extended social circles. Some interviews with workers were 
conducted sporadically, yet snowballing did not work as workers were reluctant to let their 
co-workers know that they had told me something about pay in their factory. An auto worker 
also rejected my request via a gatekeeper for the sake of ‘espionage prevention’. 
 
Fourthly, I sought help from labour non-governmental organisations (LNGOs) within the area 
to see if they could refer me to auto workers. The development of LNGOs in China began in 
the 1990s, mainly to fill the vacuum left by the officially-led trade unions in order to provide 
legal, educational and cultural services to workers (Chan, 2013). Due to their lack of legal 
status and detached relationships with local governments, they did not formally play the role 
of worker representation. In recent years, some LNGOs had become more active in 
intervening in collective labour disputes, many of which were pay-related. Some LNGOs also 
advocated on labour policies and conducted social surveys on pay, employment relations 
and migrant workers’ rights in general (Chan, 2013). Having worked with LNGOs for more 
than two years before starting the PhD, I recognised that LNGO staff who approached 
workers on a regular basis could also be beneficial for my work in providing further insights 






However, after a substantial crackdown on LNGOs in Guangdong in late 2015, the remaining 
LNGOs either chose to stay low-profile, had temporarily suspended their operations, or were 
focusing on the provision of social services. I managed to get some help from a workers’ 
library recently established by a charity in an industrial zone, but meeting workers was still 
very difficult. The library had not been in the community for long, thus it had yet to become 
a gathering point for workers. Workers came to the library for specific activities, which were 
usually held once a week on weekends. The staff had identified workers whom might be 
interested in being interviewed, and then invited them to come to the library on a weekend 
or during an activity, which was also held on a weekend or a public holiday. Since workers in 
that industrial zone usually worked six days a week, their only day-off per week was also 
dedicated to resting time, grocery shopping and other activities. Coming to the library had 
yet to be their priority. Therefore, it was common that workers verbally agreed to meet, but 
at the end did not show up.  
 
Using the above tactics, I could only secure around a dozen of interviews. They did not lead 
to a concrete understanding of the pay system in any particular factory, since workers were 
from different factories, and an alternative perspective or an official account from their 
factory management could not be obtained in this way. Therefore, I started making 
alternative plans after 6 months in the field, such as changing the research theme, looking at 
other industries and relocating to another province. The game-changing moment happened 
during a short break to the UK over the summer, when a Chinese friend living in London 
agreed to introduce me to a remote family friend of hers, who was a manager of an auto 
parts factory. My friend had to pass on the invitation via her mother in China, and it was only 
in September 2017 when the manager got the message and agreed to arrange an 
appointment with me.3 
 
Factory F, where the manager worked in, was located in Town S neighbouring Guangzhou. 
He was willing to help me with the research, and also accompanied me to visit managers in 
three other factories in person. Among them, the manager of Factory H agreed to participate 
and allowed me to conduct fieldwork there for one month. During the time in Factory H, I 
 
3 My Chinese friend introduced me to her mother as a generic ‘schoolmate’, but in fact we had never 




attended activities organised by a HR consultancy firm, which HR officers from Factory H and 
other companies also attended. Some HR practitioners and consultants were curious of my 
background as a student from Hong Kong studying in the UK. They were also sympathetic to 
my circumstance as a female conducting research on my own in a remote industrial zone. I 
also became an intern with the consultancy firm, leading to opportunities to visit factories in 
the town and to interview HR practitioners. The consultancy firm had their own interview 
agenda, but allowed me to ask questions related to my research as long as within the time 
allowed for the appointment. As a result, a HR officer of Factory D offered to be interviewed 
informally, introduced me to more workers in her factory and circulated an online 
questionnaire for me. At this point, my research site gradually shifted from Guangzhou to 
Town S. 
 
People I met in Town S were more relaxed in terms of political sensitivity and more open to 
talking about pay. The identity of me being from ‘outside the border’ was not as much of a 
problem, and even became an advantage in some cases, especially when I met interviewees 
in person. My extended familial ties in Town S also made acquainting with managers in the 
local area easier, as they were happy to hear that my grandparents were born near Town S. 
It became a talking point which enabled me to start a conversation with someone before 
focusing more on specific questions related to the research. Some interviewees were still 
reluctant to mention pay figures explicitly to me, but were willing to share pay-related 
practices and approximate pay ranges. 
 
I spent the last six months in the field focusing on looking for more interviewees just in Town 
S. This had to be suspended for one month in the midway, as factories declined contact 
before and during the Spring Festival.4 During my last month in Town S, I tried to approach 
 
4 Factories took a break from production for ten days to two weeks for the Spring Festival. Work in 
factories generally became more intensive before and after the festival to keep production up. HR 
departments were also occupied with recruiting workers after the Festival, as labour turnover was 
particularly high in this time of the year. Therefore HR officers said that they were too busy with work 




workers at factory gates, but ceased to do that due to safety concerns.5 I also tried to linger 
at a grocery store inside a nearby village inhabited by factory workers with the permission of 
the store owner, but very few people were willing to stay after their shopping. After a few 
trials I also found it unsafe to approach workers who gathered and drank in local restaurants 
in the evening on my own. Due to the time constraints imposed by the university for change 




With factories as the unit of analysis, interviewing different types of individuals who played 
a role in pay setting was essential for triangulation. The following groups of people were 
targeted in each factory. The first group was factory management, which mainly represented 
the employers’ perspective. In the case of Factories H and F where the general manager of 
the factory was the first point of contact, lower-rank managers and HR officers were also 
interviewed to obtain more substantial knowledge about execution of pay policies, rather 
than just the general direction of the policies. They provided accounts on the pay structure 
and pay policies within the factory, management style and strategies on production 
arrangement and product markets. The second group was given by workers in different 
departments and at different ranks in the factory. The third group was represented by 
recruitment agency staff. They were not included in the factory-level pay setting process, but 
they were good informants on jobseekers’ pay expectations and on the outlook of the local 
labour market.  
 
In total, 84 individuals were interviewed, among which there were 53 workers or engineers, 
26 HR officers and managers, and 5 miscellaneous people, including HR consultants, 
recruitment agency staff and local residents in Town S. The workers and managers covered 
29 automobile and auto parts factories, among which 20 of them were in Town S, 8 in other 
 
5 Most factories had CCTV cameras installed at the front and back gates. It was also hard as a single 





parts of Guangdong Province and 1 in Shanghai.  A breakdown of the interviewees’ position 
and gender is shown in Table 1: 
 
Occupation Total Male Female 
Workers and engineers 53 40 13 
HR officers and managers 26 16 10 
Others 5 2 3 
Total 84 59 25 
Table 1: Breakdown of the number of interviewees by occupation and gender 
 
In three factories in Town S, namely Factories H, F and D, I was given more time and access 
to employees. This resulted in more interviews done in these factories, as illustrated in Table 
2: 
 
Occupation Total Factory H Factory F Factory D 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Workers and 
engineers 
41 11 8 11 3 7 1 
HR officers 
and managers 
9 4 2 1 1 0 1 
Total 50 25 16 9 
Table 2: Number of interviewees in Factories H, F and D, broken down by occupation and gender 
 
All but one interview were conducted in person, supplemented by Wechat correspondence 
before and afterwards.6 One interview with an engineer based in Shanghai was conducted 
by Wechat and phone. The duration of each interview ranged from twenty minutes to two 
hours, subject to the relevance of their occupation to the research theme and environmental 
constraints, such as time and location. Interviews with people outside the three factories 
were mostly done on an individual basis. I made individual appointments with them either 
directly or via the consultancy firm. The interviewees chose the venue for the interview to 
their convenience, which included restaurants, cafes, universities, the workers’ library and 
their workplace. Half of them were not recorded since I could not find the right timing to ask 
whether the interviewees would like to be recorded. Some interviewees also declined my 
 




request for recording. Under these circumstances, I took notes by hand during the interview, 
typed them into text afterwards, and sent them to interviewees for verification if I was given 
their contact details. However, most of them did not reply afterwards. 
 
Interviews in the three factories were arranged in multiple ways. In Factory F, the HR officer 
called workers into the meeting room individually during working hours for the interview. 
However, she and other managers were not present during the interview. All but two of the 
interviews were recorded, since two workers explicitly mentioned that they did not want to 
be recorded. In Factory D, five workers were interviewed on the shop floor on a weekend 
when workers work overtime and managers are not there. It was the first time that I had met 
the HR officer of Factory D, who was my gatekeeper to the factory. Since she brought me 
into the factory without her superiors knowing it, I believed that taking the recording device 
out would bring her unwanted attention from other workers. That was why interviews done 
on that day were not recorded. The rest of the interviews with Factory D workers outside the 
factory were conducted by appointment and recorded with the workers’ consent. In Factory 
H, the manager initially suggested handpicking workers for me, but later let me talk to 
workers on the shop floor during working hours as long as the interview did not slow down 
the production. I was introduced as an intern who wanted to know more about the factory 
and the HR practices. The HR department also gave me a badge so that I could introduce 
myself to workers in a more straightforward manner.7 I was also allowed to stay in the 
factory dormitory for three weeks, so I interviewed workers in the canteen and in the 
smoking area after their shift as well. These interviews were often broken down into many 
small sessions, as I could only ask a few questions during each encounter with a worker. All 
interviews in Factory H were unrecorded. These include those with the managers and HR 
officers conducted in their office, since they declined to be recorded. I jotted brief notes 
when the situation allowed, but most of the time I had to memorise who said what and wrote 
them down only at night or during the following morning. 
 
 
7 The badge showed my ID photo and position as a ‘researcher’. I introduced myself to workers as a 
researcher studying the operations of the factory in the first few days, but very few workers 
understood what this meant. Later I simply said that I am a student doing an internship with the HR 




The interviews were all semi-structured. I designed different sets of interview guides for 
interviewees of different occupations. The questions broadly covered the following areas – 
work history in the company, working conditions, understanding of the pay system, 
understanding of the factory and the automobile industry, comments on the pay levels, local 
connections and future career prospects. Due to nuances in language style in Hong Kong and 
China, I consulted university students in Guangzhou regarding the use of words, as well as 
evaluated and refined the questions after each interview. 
 
 
3.4.3. Participant observation 
 
I conducted participant observations mainly in Factory H and with the HR consultancy firm. 
Participant observation, as described by de Laine (2000), was deployed as a technique 
leading to the creation of relationships with research subjects and to access to data which 
could not be achieved by other methods. On the one hand, it contributed as a stepping stone 
for more concrete conversation with workers or even interview. On the other hand, it also 
provided me with a better understanding of the labour process in individual workplaces. 
Although I did not stay in the factories as a waged employee and therefore obtained limited 
first-hand data in wage payment, participating in the production of Factory H and having a 
closer look at the exchange of HR practices facilitated by the consultancy firm were both 
helpful in understanding the circumstances under which workers respond to pay practices in 
Town S.  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, I was allowed to roam on the shop floor in Factory H 
and catch people for interviews if they were willing to or had the time to during working 
hours. Only the paint shop was out of bound due to occupational health and safety concerns. 
I also stayed in a shared room in the factory dormitory where employees of the factory, 
ranging from the general manager to shop floor workers, were all accommodated in the 
same storey at that moment. In general, I followed the daily routine of a shop floor worker 





In the first week there, I walked around the shop floor during the day shift and approached 
workers at their position. Most workers found it odd that I simply stood right next to them 
when they worked, thus showed some impatience towards my presence. A worker later told 
me that he and his colleagues thought that ‘I was a supervisor from the [Sino-European] 
assembly plant to see whether they shirked at work’. Personally I also found that strict non-
participant observations put myself into a tricky circumstance in positioning myself on the 
shop floor, since workers perceived me as studying them in the interest of the management, 
especially when I was introduced to workers and shop floor management by the HR officers 
upon arrival.  
 
Later, I started helping out with easy manual tasks in different shops, such as (un)packaging, 
sorting and peeling parts. Once the first attempt was made, it became easier for me to 
introduce myself into a team of workers by working on a certain task, and then establishing 
rapport with them. Workers also began to take my presence more as a matter-of-fact. For 
example, when I first went there the female workers in the warehouse let me try out some 
daily routine tasks that they were responsible for. Later they expected me every evening and 
become more and more welcoming towards me. The makeshift co-working relationship 
facilitated lengthier conversations with workers, as well as more insider news about the 
factory from the workers’ perspectives. When I became familiar with more workers, I also 
talked to them during breaks in the canteen and in the smoking area. Since the conversations 
were laid out impromptu, I checked my interview guide after a day of work and took note of 
what else had to be asked to individual workers the next day. 
 
The second part of participant observations was conducted during an informally organised 
internship with the HR consultancy firm. The firm received funding from the town-level 
ACFTU branch for a three-year project to promote ‘the advancement of employment 
relations’ in Town S, but the project targeted mainly HR practitioners and factory managers 
in town. My duty as an intern included interviewing HR officers in factories for the project-
end evaluation and a later an exploratory study of the development of the automobile 
industry in Town S. In addition, they also allowed me to audit trainings and discussion groups 
organised by the firm for HR practitioners in Town S and Guangzhou. In this way, I was able 




Interviews with some participating managers were also arranged afterwards, since they 
remembered me as an intern with the consultancy firm and thus did not find me suspicious. 
 
3.4.4. Document research 
 
Document research was conducted for background information about Town S, as well as on 
the local and national development of the automobile industry. It consisted of three main 
parts. First, documents about pay in the automobile sector and other industries in Town S 
were collected and examined. These included statistical figures on pay trends released by 
the local governments in forms such as ad hoc reports, newspaper reports and statistical 
yearbooks. Second, I went through policies and local government initiatives for the 
development of local industries and of the labour market. Information was mostly found in 
local news reports and laws and regulations publicised by the local governments. Third, I 
consulted news reports, prospectuses and annual reports of the respective parent company 
of the factories for background information on the factories. The majority of the documents 
were found online via search engines. I also made use of newspaper databases, laws and 
regulations databases and statistical yearbooks available in the library system of the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, Universities Service Centre for China Studies, the Sun Yat-sen 
Library of Guangdong Province and the Nanhai Library in Guangdong. 
 
3.4.5. Concerns on potential data collection hazards 
 
Four points on data collection should be noted as they impacted how and what kind of data 
was eventually collected. First, most interviewees were selected by gatekeepers, rather than 
by myself. As illustrated above, a number of compromises and pragmatic concessions were 
made regarding who I eventually managed to interview and the conditions under which the 
interviews were conducted. In order to mitigate potential biases, I kept gatekeepers 
informed of the ideal diversity of interviewees that I would like to achieve. Interviewees 





Second, time pressure determined key actions in different phases of data collection. Due to 
contingencies in the field, time management was often beyond control. Time allowed for 
fieldwork was likely to be disproportionately skewed towards seeking permission to collect 
data, or waiting for the appropriate timing, more than actually collecting data (Baccaro et al., 
2019). In various situations I was also situated in the ‘take it or leave it’ dilemma, in which I 
either had to accept unsatisfactory conditions or to risk not collecting any data at all. 
Therefore, the research framework and key themes of data needed remained open and 
flexible. Continuous evaluation of fieldwork progress and timetabling was also done to make 
the most from the time allowed. 
 
Third, access to statistical data was restricted. The original sources of precise town-level 
statistics during this period were difficult to obtain. They were occasionally mentioned in 
municipal-level statistical yearbooks, but the presentation was by no means consistent over 
the years. Some Guangdong-based academics remarked that industrial and labour market 
surveys were undoubtedly done at the town level, but the statistics were restricted to 
internal reference for local authorities. It was only under rare and fortunate circumstances 
in which they obtained exclusive sources informally via personal networks. Some academics 
and HR consultants suggested channels to obtain the statistics that I needed, or specific 
people who might share the information with me, but these attempts were unsuccessful. 
Most statistical figures presented in this thesis were gathered from news reports on Town S 
from 2000 to 2018, when public disclosure through the state-controlled media was approved 
by local authorities.  
 
Fourth, ethical procedures regarding consent and anonymity were executed in rigour subject 
to circumstances. Only a third of the interviewees with whom I kept a conversation of over 
twenty minutes signed the consent form. The rest did not sign it for various reasons. Some 
simply said they did not want to sign any tangible documents, or were fine with not signing 
it. Some read the form but handed it back to me and started talking straight ahead. In some 
cases, especially with HR officers from other factories in Town S, staff from the HR 
consultancy firm suggested me not to show the interviewees the consent form to avoid 
suspicion from them. In addition, keeping worker interviewees anonymous from their 
management was not possible in Factories F and D, as the management decided who was to 




aware of their participation in the research and guaranteed their safety and anonymity to 
the best of my capacity. For instance, I explained the research objectives and asked for 
consent verbally if I did not have the chance to show them the consent form. Workers were 
also anonymised in this thesis and any personal attribute which made them identifiable was 
not mentioned. 
 
3.5. Data analysis 
 
During the data collection process, data took different formats. For those interviewees which 
had been recorded, transcription was handled according to the following procedures. First, 
interviews were recorded by a recording app on either my phone or tablet during the 
interview. Then I converted the recordings to text by means of unfocused transcription, in 
which the transcript simply conveyed ‘the basic “intended meaning” of a recording of speech 
or action without attempting to represent its detailed contextual or interactional 
characteristics’ (Gibson and Brown, 2009:116). Nevertheless, I tried to retain the way in 
which an interviewee talked about a point as much as possible. Interviews conducted in 
Mandarin were transcribed verbatim, but some phrases in those conducted in Cantonese 
were slightly converted in the transcripts for the convenience of reading. 8  Second, for 
unrecorded ones, I rewrote my handwritten notes into a summary of the interviewee’s 
account after the interview as soon as I could. The summaries were laid out in bullet points 
or paragraphs. During the interview, I also memorised key phrases and expressions that the 
interviewee used, so that I could include them in the summary afterwards. Other fieldnotes 
were handwritten on site, but were then typed for further analysis. They were grouped into 
a single file, presented in chronological order. Episodes of encounter with individuals were 
further grouped by person. The fieldnotes included observations in the field and unspoken 
gestures of the interviewees before and after an interview. 
 
 
8  Mandarin and Cantonese are two different varieties of the Chinese language. Cantonese is 
considered a ‘verbal’ language. It is sometimes slightly converted into written form when presented 
in text for formality and clarity. The conversion is not standardised, subject to linguistic preferences 
of the writer. In contrast, spoken Mandarin can be precisely written down. I transcribed all interviews 




I analysed my data primarily by inductive thematic analysis. As defined by Gibson & Brown 
(2009:127), thematic analysis involves searching for ‘commonalities, relationships and 
differences’ across different components of a data set by aggregating themes. It is commonly 
used in qualitative research for its flexibility, independent of theoretical and epistemological 
approaches (Braun and Clarke, 2008). I find thematic analysis particularly suits this research 
project due to the contingencies that I experienced in the field. As mentioned in the previous 
section, I did not manage to collect data for my original research query on pay setting per se, 
but did obtain other data which I did not expect, including details about the execution of pay 
practices on a day-to-day basis, attitudes towards pay practices, and the industrial 
development in Town S. The flexibility of thematic analysis allowed me to explore new 
themes in the new set of data and exploit potentials in the data which I had started thinking 
about in terms of their significance only after collecting it by accident.  
 
Consequently, I followed the various phases of thematic analysis suggested by Braun & 
Clarke (2008) to analyse the data, although they were not clear-cut and sequential in every 
respect in practice. First, I familiarised myself with the data by transcribing the interviews 
and fieldnotes by myself and re-reading the transcripts for multiple times. Second, I 
conducted the first phase of open coding. It technically commenced before transcription of 
all interviews was completed. I created 100 initial codes with NVivo, as demonstrated in the 
Appendix. These codes are apriori codes (Gibson and Brown, 2009), indicating direct 
responses to questions predesigned in the interview guides. After the first phase of coding, 
it was realised that the apriori codes were insufficient in covering the richness of the data 
set. Therefore, I searched for themes, reviewed and refined them in groups. Opinions of 
different parties in the same factory on the same subject were also contrasted to reveal a 
comprehensive account of a theme. This stage was intertwined with the production of 
subsequent drafts, as the process of structuring different findings chapters in an iterative 
manner helped with re-examination of the existing data for other emerging themes and 
determining whether alternative secondary sources were required.  
 
Eventually, the following main themes emerge. The first theme covers descriptions of factory 
life and working conditions on the shop floor. The second theme covers descriptions of HRM 
practices and pay systems in the factories. The third theme demonstrates workers’ 




main theme concerns workers’ reactions to the job and the pay system, as well as any 




This chapter unfolded the data collection process for this research project. Adopting a critical 
realist approach, I recognised the importance of understanding human actions based on the 
context and power relations involved in determining and sustaining them. Therefore, a 
repertoire of data collection methods to obtain accounts from different actors of the 
workplace relations was adopted to diversify data sources for the sake of triangulation. 
Instead of participant observations, which was commonly used in previous studies on labour 
processes, interviews were prioritised as the primary data collection method given the 
peculiar setting of the Chinese research site and the reflexivity of my own identity. 
 
A significant part of the fieldwork, including the selection of research location, factories and 
interviewees, was conducted in a contingent manner. This was largely due to the practical 
constraints that I faced as a non-Chinese female researcher from a foreign institution. 
Nevertheless, a substantial volume of data was eventually collected, while measures to 
maintain data integrity were attempted throughout the process of data collection. Thematic 







4. Urbanisation and the Development of the 





This chapter describes the context of Town S, which in recent years had undergone 
significant urbanisation and industrial development in recent years, and outlines how this 
context sets the scene for the understanding of pay. The aim is to explore the circumstances 
under which companies develop individual practices, as well as the outlook of labour market 
that they are situated in.  
 
The development of the automobile industry in Town S over the past decade is observably a 
great leap forward for industrialisation and urbanisation in Town S, according to the agenda 
of local governments. It is also apparently a key driver for changes in local demography and 
in the labour market. What are the roles that local and central governments play in attracting 
investments and talents? What have they done to make Town S an attractive place for labour 
migrating from other localities? 
 
Against the background of these questions, this chapter will provide an account of state 
efforts in shaping and transforming the local labour market to embrace the development of 
the auto parts industry in Town S. It thus consists of four sections. First, I will outline the 
introduction of the automobile industry into Town S and its strategic role in the urbanisation 
agenda of the local government. Second, I will explain how the state-initiated new industrial 
development serves as a backdrop for the transformation of the labour market. Third, I will 
introduce labour market institutions at the national and provincial levels which govern 
remuneration practices in the locally shaped labour market. The last section will be an 






4.2. Development of advanced manufacturing industries in Town S 
 
The development of the automobile industry in Town S has rapidly accelerated since the 
2000s. Located in Guangdong, southern China, Town S was largely rural until the beginning 
of industrialisation and urbanisation in the late 1990s. Factories in light industries such as 
pottery (for architectural purposes), furniture, electric appliances and metal processing were 
first established. The majority of them were locally invested, especially those which were 
township and collective enterprises (TVCs), while the rest were foreign invested companies. 
In the mid-2000s, a number of towns and villages nearby were integrated into Town S under 
an initiative by municipal and provincial governments, which resulted in a significant 
enlargement of the administrative jurisdiction of Town S. According to guidelines of the 
administrative reform issued by the municipal government, the government of Town S was 
also granted additional administrative power to ‘foster economic development, regulate the 
market, public service provision and social governance’. The enlargement of administrative 
power enabled the government of Town S to be more aggressive in terms of urban 
development. By 2006, an industrial park dedicated to attracting external investment was 
included in the zoning plan of Town S. In a few subsequent years, Town S became a 
destination of foreign investment, which included a significant share of Japanese capital. 
Japanese companies setting up operations in Town S included a group of auto parts 
manufacturers. According to a news report in early 2010, there was a total of 14 Japanese-
invested auto parts factories in Town S. They were within the parts supplier network of the 
automobile industrial cluster in southern China, which had only recently emerged at that 
time and was dominated by Japanese carmakers.  
 
Town S is considered a strategic location for auto parts factories which are at the periphery 
of the supplier network of Japanese carmakers. The three biggest Japanese carmakers in the 
automobile industrial cluster are all located in Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong 
Province. However, their respective assembly plants are based in distant corners of the city. 
Conventionally, land neighbouring a Japanese assembly plant is reserved to first-tier parts 
suppliers, and this guarantees geographical proximity in logistical arrangements. Since the 
first-tier parts suppliers supply exclusively one carmaker, delivering products to other 
carmakers is not a concern for them. However, in order to secure a profit margin, the second- 




carmakers, rather than adhering to a mandatory and exclusive commitment with just one 
carmaker. Although Town S is located outside Guangzhou, the road network enables direct 
and speedy logistical links from Town S to any of the three carmakers. As a manager in one 
of these supplier factories explained, ‘Regardless of where you have to deliver the parts to, it 
takes more or less an hour anyway from Town S.’ (ZTX, J-Factory P, December 2016) As a 
result, apart from two auto parts makers which are first-tier suppliers fully owned by 
Japanese carmakers, other Japanese auto parts companies in Town S are second- or third-
tier suppliers for Japanese carmakers. 
 
Nevertheless, until the early 2010s, the manufacturing industry of Town S was still 
dominated by small- and medium-sized factories, operating mostly in light industries 
characterised by being labour-intensive, energy-intensive, high polluting and low value-
added. This pattern of industrial development is common in the process of urbanisation in 
other localities of China, as urbanisation in China is known to be led by infrastructure and 
rural industrialisation in a bottom-up approach (Ma and Cui, 2002). Driven by competition 
and the need to differentiate Town S from other localities, the government of Town S 
endeavoured to explore new approaches to enhance economic development in the locality. 
The development of advanced manufacturing industries, especially the automobile industry, 
became part and parcel to the strategic consideration of Town S in the process of 
urbanisation.  
 
The plan of a Sino-European carmaker in the late-2000s to set up an assembly plant in 
southern China opened the opportunity for Town S to further urbanise itself. The Sino-
European carmaker was the first automobile joint venture established in China back in the 
1970s. Based in the northeast of the country, it was seeking to expand its market share in 
the south, which stood at less than 5% at that time. According to news reports, local and 
provincial governments were keen to be selected as the site of the assembly plant in Town 
S, so that Town S could become more of a major contributor to the automobile industrial 
cluster by hosting a direct competitor of the Japanese carmakers. The plan of a new assembly 
plant also coincided with the ambition of the local and provincial governments, in which 





The local government had high hopes for a trickle-down effect brought about by the 
development of the automobile industry. According to the blueprint of the process of 
urbanisation laid out by the government of Town S, it sought to encourage urbanisation 
driven by service industries on the basis of advanced manufacturing industries, as the latter 
would bring in a working population with higher disposable income and greater consumer 
demand. This principle of urbanisation is later enshrined in the new model of urbanisation 
adopted by the central government in the twelfth Five-year Plan, namely the New 
Urbanisation Programme, which highlights the importance to strike a balance between 
economic development and quality of life in urbanisation attempts (Liu, 2016). In this way, 
key industries to be fostered were carefully selected, and eventually automobile and 
advanced equipment manufacturing were prioritised. By introducing the new carmaker to 
Town S, the local government expected the simultaneous clustering of enterprises in other 
parts of the supply chain and other equipment manufacturers in town, thus facilitating the 
settlement of people working in those companies. According to a news report in December 
2011, the mayor of Town S9 strived to have the Sino-European carmaker ‘be the core of an 
“auto city”, surrounded by auto parts manufacturers. Infrastructure and public services will 
also be introduced to Town S to accommodate newly arrived residents.’  
 
The attempt of the government of Town S to develop Town S resonated with the 
development of a ‘pseudo-company town’ (Porteous, 1970), since the Sino-European 
carmaker was expected to play a leading role in driving local development – on the one hand, 
the town would directly provide employment to the carmaker and other suppliers connected 
to the carmaker; on the other hand, it would be a pull factor for other organisations which 
intended to develop a closer collaboration with the carmaker to settle down in Town S, 
including other advanced manufacturing companies, research and development agencies 
and the hospitality industries, which in turn would create further jobs. After allegedly intense 
competition with other localities also interested in hosting the assembly plant, Town S was 
eventually selected as the destination. The future with a carmaker in town also became a 
raison d'être for the local governments to invest on infrastructure in Town S. As auxiliary 
projects of the industrial development, plans to build infrastructure such as roads, 
 
9 This refers to the highest-ranking public official in the administration of Town S (zhen zhang), which 




underground, railway lines, housing, leisure amenities and a hospital to be built in phases to 
connect Town S with neighbouring city hubs were announced afterwards. 
 
Under an agreement signed by the Sino-European joint venture, their respective Chinese and 
European partners, the provincial chief of Guangdong and the municipal chief of Town S, the 
assembly plant was constructed and commenced production in 2013. A greenfield site of 
over 2,000 acres on the outskirts of an existing industrial zone, which is approximately 10km 
away from the town centre, was leased to the carmaker to build the assembly plant and to 
accommodate its network of auto parts supplier factories. Since then a series of 
infrastructure projects have been under way. According to an interview with the party 
secretary of Town S in mid-2011, the town government ‘received interest from a few 
hundred more companies connected to the new assembly plant to settled in Town S’. 
 
The local news presented a positive outlook of the expansion of the automobile industry in 
Town S. According to one report in May 2014, 50 auto parts factories were set up in the 
greenfield site of Town S since the assembly plant went into production. Another one in 
March 2016 stated that there were a total of 133 automobile and parts manufacturers in 
Town S. Soon after production commenced, the carmaker announced plans to expand, 
including building the second assembly plant next to the existing one to produce more 
vehicle models. The second plant went into operation in mid-2018. 
 
Since there are no year-on-year official statistics at the town-level by industry, as explained 
in the methodology chapter, the economic contribution of the automobile industry to Town 
S could only be deduced from fragmented information from local news reports. Two 
observations are thus drawn. First, in 2015, 133 auto and parts manufacturers account for 
16.57% of local industry gross output, which is defined by ‘the total volume of final industrial 
products produced and industrial services provided’ (National Bureau of Statistics, 2004). 
The proportion was not remarkable at all compared to the entire manufacturing sector at a 
first glance. However, the automobile industry demonstrated its high value-added status 
from the amount of corporate tax that automobile and parts companies paid. Among these 
companies, 103 of them contributed to 48.27% of the tax revenue (which amounted to 




a 20% increase from 2014. This implies that the industry has yet to be the biggest industry in 
terms of scale, but it is exceptionally high value-added.  
 
Second, the Sino-European carmaker stood out as a dominant player in the automobile 
industry in Town S. The scale and profit-making capacity of the carmakers and auto parts 
companies can be deduced from the amount of profit tax that they paid. According to a local 
news report in March 2017, the carmaker alone paid over ¥3 billion of corporate tax in 2016, 
making it the biggest taxpayer in Town S. The second and third biggest tax-paying companies 
were two first-tier supplier factories for Japanese carmakers, paying over ¥0.5 billion and 
¥0.1 billion respectively, which is significantly lower than the amount that the Sino-European 
carmaker paid. This created a strong sense of presence for the Sino-European carmaker in 
Town S as a profitable business with positive development prospects.  
 
Meanwhile, the auto parts suppliers of the Sino-European carmaker were frequently 
mentioned as a package with the carmaker in local media and job advertisements, which 
gave an impression that these companies were a unified organisation. Yet these companies 
were indeed different business entities with varying origins, and the distance between the 
carmaker and its auto parts suppliers in terms of scale and profitability was also significant. 
While the carmaker employed about 10,000 workers working in the assembly plant, the 
average size of the workforce of its auto parts suppliers rarely exceeded 400. In 2016, three 
of its parts suppliers paid over ¥30 million of profit tax, and six of them paid over ¥10 million. 
This still indicated optimistic performance levels for these companies, but it could not be 
compared to that of the carmaker. 
 
4.3. Efforts of local governments to shape the local labour market 
 
With the support from local governments, the automobile industry became part and parcel 
of the local economy in Town S within a decade. The shift of focus in industrial development 
brought significant implications to the local population and to the local labour market. In the 
following sections, I will outline the main changes in the demography of Town S in parallel 
with its industrial transformation and urbanisation. Furthermore, attempts of the local 





4.3.1. Recent changes in the demography of Town S 
 
The local population in Town S has experienced a dramatic expansion in the past decade. 
According to local newspaper reports, the settled population (changzhu renkou) stood at 
roughly 24,000 residents in 2006, and the figure rose to over 800,000 in 2016. The rapid 
demographic growth is partly contributed to the reorganisation and integration of 
administrative units in 2009, which significantly enlarged the jurisdiction of the Town S 
government and widened the scope of census. Nevertheless, between 2013 and 2015 when 
the scope of census remained unchanged, the number of settled population increased from 
around 665,000 in 2013 to 810,000 in 2015. 
 
Changes in the trends of the local demography were in line with the general picture of 
urbanisation and industrial development in Town S. Firstly, a shrinking proportion of the 
population was working in agriculture. On the one hand, local news reports published since 
2013 consistently stated that workers in the manufacturing sector, which included both local 
and non-local residents, accounted for over 60% of the total population in Town S. On the 
other hand, the proportion of local residents engaging in agricultural activities shrunk 
drastically year after year since 2012, from 80% before 2011 to 75.3% in 2012 and 54.1% in 
2015. 10  In other urbanised areas in China, local residents who previously worked in 
agriculture benefited from leasing their arable land to other industries and the profit derived 
from the conversion of land use (Tomba, 2017). Local residents in Town S apparently 
followed a similar path. The land occupied by the new assembly plant and auto parts 
suppliers was previously farmland that was owned and cultivated by local residents in nearby 
villages. After leasing the land to the carmaker under the coordination of the local 
government, the villagers abandoned farming and developed other means to make a living. 
For instance, some converted houses in their village to multi-storey buildings, providing 
accommodation to factory workers in the area. Shops and commercial activities run by local 
villagers catering for the daily needs of factory workers also emerged in villages. Rather than 
staying in the village, most local residents whose houses were now for rental moved to the 
more prosperous town centre.  
 





Secondly, the majority of the settled population constituted of migrants. The population of 
local residents still grew every year, but the increase in the local population only accounted 
for a small proportion of the growth in the settled population in Town S. If we deduct local 
residents from the estimated settled population, as shown in Table 3, it can be estimated 
that around 60% of the settled population are not local. In other words, migrants constituted 
a dominant proportion of population growth. The majority of workers whom I encountered 
during fieldwork were from outside Town S. There were not only migrants from inland 
provinces, but also from within the Guangdong Province, especially the western part due to 
geographical proximity and transportation links. However, it would be misleading to take all 
migrants as manufacturing workers by default, as they might also include their dependents 
and those providing auxiliary services. In a national news report published in October 2016, 
local officials surmised that the newcomers were mostly given by production line workers, 
technical staff and managers in the rapidly expanding manufacturing sector, university and 
technical college students and entrepreneurs from over all the country. 
 










2013 665,000 277,781 41.77% 58.23% 
2014  282,891   
2015 810,000 287,885 35.54% 64.46% 
Table 3: Composition of the Settled Population in Town S (2013-2015) (Sources: Foshan Statistical 
Yearbooks (2014-2016), local newspaper reports) 
 
4.3.2. State agenda in developing a skilled workforce in Town S 
 
As newcomers mostly came for employment opportunities created by the new industries, 
state efforts in facilitating these trends should not be ignored. For the government of Town 
S, introducing new industries into the town landscape is an important step for the formation 
of a skilled labour force. The role of the state in job creation and boosting labour demand is 
enshrined in the law. The Employment Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China 




responsibility by different levels of local governments by encouraging the establishment of 
new enterprises (particularly in the non-public sector) and widening their scope of operation 
as prescribed by laws and regulations. The State Council also publishes directives on 
promoting employment. In the Employment Promotion Plan (2011-2015) published in 2012, 
the national target for growth in employment in urban areas is to place 45 million more 
people into employment, and make 40 million people leave the agricultural sector. Different 
levels of government are also expected to prioritise employment for the benefit of 
socioeconomic development while designing economic plans and strategizing industrial 
development. 
 
In the long run, the government of Town S not only aims to create jobs, but also jobs of ‘high 
quality’, meaning that the jobs created should be higher skilled and better paid. Tracing back 
to public statements made by local officials, they considered that jobseekers would be 
attracted to and interested in settling down in Town S only when businesses and jobs were 
already there in the first place. This explains why the local labour supply did not seem to be 
a key determinant in the decision-making process of the Sino-European carmaker to set foot 
in Town S. As far as local media coverage could tell, the government of Town S ‘won over’ 
the carmaker to set up the assembly plant in Town S for its strategic location, speedy and 
accommodating attitude of the local government, and tax exemption packages. There was 
thus far no mention of existing manpower available in Town S throughout the process. 
 
Indeed, there was little news coverage on the local labour market conditions as an advantage 
of Town S before it was selected as the site for the assembly plant. Despite the unavailability 
of official statistics on the local labour market as well as inconsistencies in estimated figures 
of labour demand overtime, the existing workforce in Town S apparently did not satisfy the 
labour demand created by the new industries under any circumstance. On the one hand, the 
labour demand of the automobile and auto parts factories was evident. For example, 
according to a local news report in 2011, local officials expected the recent development of 
the automobile industry in Town S to directly create more than 50,000 jobs, among which 
10,000 would be skilled positions. However, when the start of production was approaching 
in 2013, the Sino-European carmaker alone was reported to require more than 20,000 
workers in its full production capacity. Other auto parts factories, instead, would require 




created jobs would be, the local authorities made it clear that they would not solely rely on 
the existing workforce in Town S to satisfy the emerging labour demand in terms of both 
quantity and quality. Regarding employment opportunities for local residents, the town-level 
party secretary explained in a local news report in December 2011 that the local government 
‘encourages local villagers to work for the new auto companies. Those who meet their 
requirement could work on technical positions, otherwise they could still do cleaning and 
gardening in the plant.’ More importantly, the local authorities believed that by facilitating 
the establishment of businesses in advanced industries, they would attract skilled workers 
from outside Town S. The ultimate aim was to accommodate new workers, which were likely 
to occupy skilled and managerial positions. With higher disposable income, these new 
workers would help create consumer demand and attract further external investment for 
better urban infrastructure and services. 
 
As a result, local governments concentrated efforts in creating the ground for job 
opportunities in the new industry to emerge. It is not my intention to undermine the 
attractiveness of Town S in other dimensions, which eventually drove the carmaker and 
other companies to decide to move to Town S, but clearly the availability of labour locally 
was not prioritised as much as other factors of production from these companies’ 
perspective.  
 
4.3.3. Measures to improve the habitability of Town S for newcomers 
 
Regardless of the local authorities’ wishes to create high quality jobs in Town S, they were 
not the direct providers of the job opportunities. What local authorities did, instead, was to 
make Town S more accommodating, by providing services and facilities otherwise not 
available at the company level.  
 
As mentioned above, the land occupied by the new carmaker and its supplier factories was 
former farmland in the outskirts of the centre of Town S. Given that Town S was mostly rural 
and underdeveloped, the urban outlook was not entirely compatible with the incoming 
working population deriving from the introduction of new advanced industries. Consumption 




overtime. In face of the influx of new workers, the government of Town S and higher levels 
of administration undertook, or at least announced, a series of measures to improve the 
habitability of Town S for newcomers and their families. 
 
Local villagers recalled that accessibility and habitability were major problems which 
residents in Town S had experienced. The land which the Sino-European carmaker later 
occupied had been abandoned for years. It used to be owned by local village committees, 
but it bore little potential in development due to the lack of infrastructure connecting it to 
the rest of Town S. Furthermore, social services in healthcare, social welfare and education 
were limited and exclusive to local residents. It was by no means easy for migrant workers 
with a family to get settled in Town S. Even if they did, they would not be able to satisfy most 
of their social needs locally. Both local officials and the factory management considered this 
as a disadvantage in terms of attracting talent, as few people would like to work in a place 
with nothing much to do outside work. In order to appeal to higher-skilled workers who could 
afford an urban lifestyle, the local governments made a series of pledges regarding 
infrastructures such as transport, housing and social services to improve the accessibility and 
habitability of the greenfield sites and Town S in general. Some of them have been realised 
but some were still at the primary planning stage by the time of my fieldwork.  
 
First, there was a region-wide effort to invest heavily on transportation projects, by building 
better connections between Town S and neighbouring localities. In the past, inter-city 
highway networks surrounding Town S fulfilled the logistical needs of factories in Town S, 
but there was the hope that the mobility of workers and commuters in and out of Town S 
would also be enhanced. Therefore, infrastructure projects to build inner-town roads, as well 
as new railway and underground routes to connect Town S and the provincial capital city 
were in progress since 2010. The extensive road work in town facilitated the operation of 
more bus lines, making travelling in town easier than before. Furthermore, the public bike 
system which originated at the municipal level was extended to Town S in early 2016 to 
enhance the mobility of individuals within shorter distances within the industrial zone.   
 
Second, the state-encouraged real estate development in Town S was under rapid expansion 




which took the shape of dormitories. The type and quality of accommodation provided for 
workers differed from factory to factory, while the mainstream solution in Town S was to 
house workers in a dormitory building within the factory premise. That said, staying in the 
factory dormitory was not compulsory for workers in most automobile and auto parts 
factories in Town S. Workers could also rent their own place in nearby villages and commute 
to work on coaches arranged by their factory or by their own means of transportation. Those 
with family were particularly inclined to move out of the factory dormitory and have their 
own place outside. This created opportunities for the rental market in villages in the 
periphery of the industrial zone. In addition, local governments also encouraged home 
ownership. Big companies such as the Sino-European carmaker appropriated land in the 
outskirts of the industrial zone to build apartments exclusively for their employees at a 
discounted price with generous mortgages. Other high-skilled workers were also encouraged 
to buy a permanent home in the numerous real estate projects in Town S.  
 
Home ownership is more than a permanent residence, but it also leads to local household 
registration enabling an individual and his or her family to access public services locally. 
Home owners migrating from other localities are eligible for higher points in a point-based 
system, which allows them to transfer their household registration status from their 
hometown to Town S. Being locally registered significantly widens their access to local public 
services, in particular healthcare and education in public schools for their children. After the 
establishment of the Sino-European carmaker and the completion of roadworks between 
Town S and Guangzhou, house prices were pushed up drastically in recent years. Since 
Guangzhou as a metropolis had already experienced a continuous rise in house prices in 
recent years, prospective home buyers sought to look for properties further away from 
Guangzhou but still within commutable distance by car. This developed real estate into 
another lucrative industry in Town S, but it contradicted the idea of providing housing for the 
settled population in Town S, since developers targeted potential buyers working in both 
Guangzhou and Town S, where the former outnumbered the latter. Hence, house prices in 
Town S set a bar of affordability to home ownership, which higher-skilled and higher-earning 
workers were more likely to overcome. 
 
Third, plans to expand public services, such as education, healthcare and social services were 




of local villagers. To accommodate an expanding workforce and settled population, the 
district-level hospital announced the plan to open a new branch in Town S to meet rising 
medical demands. Regarding education, state education in China is heavily constrained by 
household registration status. Children going to school outside their hometown resort to 
turning to private schools, which are often fee-paying and create a financial burden for 
migrant parents. To tackle this, the government of Town S announced in October 2016 the 
provision of 15,000 more places for children whose parents were coming to work and live in 
Town S. According to the mayor of Town S in a local news report at that time, the forthcoming 
places in schools would be for children of ‘new residents’, so that parents would have less to 
worry about moving to Town S. As of social services, the town-level trade union established 
a community centre in 2015, targeting individuals working in the industrial zone near the 
Sino-European carmaker. The operation of the centre was subcontracted to a number of 
social work organisations, which organised recreational activities and counselling services for 
factory workers, as well as childcare services for the workers’ children visiting their parents 
in Town S during school holidays. The social work organisations also collaborated with 
company-level trade unions and HR departments to fund recreational activities at the factory 
level and to provide consultation in human resource management for factory management 
and career advice and soft skills training for workers.  
 
Fourth, the local government was keen to attract investments on commercial activities in 
Town S, especially for service industries such as real estate, hospitality and entertainment. 
As young professionals and technical workers were among those that the local government 
would like to attract to Town S, it was recognised that they would ask for more than just a 
shelter near their workplace, but also for a certain quality of life. An example of this is given 
by the building of a new shopping mall right next to the Sino-European carmaker, which the 
local government and developer hoped to fill with eateries, shops and entertainment 
facilities which would appeal to the newly recruited workers in the carmaker and its supplier 
factories.  
 
These plans revealed the intention of local governments to attract talent beneficial to the 
upgrading of local industrial development and urbanisation. Unlike past practices of leaving 
provisions for workers’ daily living needs largely to employers or factories, local governments 




stronger will of the local government to retain migrant workers was also observed. On top 
of facilitating the inflow of incoming labour, policies to encourage home ownership and the 
transfer of household registration status also made staying in Town S permanently more 
feasible than before. 
 
4.4. Labour market institutions in Town S 
 
The previous section demonstrated that the local government in Town S and at the municipal 
level played an active role in facilitating the inflow of workers in order to satisfy the labour 
demand derived from the newly developed industries. Once established, the regulation of 
employment relationships is bounded by labour laws and regulations enacted at the national 
and provincial levels. In particular, the provincial government enjoys discretion in setting 
benchmarks for remuneration standards, such as minimum wage and suggested wage levels, 
as well as opportunities and rules for wage collective negotiations.  
 
In the following sub-sections, I will briefly introduce the institutions laid out by the state to 
regulate the determination of remunerations at the company level. The first institution 
concerns the minimum wage and wage guidelines which govern the determination of wage 
levels. The second one covers rules on wage collective negotiation as a means for employers 
and workers to bargain for wages. 
 
4.4.1. Wage setting 
 
Since the market reform which began in the late 1970s, control over company-level wage 
determination has gradually shifted from primarily the state (Korzec, 1992; Takahara, 1992) 
to the management at the company level. Being the primary legal basis at the national level 
to govern the determination of remuneration of workers, the Labour Law recognises the 
overarching principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ on the prerequisite that production and 
business operations vary from company to company. Hence employers refers to their 
individual characteristics in terms of production and economic efficiency to determine the 





Given the employers’ discretion to decide on the exact pay rate, labour laws and regulations 
at the national level stipulate the payment of certain wage components, namely overtime 
pay and the high temperature subsidy. According to Chapter Four of the Labour Law, 
employers should implement a forty-hour five-day standard working week. The maximum 
length of overtime work per week should not exceed thirty-six hours. For every overtime 
working hour, workers are entitled to overtime payment determined on the basis of the 
worker’s hourly pay (150% per hour for weekday, 200% per hour for Saturday and 300% per 
hour for Sunday and national holidays). Workers working under high temperature conditions 
are also entitled to a monthly payment of a high temperature subsidy according to the 
Administrative Measures on Heatstroke Prevention. The rate of the subsidy and the number 
of months in a year when workers should be paid the subsidy are determined by the 
provincial government. Since 2012, the subsidy amounts to ¥150 per month between June 
and October in Guangdong. Article 48 of the Labour Law also states that the monthly wage 
level of a worker should not fall below the legal minimum wage level. 
 
As the only legally binding benchmark for pay, the level of minimum wage is determined by 
the provincial government. The Labour Law acknowledges the existence of a minimum wage, 
while details of its determination are laid out in the Provision on Minimum Wage issued by 
the State Council in 2004. The Provision outlines the practicalities in determining the 
minimum wage level. In general, there are a few principles to be followed in the 
determination and adjustment of minimum wage. The Provision requires the taking into 
consideration of the basic living needs of workers and family members whom they support, 
the average wage of the wider local workforce, as well as the economic and social 
development of the locality. These criteria indicate that, on the one hand, the minimum 
wage should be able to support workers and their families; on the other hand, it should help 
alleviate income inequality in society. More importantly, the Provision allows for different 
minimum wage rates in different localities with various levels of economic development 
within a province. Provincial governments are given the discretion to determine the number 
of bands for minimum wage rates. Localities within provinces are then further categorised 
into different bandings and can implement different tiers of minimum wages. For instance, 




applied since 2011.11 The first tier applies to just the provincial capital city, while Town S falls 
in the second tier. 
 
The Provision requires to adjust the local minimum wage at least once every two years. In 
the past decade, this requirement was fulfilled in Guangdong, where the minimum wage is 
adjusted on a largely biennial basis, as shown in Figure 1, with the exception of the period of 
2015-2018. The central government initiatives of ‘supply-side structural reforms’ in 2016 in 
face of a nationwide economic slowdown in recent years motivated the Guangdong 
provincial government to suspend the adjustment of minimum wage levels. According to the 
provincial action plan of reform, the suspension was driven by the need to lower operational 
costs, including labour costs, for employers (Guangdong Provincial Government, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 1: Adjustment of the minimum wage level in Guangdong Province in 2006-201812 
 
The minimum wage adjustment has to be determined under a tripartite consultation system 
at the provincial level, which involves the labour and welfare departments of the provincial 
government, the provincial branch of the ACFTU and the provincial employer federation 
 
11  Shenzhen as a special economic zone within the Guangdong Province had the authority to 
determine its own minimum wage level, which was always higher than the first tier of that of the 
Guangdong Province. In 2018, the Guangdong Provincial Government announced that the minimum 
wage level in Shenzhen will be stipulated at the provincial level rather than at the municipal level from 
2019 onwards. 


































(Clarke et al., 2004). According to Article 8 of the Provision, once the proposed adjustment 
is formulated by the three parties, it is then submitted to the Ministry of Human Resource 
and Social Security (MOHRSS). The MOHRSS then consults the ACFTU and the employer 
federation at the national level before approving the adjustment. However, the consultation 
is not made public, nor does it involve trade unions at the organisational level. In Shenzhen, 
a special economic zone within the Guangdong Province which, however, follows a different 
rate of minimum wage, the last public hearing for minimum wage adjustment was held in 
2009.13 
 
Besides minimum wage levels, provincial governments publish wage guidelines annually. The 
wage guidelines, originally developed back in the socialist era, are compiled by self-reported 
statistics provided by companies in different sectors, ownership types and localities at the 
municipal and provincial levels. A specific amount of yearly wage for individual jobs and 
positions in each sector are suggested, presented in three grades (high, medium, low), but 
they are not legally binding, meaning that employers could follow any of these no matter 
whether they consider themselves high-performing in the sector, or not follow any of these 
grades at all. Employers could also choose to not follow them at all, as they have no legal 
obligation to pay workers according to these rates. Therefore, these rates are strictly for 
‘guiding’ purposes. Their implication for the determination of pay at the factory level in the 
auto parts industry in Town S will be further discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
4.4.2. Collective wage negotiation 
 
The state also plays an important role in facilitating collective bargaining via the state-
sponsored ACFTU. Collective bargaining, or the preferred term ‘collective negotiation’, and 
collective contracts are by no means new terms in Chinese industrial relations, as they have 
been enshrined in national laws for years. During the socialist era and the early stages of the 
market reform, legal regulations on collective contracts at the plant level exclusively covered 
state-owned enterprises. Nevertheless, the scope of application of the laws have extended 
to all types of business entities in recent amendments. For example, the Trade Union Law, 
first enacted in 1950 and last amended in 2009, states that it is responsibility of the trade 
 




union to ‘represent workers in equal representation and sign a collective contract with an 
enterprise or a public institution managed as an enterprise’ (Article 20). The Labour Law and 
Labour Contract Law provide further details on the components of a collective contract and 
its management. According to Article 51 of the Labour Contract Law, a collective contract 
negotiated by representatives of the employer and workers  in an equal position could cover 
‘matters of remuneration, working hours, breaks, vacations, work safety and hygiene, 
insurance, benefits etc.’. The AFCTU branch at the superior level should also supervise the 
selection of representatives and the process of negotiation. 
 
Guangdong was considered a pioneer in approaching collective negotiation more proactively 
in recent years particularly, in response to the increasing number of workers’ collective 
resistance in the form of wildcat strike (Brown, 2015). In 2010, Town S hit the national news 
headline for a nineteen-day strike in a Japanese auto parts factory in Town S, which resulted 
in a substantial pay rise and re-election of the plant-level trade union. Since then, gestures 
of the provincial government and trade union to promote collective bargaining in the private 
sector were observed, which included setting directives for the implementation of collective 
negotiations and facilitating plant-level collective negotiations. In a directive issued by the 
provincial department of human resource and social security in 2010, the collective 
negotiation of wage was prioritised before other elements of a collective contract for its 
‘essential function in maintaining peace and stability of an employment relationship’. It also 
announced a three-year campaign in promoting plant-level collective wage negotiations in 
the province. The duties of the local departments of human resource and social security, and 
trade unions included ‘promoting collective wage negotiation and raising the awareness of 
employers, workers and the public’; ‘facilitating wage collective negotiation in enterprises 
with more well-established plant-level unions’; as well as monitoring the process of wage 
collective negotiation to avoid escalations of industrial conflicts (Human Resources and 
Social Security Department of Guangdong Province, 2010). Written templates of 
correspondence on collective negotiation, dispute resolution and collective contract were 
also attached. The directive was further strengthened by the Guangdong Province Regulation 
on Collective Contracts in Enterprises enacted in 2014. This further outlines the elements of 





The above sub-sections illustrated two points which are relevant indicators of the state 
regulation regarding industrial relations in Town S. First, the legal minimum wage set the 
minimum price for labour in Town S. The wage guidelines showed additional effort of the 
state to direct the upward flow of pay levels, but at the end it is up to the voluntary 
implementation of individual employers. Second, the trend of workers’ collective actions had 
urged the local government to open up the opportunity for factory-level wage collective 
negotiation within the legal regulatory framework. 
 
4.5. Everyday life of factory workers in Town S in the making  
 
Massive plans of infrastructure and state-supported investments significantly changed the 
outlook of Town S. The next concern was around the working life of the newly recruited 
workers at the backdrop of such changes, and the ongoing process of labour market 
transformation. Two major issues will be highlighted in the following section. The first issue 
is given by the fact that accessibility within Town S and with other localities was limited to a 
selective group of people who are more resourceful. Second, the inflow of labour to Town S 
largely depended on pre-existing relationships. 
 
4.5.1. Accessibility and habitability 
 
Regardless of the fact that the Sino-European carmaker was built on a greenfield site, the 
infrastructure for logistic purposes was complete. Direct access to the plant from Guangzhou 
and other localities by car was not a problem as it is well connected by roads and highways. 
Nevertheless, the industrial zones of Town S remained a world of its own for people without 
their own means of transportation due to limited public transport. For instance, it easily took 
three hours to travel from Guangzhou to the Sino-European carmaker by public transport 
with multiple transits, while it was normally a 1-hour journey by car at off-peak hours. The 
fastest route by public transport was to take the light rail from Guangzhou which stops at a 
newly built station approximately ten kilometres away from the carmaker. This compresses 
the journey to twenty minutes but there was only one train every two hours. It also took up 
to an hour to go to the industrial park by bus (waiting time including) for those who found 




centre of Town S and the municipality centre. However, the last bus to and from the 
industrial zone left as early as 8pm. This made going out after work by public transport 
basically unfeasible for workers living on site.  
 
Workers mainly commuted within the industrial zone in two ways. The first way was by 
coaches provided by their companies. Some companies sent coaches to pick workers up from 
the town centre and the villages populated with migrant workers before and after each shift. 
This solution was strictly for commuting purposes and did not run during off-work hours. The 
second way was given by one’s own means of transportation, among which motorcycle and 
bicycle were the most popular. However, this only allowed mobility within a short distance, 
such as between two villages. A public bike system had been installed in industrial parks since 
2016, but this required a large deposit and getting a user’s card from sparsely located ticket 
offices operating during normal office hours, when most workers would be at work at that 
time.  
 
Some office workers owned a car which let them travel further, but car ownership was largely 
unheard of among production line workers. Car ownership obviously enhanced the mobility, 
as well as the freedom of workers in Town S. For instance, some office workers mentioned 
the luxury of having a car so that they could afford the time to go out for lunch, instead of 
eating at the factory canteen every day. It also gave them easier access to better social 
services, such as emergency healthcare in the municipal centre. The government’s promise 
of building a hospital in the town has not yet been fulfilled. A HR officer from an auto part 
factory said, ‘there is not even a proper clinic around. We could only go to two small hospitals 
in town, where quality is not great.’ (GQC, D-Factory C, April 2017) Since the shopping mall 
next to the Sino-European carmaker was never fully open, production line workers also 
mentioned going to the town centre for grocery shopping only during weekends, as they just 
had the energy to stay somewhere close and relax after work; unlike factory managers who 
could afford to go out for a quick treat in the town centre by car in 15 minutes.  
 
These observations on the geographical context of Town S and workers’ commuting habits 
demonstrated the potential costs of navigating in the greenfield. In a newly developed area 




unfriendly. This meant that people who were lucky to be endowed with resources such as 
embeddedness in the area, the luxury of time to travel and wealth to possess their own 
means of transportation were still favoured. This resulted in workers’ mobility being confined 
to a limited geographical scale. Even if they did not live within the premise of the factory, 
their everyday life was still confined by the job. This resulted in the following implications in 
terms of workers’ acceptance of working conditions and pay levels. First, it affected their 
capacity in locating better paid jobs. Second, it determined the social circle in which workers 
learnt about pay practices in other factories and compared pay among themselves. 
 
4.5.2. Pre-existing relationship as a dominant pull factor 
 
As a newly developed industrial area, Town S still lacked a strong pull factor as a destination 
to look for work. Compared with nearby metropolises such as Shenzhen, Guangzhou and 
Dongguan, Town S was less likely to be thought of as a land of job opportunity. Workers 
actually decided to look for a job or accept a job offer in Town S for various reasons, and the 
influence of pre-existing relationships was prevalent among these. 
 
Three types of pre-existing relationships which brought auto and auto parts workers to Town 
S were observed. The first type was related to the partnership between the carmaker and 
vocational schools. It is a common practice for carmakers to establish collaborative 
partnership with vocational schools, where they directly recruit fresh graduates. This 
practice is quite common for carmakers as documented in the work of Jurgens and 
Krzywdzinski (2015). In the partnership with vocational schools, carmakers ensure that the 
curriculum is compatible with the skill set required in the production, also secure a stable 
supply of worker reserve. In Town S, the majority of their new production line workers in the 
Sino-European carmaker and in the biggest Japanese auto parts factory in Town S had been 
recruited through vocational schools. According to a representative from the party branch 
of the Sino-European carmaker, the company recruited and trained the majority of workers 
in the northeast. These workers were later relocated to the assembly plant in Town S. Other 
auto parts factories were not big enough to establish a consistent relationship with schools. 
Nevertheless, some of their HR officers mentioned recruiting technical staff during campus 




type of pre-existing relationship came to Town S primarily because of the employer that they 
were about to work for.  
 
The second type was given by a pre-existing relationship with particular people who workers 
already knew. Workers came to Town S to follow the people that they knew, such as the 
fellows from the same home town, friends and family members. It was common for them to 
mention someone that they knew, such as a partner or family member who had moved to 
the Town S before them. Hence the workers came and sought refuge with them. There were 
also local workers from nearby villages who had heard about job opportunities in Town S by 
word of mouth. They lived close enough to Town S to witness the progressive industrial 
development in Town S, and preferred not to look for work too far away from home.  
 
The third type of relationship was related to intra-company transfer. Originally based in 
northeast China, the Sino-European carmaker had an established and trusted network of 
auto part suppliers in the northeast. These supplier factories were encouraged by the 
carmaker to set up branches in Town S to serve the new assembly plant. Therefore, most of 
the auto part factories newly set up in Town S had roots elsewhere. Workers who fit into this 
category were relocated to Town S by their employer who had expanded operations to Town 
S. They were mostly veteran technical workers and middle- to senior-level management, who 
were entrusted by their employer with running the new branch. The carmaker itself also 
encouraged veteran production line workers originally from the northeast to relocate to 




The illustration of the industrial and urban development in Town S so far has provided an 
overall picture of how Town S emerged as a destination for advanced manufacturing 
industries and higher-skilled labour. First, this was supported by state ambitions regarding 
industrial upgrading and urbanisation, which provided the physical space and logistical 
arrangements for new industries to settle down in Town S. Second, in contrast with the 
laissez-faire approach adopted in the past, local governments opened the doors for the 




encouragement of home ownership and improvements in terms of access to public services 
demonstrated local governments’ attempt to retain newly arrived workers in Town S.  
 
Nevertheless, observations in the field demonstrate that incomplete infrastructure projects 
contributed to stranding the expected labour inflow. Workers who were more resourceful in 
social and financial terms had obviously greater advantages compared to others when 
navigating the new and expansive industrial zone. The pre-existing relationships which 
supported their decision to find work in Town S contributed to their occupational prospects 
and their acceptance of factory-level managerial practices and working conditions. These 
considerations also paves the way for further investigations in later chapters on the channels 
available for workers to accumulate pay knowledge on the shop floor, and to what extent 











In the previous chapter, I discussed how the automobile industry emerged and developed in 
Town S. The industry exhibited a few distinctive features – it was developed in a relatively 
short time frame; the labour demand was not necessarily compatible with the existing labour 
market; it occupied a greenfield site, which itself became the driver of urbanisation and of 
the development of infrastructure in Town S. With strong support from local governments 
through high publicity, the automobile industry was well-known in Town S and played a 
leading role in transforming the local labour market. 
 
Against this background, it is reasonable to speculate that the development of the industry 
contributed to how workers positioned themselves in the labour market and shaped their 
expectation towards the job in Town S in terms of remuneration. Those who drew my 
attention particularly were the workers in the new auto parts supplier factories. These 
factories were set up in Town S during this particular time but remained out of the spotlight 
– in the local news, they were always addressed as ‘ancillary factories’ of the Sino-European 
carmaker. How were workers remunerated in these factories? How did the optimism in the 
local industrial development match with the way that workers were rewarded and, more 
importantly, to what extent workers felt satisfied with the reward? 
 
The following two chapters will seek to address these questions. Since the state did not 
intervene that much in issues related to pay at the factory level, heterogeneity in practices 
across companies was possible. Indeed, when it comes to how labour is remunerated in 
production, this is largely an organisational issue, especially in private enterprises. Therefore, 
this chapter aims at exploring further down to the factory level to examine the set of 
practices which governed how workers were paid under the plant-level pay system, as well 





Hence, in this chapter I will present the findings on pay systems and communication practices 
adopted in auto parts factories in Town S. In addition to examining the variety of pay system 
designs and implementation practices on the shop floor, I will also assess the way in which 
pay was communicated to workers and their subsequent attitudes towards pay. 
 
This chapter consists of two main parts. In the first part, I will introduce the diversity of 
remuneration practices in the auto parts industry in Town S, represented by the three cases 
of Factories H, F and D, where I had access to a more comprehensive set of research 
participants. In the second part, I will look into how these systems were communicated and 
implemented on the shop floor, as well as how workers understood them. I will focus on 
three timeframes during an employment relationship, including the time in which workers 
were recruited, the pay day, as well as other times of their everyday working life.  
 
5.2. Practices to remunerate auto parts workers in Town S 
 
Given that the automobile industrial cluster developed in Town S in a short period of time, 
an industrial norm of how automobile auto parts factories remunerated workers was not 
apparent. Rather, through a closer look into the remuneration practices of different 
companies with seemingly common exogenous features, a diversity of pay systems was 
observed. 
 
My fieldwork in Town S enabled me to have a relatively comprehensive picture of three auto 
parts factories in Town S, namely H, F and D. Through interviews with HR officers and veteran 
workers, as well as participant observations in Factory H, it was possible to obtain official 
accounts of the state of the operations and of the workforce in these factories were 
obtained. Therefore, this section aims at looking at how the three factories operate, in order 
to draw a comparison among them to demonstrate the diversity of and nuances between 





This section focuses on introducing the profile of Factories F, H and D respectively. These 
factories were all recently set up in Town S. I will introduce the features of the factories in 
four different areas. First, I will start with a brief description of the company background of 
each factory, including the establishment of the factory, the sources of capital, the 
relationship with the parent company, the clientele and the product market. Second, I will 
look into the composition of the workforce in each factory, in order to paint a better picture 
of who worked in the factories and where the employees came from. Third, I will briefly 
introduce the working hours in these factories, the length of which was related to the 
calculation of some of the pay components. Fourth, I will elaborate on the pay system of 
these factories, covering the composition of pay, and the calculation and determination of 
each component made known to me by factory management. 
 
Due to the possibility that the circumstances in each factory may have evolved over time, 
the factory profiles below account for the time period between October 2016 and May 2017. 
Regarding the HR systems and business operations of the factories, official accounts were 
provided by the factory management, who were represented primarily by frontline HR 
officers. These are weighted higher in the following sub-sections, but will still be critically 
assessed and triangulated later in the chapter. 
 
5.2.1. Factory H 
 
Factory H was established in 2012 in Town S and started production in 2013. It is a subsidiary 
of PH Company. PH is now formally a subsidiary of a SOE. Yet, the involvement of domestic 
capital in its development trajectory was significant. PH enlarged its operations in the auto 
parts manufacturing by acquiring a domestic-invested auto parts manufacturer, which was 
of similar size as PH back then. Therefore, the HR manager of Factory H described the factory 
as ‘a private enterprise controlled by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC)’.  
 
Factory H was not required to follow regulations strictly on SOEs, while it enjoyed discretion 
in making its own adjustments under the existing framework set by PH. Regarding human 





‘The personnel and performance appraisal systems of Factory H and other subsidiaries are 
centrally planned by PH. However, subsidiaries all over the country face different changes in 
the business environment, which are compatible with the central plan by PH to different 
degrees. In Factory H, the management style of SOEs does not work well. Therefore, we make 
adjustments to the central plan, and the headquarter does not set limits on the extent to 
which adjustments can be made. After all, Factory H is an independent business entity, and 
PH does not intervene that much.’ (YXY, Factory H, November 2016) 
 
Factory H manufactured and assembled over eighty types of plastic parts for cars. Production 
was mainly for the Sino-European carmaker in Town S. However, Factory H in fact produced 
parts for other carmakers and electric appliance manufacturers as well. The Sino-European 
carmaker hitherto still accounted for 80% of the clientele, but a number of its products were 
contracted out to lower-level parts suppliers, who delivered products to Factory H just for 
dispatching. At the time of the fieldwork, roughly 40% of the shops were making parts for 
other carmakers. It was a relatively recent move by Factory H to diversify its clientele. 
According the HR officer, the former general manager of Factory H had been reluctant to 
supply for companies other than the Sino-European carmaker, but the incumbent general 
manager was keen on ‘taking whatever orders which might help boost the business’. 
 
On the shop floor of Factory H, workers worked for one of the five main departments – the 
plastic injection department, the assembly department, the paint shop, the quality control 
department and the logistics department. The plastic injection department was the biggest, 
occupying half of the shop floor. The plastic injection, assembly departments, the paint shop 
and the warehouse were physically independent from each other.  
 
Work was organised in its own way in each department. In the plastic injection department, 
there were one to two positions at each of the ten injection machines where operators 
rotated. In the assembly department, operators were formed into groups of two to work on 
individual products. The paint shop was out of bounds for me, but from the outside a 
consecutive production line could be seen. Inspectors from the quality control rotated 




managed by two to three line leaders. Work was largely manual, especially in the assembling 
department and warehouse, although there were robotic arms installed next to the injection 
machines, so that workers did not have to go around the machine to deliver finished 
products. 
 
5.2.1.1. Workforce composition 
 
When I was visiting Factory H in late 2016, there were around 170 employees in the factory. 
The general manager and a majority of the departmental managers were dispatched from 
the PH headquarter, while other office staff were recruited locally. On the shop floor, a 
majority of workers were migrant workers from outside Guangdong, such as Guangxi, Henan 
and Sichuan. A number of them were also from other localities within the Guangdong 
Province. Regarding the rarity of locally born-and-bred workers, a HR officer TQ mentioned 
her negative impression of local workers:  
 
‘They don’t really treasure job opportunities in our factory. Some of them were no-show at 
job interviews. Some accepted the job but stayed for just a very short time because of trivial 
reasons, such as office facilities being too basic. This happens so often and now I am very 
cautious of hiring local people.’ (TQ, Factory H, November 2016) 
 
There was no official figure for the gender composition on the shop floor, but according to 
my observation, the gender split of the workforce here was more balanced than other auto 
parts factories, with the assembly department and the warehouse being more female-
dominated than the others. 
 
More than 70% of the workforce worked on the shop floor, and a majority of them were 
operators. There was no specific skill requirement for operators. Prior work experience was 
preferred (or necessary for veteran positions such as that of line leader) but not a must. Their 
age ranged from 18 to 50, and most of them were middle school leavers. They had diverse 
occupational backgrounds, but most of them had worked in factories before. Only a handful 





According to the HR officer, the labour turnover was ‘very high’ in Factory H. That year it had 
reached 50%. I had observed that only a handful of operators on the shop floor had been in 
the factory for more than a year. Most of the existing operators had worked in the factory 
for less than 6 months. 
 
5.2.1.2. Working hours 
 
The working hours for white-collared and blue-collared workers were drastically different in 
Factory F. Office workers and managers worked primarily eight hours a day and five days a 
week. There was only one shift for them. They were also entitled to an hour for lunch break. 
In contrast, the working hours of workers on the shop floor were exceptionally long. There 
were two shifts on the shop floor per day for operators. Each shift lasted for eight hours 
nominally, but everyone was expected to work for twelve hours per shift. For a twelve-hour 
shift, workers had a thirty-minute lunchbreak and a thirty-minute dinner break. 
Nevertheless, most of them went straight back to work after finishing their food in the 
factory canteen. The shifts were rotated fortnightly. Shop floor workers said it was rare for 
them to have both days off over the weekend, since they always worked on Saturdays. 
During the month when participant observation was conducted, there was a period when a 
majority of the operators worked for 13 days in a row, including Sundays. 
 
5.2.1.3. Pay system 
 
Pay for workers in in Factory H consisted of a number of components. Workers at different 
departments and positions were paid according to different pay calculation formula with 
different pay components. In other words, there was in fact more than one pay system 
running in parallel in Factory H. These systems could be categorised into the following types. 
 
The first type of pay system was primarily time-based. Under this system, workers were paid 
a base pay which was the biggest component in the whole monthly pay package. There were 




month. According to the HR officer, due to its state-owned background, the small difference 
between pay grades was aimed at keeping the pay dispersion more even within the factory. 
Office workers and engineers were paid in this way. Shop floor operators on probation, which 
lasted for one to three months, were also paid according to the number of hours with a base 
pay. Their base pay level followed the minimum wage level of Town S, which was set at 
¥1,510 at that time. This was only a temporary arrangement for these operators, since they 
would not be paid by time after the probation period.  
 
The second type of pay system was piece-based, which applied to the rest of the workers on 
the shop floor. Workers whom were paid according to this system had no base pay. Instead, 
they were paid according to the number of products that they made. Each product bore a 
different unit price, which was set by the quality control department. The department 
conducted time and motion studies to determine the unit price. TH, the department head 
explained that they had first set a production quota for each product based on the orders 
received from their clients, then they tested for the time needed to produce a unit14, and 
then deduced the unit price by taking into account the local minimum wage (TH, Factory H, 
November 2016).15 Both TH and TQ (an HR officer) claimed that the unit price of each product 
was evaluated every year. For operators, their piece wage per month would therefore be 
determined by the unit price of products they were assigned to make multiplied by the 
number of products they eventually made in a month. Auxiliary production staff, such as 
warehouse workers, were paid the average piece wage that all operators earned in a month. 
Line leaders were paid 120% of the average piece wage of operators in their respective line 
or shop.  
 
Although operators were paid by piece, they also received overtime pay. Given that the 
Labour Law and the Guangdong Regulation on Wage Payment do not provide specifications 
 
14 According to TH, the duration of product life cycle, the manpower needed to make a product and 
the degree of difficulty in making it were also taken into consideration. The production process was 
timed for multiple times, and a value slightly above the average would eventually be taken as the 
official time. 
15 For example, the local minimum wage in Town S was ¥1,510 per month in 2016. If a product took 




on how to calculate overtime pay for workers who are primarily paid by piece, TQ said that 
Factory H also paid operators who were not on a time-based base pay for overtime ‘in order 
to avoid breaking the law’. Nevertheless, the factory adopted an approach to calculate 
overtime pay which was borderline legal. It took ¥8.68, which was at the hourly local 
minimum wage in Town S in 2016, as the base for calculating overtime pay. Instead of 150% 
for overtime during weekdays and 200% during weekends, the factory paid 50% of the base 
pay for weekdays and 100% for weekends. TQ explained that smaller ratios were adopted 
because ‘the unit price in the factory is fixed loosely, and what workers earn during normal 
working hours is already higher than the base pay in other companies’ (TQ, Factory H, 
November 2016). The lower rate of overtime payment was to offset the effect of the unit 
price. 
 
Base pay or piece wage, as well as overtime pay made up the majority of workers’ monthly 
pay. There were other smaller components, such as subsidies for night shift, full attendance, 
high temperature working environment (paid in the summer months) and dangerous 
working environment (e.g. in the paint shop). Workers were offered on-site accommodation 
in the factory dormitory but had to pay for water and electricity. They could also have one 
free meal per working day and discounted meals at other times of the day in the factory 
canteen. TQ also mentioned the provision of social insurance for all workers, but few details 
were known about this. 
 
TQ mentioned performance pay but gave little details on this. In general, the performance 
pay of shop floor workers was determined by the performance of their department, while 
that of office workers was determined by the performance of the company as a whole. TQ 
also said that they had planned an end-of-year bonus. According to the plan, the bonus for 
each worker would amount to their average monthly pay throughout the year multiplied by 
a coefficient, which would be determined by the quarterly performance appraisal of 
individual workers, at departmental and corporate levels. The end-of-year bonus was 






To summarise, the three types of pay systems applied to different workers in Factory H are 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Type of employees Composition of pay 















Figure 2: Composition of pay under different systems in Factory H 
 
Pay adjustment could be achieved in a few different ways. For office workers, it was mostly 
by means of job promotion. The general manager could also approve pay grade promotion 
for individuals with outstanding performance levels, but TQ said that this was not common. 
For shop floor workers, she said pay rise would be achieved by becoming dexterous: ‘When 
they become better at their job, it is more likely for them to be assigned to products with a 
higher unit price which makes them earn more.’(TQ, Factory H, November 2016) Among the 
workers I had interviewed, most of their average monthly pay fell between ¥2,000 and 
¥4,500. 
 
5.2.2. Factory F 
 
Factory F is a subsidiary of a private enterprise, PF, based in southern China. According to the 
general manager of Factory F, PF had been the manufacturer with the biggest market share 
of a certain type of exterior auto part in the industry.16 Its standing in the industry was 
recognised by the local government as well. According to the general manager JYJ, ‘Recently, 
we have received a huge subsidy from the municipal government to promote industrial 
upgrading as a “model unit of Industry 4.0”. It is all because of the significant scale and 
industrial standing of our company.’ (JYJ, Factory F, September 2016) 
 





Factory F was established in Town S in 2013 to supply the Sino-European assembly plant 
exclusively. It processed and assembled a specific part for the assembly plant, which the 
plant sourced 80% of what it needed from Factory F and 20% from another local supplier. 
The parts were first manufactured in another production site of PF (SF) within the province, 
and then delivered to Factory F for further processing. Since the parts were bespoke for 
different models of cars built in the assembly plant, Factory F was also responsible for 
arranging parts with different features in particular sequences compatible with the mixed-
model production system in the assembly plant. The shop floor manager LXJ, who previously 
worked in SF and was involved in the establishment of Factory F, described that the setup of 
Factory F followed the general principle of PF:  
 
‘PF wants to have a processing hub like this next to every assembly plant that we supply. […] 
Factory F is responsible for some specific procedures of the production, but the parts 
themselves are primarily made in SF. Our tasks are also done in SF. It is just that some of these 
positions have been relocated to an independent plant in Town S.’ (LXJ, Factory F, November 
2016) 
 
There were three shops on the shop floor. Two shops were responsible for two variations of 
the product, while the third department was responsible for sequencing. The two production 
shops were organised along a production line respectively. Some efforts in automation had 
been introduced, such as robotic arms for delivery along the production lines and inspection 
machines to enhance the precision of the products. However, work was still primarily labour 
intensive. According to GF, a product was expected to be completed from start to finish along 
the production line in 65 seconds. Under this work arrangement, most workers recognised 
the importance of their collective capacity to reach the production targets. 
 
5.2.2.1. Workforce composition 
 
There were around 50 employees in Factory F at the time of my visit. Migrant workers 




were originally from the northeast and came to the south just to work in Factory F. Only a 
few workers were originally from Guangdong. 80% of the employees were male. According 
to the HR officer GF, the female workers worked in the factory because their husbands were 
working there too. 
 
Most employees were between the ages of 18 to 35. Two-thirds of the employees were 
operators. GF said that they did not have specific skill requirements for operators. However, 
they still strictly followed a number of criteria. For example, they preferred workers below 
the age of 35. Workers also had to be healthy and in good physical conditions, which included 
reaching a benchmark regarding their height, having good eyesight and no allergy to 
chemicals. They also preferred workers with higher education qualifications, such as 
vocational schools or above. The rationale behind this was that ‘better-educated workers are 
more capable of making suggestions for continuous improvement (kaizen), which is vital to 
the implementation of the lean production system in the factory.’ (GF, Factory F, January 
2017)  
 
A number of the veteran workers and those in the shop floor management were dispatched 
from SF after having worked there for a few years. Others were recruited via online 
advertisements or by ‘internal referrals’, meaning recommendations from existing workers. 
JYJ said that the factory had experienced difficulties in retaining workers, but GF described 
the workforce as quite stable, as they had at most four to five vacancies to fill in a year. 
 
5.2.2.2. Working hours 
 
According to employees in Factory F, Factory F adopted primarily a five-day work week and 
eight-hour work day, with two shifts a day rotating once every fortnight. There were times 
during the peak season when workers had to work one to two hours more a day, as well as 
during the weekend. The extra working time was not necessarily counted as overtime. GF 
said that Factory F adopted an ‘irregular working hour system’. Under this system, instead of 
extra working time in a standard working day, overtime was defined as the working hours 
additional to the pre-set monthly standard hours, but the number of these was not disclosed. 




seek approval from the local governments to apply the irregular working hour system on 
‘workers under special production conditions, with special working needs and 
responsibilities’ (Ministry of Labour, 1994). However, whether Factory F ran the system 
under official approval was unknown. During the fieldwork, extra working time in a standard 
working day was still taken as overtime work, but the HR officer said it was a form of ‘welfare’ 
provided to the workers rather than an obligation that the factory had to fulfil. 
 
5.2.2.3. Pay system 
 
The monthly pay of employees in Factory F primarily constituted of base pay and 
performance pay. The level of base pay was first determined by the education qualifications 
of a worker at the time of recruitment. Factory F set different entry levels of base pay for 
graduates from vocational schools or below, technical schools, polytechnics and universities. 
Workers also mentioned an increase to their current base pay on a biennial or annual basis, 
even though this announcement always came at a random time of the year. Therefore, the 
longer a worker stayed in the factory, the more frequently they would encounter a base pay 
increment, which resulted in a higher base pay by seniority. 
 
Performance pay was divided into two parts. The first part was an individual-level 
performance pay, based on monthly performance appraisal of an employee which was 
evaluated according to a number of dimensions, including punctuality, material 
consumption, quality assurance, occupational health and safety, and customer satisfaction. 
As the HR officer, GF received daily or monthly grading reports on workers’ performance 
from the shop floor management, such as group or line leaders. The management also 
triangulated the information with the depository for yield and material consumption figures. 
The second part was an organisational-level performance pay, based on how the factory as 
a whole met production targets. Production targets were determined by the weekly orders 
from the assembly plant, but Factory F also kept an additional inventory for three working 
days. The size of the organisational-level performance pay that each worker got was 





Performance pay split into these two parts accounted for about two-thirds of an operator’s 
monthly pay. Nevertheless, operators in the sequencing shop who were not directly involved 
in manufacturing did not receive the part of performance pay based on the meeting of 
production targets. Although they were paid an ‘overtime pay’ based on daily overtime 
hours, this still made their average monthly pay lower than that of other operators. Some 
operators mentioned that the factory had suspended production in July due to the high 
temperature and low season. For this reason, they were not required to work and were paid 
just the base pay. Apart from the monthly performance pay, additional bonuses were paid 
once to twice a year, which the amount of these was proportionate to the base pay of 
individual workers. 
 
Factory F paid a few types of subsidies, including subsidies for high temperature during 
summer months, transportation, food, as well as ‘a subsidy for every day worked’, which was 
similar to an attendance prize. GF explained that due to the remote location of Factory F and 
the insufficient public transport in the area, a transportation subsidy was paid to workers so 
that they could commute or go out to the city on their days off. She also mentioned that 
since the factory canteen was operated by a contractor, the factory could not discount the 
meals, but they subsidised workers’ meals by paying the food subsidy, which covered part of 
the food expenses in the factory. The factory also provided on-site accommodation for 
workers. Couples were allowed to have their own room, but they had to fulfil some 
conditions, such as submitting more kaizen recommendations every year.  
 
GF also mentioned social insurance provisions for all workers in Factory F. Instead of paying 
premiums based on workers’ average monthly pay as required by the Social Insurance Law, 
Factory F paid the minimum amount that the local social insurance authority stipulated. She 
was aware that ‘it was possibly illegal, but the factory had to strike a balance between 
workers’ welfare and operational costs.’ (GF, Factory F, March 2017) 
 
The adjustment of base pay was conducted annually, but there was no fixed time for doing 
this. According to GF, the regional headquarter decided both the amount of pay increment 





‘The [regional] headquarter would first set a limit of how many people would receive a pay 
increment. Let’s say they only allowed lifting the base pay for 20 out of 38 operators. Then 
the regional headquarter would determine which 20 operators would get it according to their 
pay grade and performance appraisal outcomes. Departmental management would see how 
the set amount of pay increment for each department would be distributed between those 
workers. Workers in a higher pay grade would get a bigger increment.’ (GF, Factory F, January 
2017) 
 
There were also special occasions when some workers were prioritised. For instance, GF said:  
 
‘Office workers are not paid the monthly production performance pay. Therefore, the 
company strikes a balance between office workers and shop floor workers by prioritising the 
pay increment of office workers. […] So I started working in the office from the start while 
some of my peers started on the shop floor at more or less the same time. Now I earn around 
¥3,000 per month, but their monthly pay can reach ¥6,000-¥7,000. […] That’s why the 
distribution of end-of-year bonuses and base pay increments prioritises us office workers 
more. Otherwise people would not stay.’ (GF, Factory F, January 2017) 
 
Most operators who I interviewed were only willing to tell me a rough range of their monthly 
pay on average. Their respective pay levels were between ¥3,000 and ¥6,000, in which 
¥4,000-¥5,000 is the most commonly reported range. The monthly pay of shop floor 
management could exceed ¥7,000. Yet according to GF, no one in Factory F earned more 
than ¥10,000 per month. 
 
5.2.3. Factory D 
 
Factory D is a subsidiary of a joint venture of a SOE (51%), DS, and a foreign-invested 
enterprise (49%). DS is partially owned by the Chinese partner of the Sino-European 
assembly plant. The close corporate relationship with the assembly plant is clear from the 
location of Factory D. Factory D and a number of other DS-controlled factories are located in 




companies with close corporate relationships with the Sino-European carmaker. According 
to HQM, the HR officer of Factory D, the SOE oversaw the daily operations of the factory, but 
the foreign partner retained control over financial matters. 
 
Factory D was also established in Town S in 2012 due to the opening of the Sino-European 
assembly plant. It supplied a number of exterior parts exclusively for the assembly plant, and 
which the assembly plant also sourced from them exclusively. These included tailor-made 
parts for four different car models, painted in a dozen of different colours. As HQM put it, 
‘that’s why there is no sales department but only an after sales service department in our 
company, as we don’t worry about the lack of orders. But our northeast-based headquarter 
does have a sales department, which is responsible for distributing orders to us.’ (HQM, 
Factory D, February 2017) 
 
There were three shops in the production department. They were responsible for plastic 
injection, painting and assembling. In the paint shop and injection shop, robotic arms were 
installed to assist the delivery of heavy products. The assembling shop had the biggest 
number of operators, since it was the least automated of them all. Half of the operators in 
the assembling shop worked with welding machines, which required one operator for each 
machine at one time. The other half worked on the manual assembling of smaller products. 
There was also a logistics department managing the warehouse. 
 
Despite the lack of opportunity to directly observe the production process, I was told about 
how Factory D took more proactive measures in supervising and disciplining workers in 
comparison with Factories H and F. For example, surveillance cameras were everywhere in 
the factory – on the shop floor, at the front and rear gates and on factory railings. Those on 
the shop floor were connected to the mobile devices of line leaders and managers, who could 
check them in real time. The use of mobile phones was only allowed in designated areas in 




specific smoking corners in the factory, but that they had to queue up for the handful of 
tokens required to be excused.17 
 
5.2.3.1. Workforce composition 
 
There were around 300 employees in Factory D. More than half of them were operators 
working on the shop floor. Others included office workers, engineers and auxiliary 
production staff, such as warehouse and quality control workers. More than 80% of the 
employees were male. HQM said, ‘we generally hire more male workers, but we always 
prefer female workers for positions where women can also be competent.’ (HQM, Factory D, 
February 2017) As observed, female operators worked mostly in the assembly department 
on manual and tasks which required precision and handicraft. There were also a few female 
workers responsible for quality checks. 
 
The workforce was young, with an average age of 22. HQM said that they avoided hiring 
people above 30 years old:  
 
‘Young people show more advantages in efficiency, responsiveness and physical strength. We 
have hired some workers in their 30s before. Yes, they were previously peasants and could lift 
very heavy things, but they just couldn’t communicate and collaborate with young colleagues 
well. They can’t establish rapport with them, and they are also not able to keep up with the 
speed and rhythm of work consistently. This affects teamwork negatively.’ (HQM, Factory D, 
February 2017) 
 
The majority of the employees were migrant workers from all over the country, but some 
shop floor management and office positions were occupied by local people born and bred in 
 
17 In contrast, workers in Factory H could go for a cigarette break whenever they wanted to. There 
was also a smoking area at a corner of the factory floor, so that workers did not have to go outside 
the plant. According to workers, that smoking area was temporary and informal, but I saw both 




Town S. The senior management team was all dispatched from the headquarters in the 
northeast. The section leader was the highest rank occupied by the employees recruited in 
Town S.18 
 
For the operators, there was no specific skill requirements, but Factory D asked for at least 
middle school qualifications and three years of prior working experience, which was not 
confined to the automobile industry. YXS, an engineer and section leader, mentioned that in 
his department, most newly-recruited engineers were fresh graduates from college or 
university.  
 
Factory D relied on labour dispatch agencies and internal referrals to recruit new operators. 
All new recruits signed a 3-year labour contract with the agencies. HQM said that DS 
encouraged the use of dispatched labour to lower labour costs and motivate workers by 
highlighting the advantages of being permanently-hired over labour dispatches. She 
explained that: ‘Although permanent and dispatched workers receive equal pay for equal 
work, permanent workers are paid on time on the 16th of each month, while dispatched 
workers have their pay delayed for a few days.’ (HQM, Factory D, February 2017) According 
to the Labour Contract Law, dispatched labour should constitute less than 10% of the total 
workforce in a company. However, in Factory F, since some of the existing permanent 
employees had left and very few dispatched workers eventually became permanently-hired, 
there was a persistent growth of the share of dispatched workers in the total workforce, 
which exceeded 10% at that time. 
 
5.2.3.2. Working hours 
 
Factory D strictly followed the production schedule of the assembly plant. At the beginning, 
a three-shift working hour system was adopted in the assembly plant and also in Factory D, 
where there were three eight-hour shifts per working day. However, the assembly plant later 
adopted a system similar to an ‘extended shift’ working hour system (Lehndorff, 1995), 
 





driving Factory D to do the same. Under this system, workers in Factory D worked two shifts 
per working day. Each shift lasted for eight and a half to twelve hours, although some 
workers said that sometimes it did not take that long to meet the production quotas of the 
day. As observed from the work schedule displayed on the shop floor, workers usually 
worked between five to six days a week. Saturdays and Sundays were for overtime or special 
duties, as observed in other European assembly plants in previous research (Schulten et al., 
2007). According to this schedule, there were about four hours in a day during which the 
factory suspended operations temporarily. Shifts were rotated once every fortnight. HQM 
described it as a win-win situation for both workers and the management: ‘workers prefer 
working a ten-hour shift as they have two hours of guaranteed paid overtime work every day. 
The management also likes how it helps reduce the headcount of workers on the shop floor.’ 
(HQM, Factory D, February 2017) 
 
5.2.3.3. Pay system 
 
From how HQM described it, the pay system of Factory D was similar to the so-called 
structural wage system first introduced in the Chinese public sector in 1985. The structural 
wage system was adopted mostly in SOEs, in which the state wanted to lower its control over 
pay decisions (Levine, 1997), although its prevalence was questionable (Cooke, 2005; Korzec, 
1992). A pay package in this system was generally given by a combination of base pay, 
functional pay linked to skills and competencies, as well as variable pay linked to 
performance (Ding and Warner, 2004). The pay system of Factory D largely followed the 
principle of a structural wage system, except that the former did not have a pay component 
explicitly rewarding seniority and loyalty. 
 
The pay system of Factory D was time-based. For the operators, there was a number of fixed 
components in the monthly pay. The biggest fixed component was the base pay, which 
Factory D set at the same level for everyone on the shop floor regardless of their position 
and rank. By 2016, it amounted to the legal minimum wage level stipulated for Town S. It 
was topped up also by other types of positional wage, which differentiated workers of 
different ranks. Even for workers in the same rank, their positional wage could be different 




were paid an additional ‘environmental subsidy’ per month. College and university graduates 
were also paid ¥200 more per month for their higher entry qualification. There was also an 
attendance subsidy of ¥100 per month, but workers said that the whole subsidy can be 
deducted for any day in which the workers are late or absent for work. 
 
Apart from the fixed components, other variable components included overtime pay and 
performance pay. Overtime pay was calculated on the basis of the base pay, which was the 
same for everyone on the shop floor. Performance pay included two categories. The first 
category was the individual performance pay, based on the quarterly performance appraisal 
of each worker. The end-of-year bonus was determined by shift and shop leaders and was 
also based on performance levels. According to ZGB, a shop leader, the HR department gave 
a lump-sum amount for the bonus payment of the whole department:  
 
‘For example, there were 14 people in a certain department, and the estimation for each 
person was set at ¥800. The total amount of the bonus would be ¥11,200. Then shop and 
shift leaders could decide how to distribute the ¥11,200 within the department according to 
individual performances. If workers had made mistakes at work, their share of the bonus 
would be redistributed to someone else who had performed well. Generally speaking, workers 
are aware that their bonus can be deducted for any mistake made.’ (ZGB, Factory D, February 
2017) 
 
The second category was based on the performance of Factory D and the assembly plant. 
The amount of this component often equalled to the sum of the other components paid in a 
given month. For this reason, it was also titled ‘double pay’. It was paid in an ad hoc manner 
throughout the year exclusively to the employees of the assembly plant and a particular 
group of auto parts factories which it had a close relationship with. Since it was determined 
by sales results, the payment of this bonus was often unannounced. Auto parts factories 
made independent decisions on how often this bonus would be paid throughout the year. 
 
Factory D also paid a high temperature subsidy during the summer months. It provided one 




coach services connecting the factory to nearby villages after each shift for workers who lived 
off site. HQM mentioned a comprehensive provision of social insurance as well, but gave 
little details on this. 
 
Decisions in pay adjustment were made solely by the headquarters in northeast China. 
According to HQM:  
 
‘Factory D has no discretion on pay setting. There might be some temporary measures 
regarding rewards for the sake of recruitment, but they are not regular. […] We provide data, 
such as labour turnover and performance appraisal outcomes, for our headquarters to decide 
the degree of pay adjustment.’ (HQM, Factory D, February 2017) 
 
There were three times of the year in which workers’ positional pay grade was adjusted. In 
February and July, workers with the top 70% of performance appraisal outcomes in the past 
quarter were eligible for a pay grade promotion. HQM said that as there were different pay 
scales for production workers, auxiliary production workers and office workers, and that the 
increment for each of them would also be different. Furthermore, ‘only workers who have 
been in the factory for more than one year are eligible for pay grade promotion. This is also 
conditional to performance appraisal. Hence it is not a universal pay adjustment for 
everyone.’ (HQM, Factory D, February 2017) In other words, the increment to the positional 
pay was de facto a conditional longevity pay. In June, the company would make decisions on 
rank promotion, which would also result in pay adjustments for workers.  
 
HQM claimed that production line workers earn ¥4,000 per month on average. Workers who 









5.3. Comparison of the three factories 
 
The above section provided a descriptive portrayal of the profiles and pay systems of 
Factories H, F and D. For the sake of clarity, the features of the three factories, as well as the 
existence of pay components in the three of them are hereby summarised in Table 4. Pay 
components applicable to every worker on the shop floor are indicated by a tick (✓). 
Feature Factory H Factory F Factory D 
Products Plastic interior parts Exterior parts Plastic interior parts 
Capital source Domestic acquired 
by SOE 
Domestic SOE and foreign 
Major clients Sino-European 







170 50 300 
Gender split Roughly 6:4 8:2 83:17 
Geographic origins 
of employees 
Mostly migrants Mostly migrants Mostly migrants 
Skill requirement Low Low Low 
Level of automation Low Medium Medium 
Labour turnover High Low Medium 
Monthly earning 
reported by workers 
¥2,000 - ¥4,500 ¥3,000 - ¥6,000 ¥2,000 - ¥4,000 
Pay system 
Base pay For non-production 
staff and operators 
on probation only 
✓ ✓ 
Overtime pay ✓ ✓ ✓ 




Positional wage Only for workers in 
dangerous positions 
 ✓ 
Performance pay ✓ (marginal) ✓ (accounted for 
two-thirds of total 
pay) 
✓ (marginal) 
Bonus End-of-year bonus 
since 2017 
End-of-year bonus End-of-year bonus 
plus ad hoc double 
pay 
Subsidies 
Night shift ✓   




High temperature ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Transportation  ✓ Coach service 
provided 
Food Offered in kind ✓  
Accommodation Offered in kind Offered in kind Offered in kind 
Type of factory 
regime 
Despotic Hegemonic Despotic 
Table 4: A comparison of the features and pay systems of Factories H, F and D 
 
5.3.1. Common features of the factories 
 
From the description of the three factories, we can see that they share a number of common 
features regarding the background of establishment and product market. First, they were 
established around the same time in Town S. Second, they had a common client which 
supported the absolute majority of their production. They also shared a similar position 
within the auto parts supply chain of the assembly plant, as they were all direct suppliers to 
the plant, and were responsible for the final stages of processing and delivery. This implied 
a degree of synchrony in production schedules with the assembly plant which eventually 
determined work intensity in auto parts factories. Especially when a just-in-time production 
system was rigorously practised in the assembly plant, both over- and under-production in 
these parts factories had to be avoided. Third, they were all subsidiary companies governed 
by their respective parent company or headquarters outside Town S. Plant-level 
management was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the factories, but they did not 
have power over all managerial decisions at the plant level. Fourth, work in these factories 
was labour-intensive for the operators who constituted a significant portion of the 
workforce. Prior industry-specific skill requirements for them were minimal. Fifth, the 
factories were not big, at least according to Chinese standards. The size of their respective 
workforce varied, but the factories would still be classified as ‘small-sized enterprises’ in 
terms of the number of employees, which ranges from 30 to 300 (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2017). 
 
Regarding pay systems, these factories all paid a mixture of fixed and variable components, 
instead of paying a fixed monthly pay to employees. Fixed components included base pay, 
positional wage and subsidies. The size of each individual component was determined by 




education qualification; or was in fixed amounts for the subsidies. Variable components were 
linked to the performance or productivity of individual workers and the factory. 
 
Some industry norms in fringe benefits were also observed among the factories. For 
example, accommodation within the gated factory site was provided in all of them. It 
resonated with the ‘dormitory compound’ described by Smith and Pun (2006:1463) but on a 
much smaller scale. This contrasts with some Japanese auto parts factories in Guangzhou, 
where on-site accommodation was not provided. ‘Dormitories’ were located within multi-
storey apartment buildings, where factories rent a certain number of storeys to 
accommodate workers, in nearby neighbourhoods. The Sino-European assembly plant also 
had dormitory compounds scattered in Town S. Some workers were still accommodated in 
those right next to the plant, but those living elsewhere had to commute by coaches 
arranged by the plant at specific times before and after each shift. In Factories H, F and D, 
living in the dormitory was not compulsory and almost free for the workers staying there. 
Social insurance and housing providence fund premiums were also paid in these factories, 
although the premium rate and the base of calculation adopted in individual factories were 
not known. Lastly, these factories all paid the high temperature subsidy required by law to 
all workers as a default subsidy in summer months, regardless of the job nature and working 
conditions of their position. 
 
5.3.2. Differences in the pay systems 
 
Meanwhile, the common exogenous features of the three factories were overshadowed by 
the range of different practices that individual factories adopted at the plant level. 
Regardless of the usage of a common set of pay components, each component weighed 
differently in the pay system of a factory, which was characterised by different rationales 
and parameters. Decisions regarding the design and implementation of the pay system were 
also subject to the company hierarchy which governed these factories. 
 
First, as the three factories all paid workers a combination of pay components in their pay 
package, each of the combinations was different. Labour regulations simply set a base line 




earning has to be made of. Apart from the payment of some subsidies and fringe benefits, 
which was understood as an industry norm, the monthly pay of workers in the three factories 
consisted of different repertoires of components. There were some components which were 
paid in all three factories, but the size of their share in the pay package varied. This means 
that a pay component could be a major part of the monthly pay of workers in one factory, 
but marginal in another. For instance, in Factories H and D, the proportion of performance 
pay was significantly smaller than in Factory F. 
 
Second, from how individuals described the pay system in the three factories, it is found that 
some components were called in the same way but meant entirely different things due to 
different parameters of calculation. For example, overtime pay was calculated at a rate which 
was lower than what was commonly understood in Factory H. It was paid conditionally 
according to total monthly working hours and as a benefit in Factory F. In Factory D, the basis 
for calculating overtime pay was disconnected from the pay level that workers were paid by 
default. Despite whether or not the outcome eventually met the legal standard, the method 
of calculation was always slightly deviant from common sense or the legal requirement in 
different ways. Another example is given by performance pay. Although the performance 
appraisal criteria in each factory was not released, we can derive from interview data that 
among the three factories Factory F conducted the most comprehensive appraisal on 
individual performance. In the meantime, Factory D conducted performance appraisal less 
frequently and with a less meticulous metric system. Performance pay in Factory H focused 
on the performance of departments and of the factory as a whole more than on individual 
workers. This implies room for variation across factories in terms of the scheme for 
performance metrics used in each factory, and the varying levels of rigour of the 
performance assessment conducted on workers. These factors imply that the calculation of 
performance pay is factory-specific.  
 
Third, the three factories varied in the proportion of variable pay components in the total 
monthly pay of a worker. Variable components occupied a major role in the monthly pay of 
workers in Factory H and F, as the proportion of variable pay could reach two thirds of the 
total pay. The variable pay components were always connected to productivity and to the 




meant that a higher proportion of the monthly pay of a worker depended on performance 
appraisal outcomes and on corporate sales results.  
 
Meanwhile, monthly pay in Factory D was primarily constituted by fixed components, such 
as base pay and positional wage. It is true that there were also performance-related variable 
pay components in Factory D, and the amount was also remarkable. However, because of 
the way in which the payment spread out throughout the year the sense of their existence 
was lower than the other components. The payment of the ‘double pay’ throughout the year 
was more likely to give workers’ annual income a real boost. As what explained by HQM: ‘the 
pay that workers get per month might not sound a lot. But if you divide the annual income of 
workers [including all the bonuses] into 12, the monthly amount is actually not that bad.’ 
(HQM, Factory D, February 2017) In this way, performance was still rewarded in Factory D, 
but not as instantly and as frequently in the case of Factories H and F. 
 
Fourth, the three factories were given different degrees of discretion under their respective 
decision making hierarchy. Among the three factories, not all of them had the final decision-
making power on pay in Town S due to their subsidiary status. Factory H enjoyed more 
discretion than the others. Although they had mostly inherited a system which was also used 
in other subsidiaries of the parent company, the parent company did not intervene much in 
how the system was implemented and altered at the plant level. In fact, despite its short 
history, Factory H had already experienced a drastic change in calculating pay for operators. 
When the factory was first established, time rate was used for a workforce of about 70 
workers. According to TQ, ‘We did not have a lot of orders at that time to keep workers busy. 
That was why workers shirked a lot as they did not have the incentive to even fulfil their duties 
during working hours.’ (TQ, Factory H, November 2016) The perpetual high labour turnover 
in the factory also resulted from ‘a lack of line leaders who are experienced in managing 
people’. That was why management decided to switch to a primarily piece-rate system to 
motivate workers based on the principle that ‘the harder or faster they work, the more they 




the piece-rate system increased workers’ self-motivation as their pay totally depended on 
how much they were willing to work.19 Another example is the end-of-year bonus. TQ said,  
 
‘In the region where our parent company is based in, paying an end-of-year bonus is rare. 
Also in Factory H, there are no end-of-year bonuses. One of our Japanese clients sends us a 
questionnaire every year to survey how much their suppliers pay for end-of-year bonuses. We 
never reply because we don’t have any here. But given that many other factories nearby pay 
a bonus, our general manager is currently considering it.” (TQ, Factory H, November 2016) 
 
These two examples show that Factory H enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy to assess 
the extent to which a centrally-planned system designed by the parent company met local 
needs and could fit into industry norms in Town S. 
 
In contrast, for Factories F and D fewer pay decisions were made at the plant level. In the 
case of Factory F, the only HR officer at the factory said that she was not directly responsible 
for pay setting. The regional headquarter decided on the base pay, on the parameters of 
measuring pay components and on pay adjustment plans. The responsibility to communicate 
with headquarters regarding pay issues largely fell on JYJ. Originally a manager in the regional 
headquarter, he was appointed to oversee the establishment and operation of Factory F, but 
he stayed only a few days a week in Town S. According to him, being the general manager of 
Factory F was merely one of the several hats he wore in the company. Apart from that, he 
also oversaw other production sites of PF in the province, meaning that he was constantly 
commuting between different cities. Therefore, the articulation of pay setting rarely took 
place within Factory F. GF said, ‘if we really have to enquire on something about pay, we have 
to ask the general manager, and then he would go and ask the headquarters. But this is very 
 
19 This view was echoed by a Japanese auto parts factory manager also in Town S, who argued that 
‘production line workers just do not work as hard during night shifts as they do in the day when 
everyone (managers of different levels) is at work, and we cannot afford having managers working 
round the clock. The piece work element pushes people to work even if there is no one looking at them.’ 
(NXC, J-Factory Y, March 2017) To the factory management, the piece wage system was a substitute 
of ‘managerial talents on the shop floor’, especially when they found that the morale in the factory 




rare.’ (GF, Factory F, January 2017) There were some special provisions in transport and 
accommodation for Factory F workers due to the geographical remoteness of Town S. For 
example, workers were paid transport subsidies for commuting to town and there were rent-
free rooms to accommodate couples (otherwise they would be accommodated in gender-
segregated shared dorm rooms). These benefits were not available in other subsidiary 
companies of PF, but they had been approved by the regional headquarters. 
 
Factory D seemed to be under the tightest control by the parent company. Decisions on pay 
setting and adjustment were made remotely by the company headquarter. The HR officer 
who I interviewed claimed that she was the only person in the company who knew about the 
pay system, but she was only responsible for implementing orders from the parent company. 
There was not even a manager in the factory who was responsible for pay, as she mentioned 
that the head of the personnel department was actually the facilities maintenance manager 
who held a concurrent post as her direct supervisor. 
 
5.4. Problems with pay communication practices 
 
In the following section, I will critically assess how the official description of the design and 
implementation of pay systems were understood by the workers governed by these systems. 
The need to have an alternative account of these practices stems from the phenomenon that 
workers presented either a different picture the pay systems, or there was a general 
ignorance of what kind of rules determined their pay. It is not within the remit of this section 
to verify whether the factory management really lived up to their own rules or promises of 
how workers should be remunerated. Instead, it seeks to delineate how workers were 
swayed from accessing the channels to and acquire the knowledge to conduct checks and 
balances of the mechanisms in play. 
 
Therefore, in this section, I will first give examples of how workers thought their version of 
the pay system did not coincide in the management’s, and also how they were not actually 
sure about whether they coincided. Second, I will describe the channels which were open to 
workers to navigate the pay system in their factory at three junctures throughout their 




Workers’ experience in Factories H, F and D are considered alongside the accounts from 
workers and HR practitioners in other factories in and near Town S, in order to determine 
the prevalence of the practices, as well as the extent to which factory management resorted 
to a particular practice. Third, I will look into the circumstances under which workers felt 
bothered or frustrated by the perplexity of pay calculations. Lastly, symptoms of withdrawal 
from pay discussion due to frustration are identified. 
 
5.4.1. Episodes of discrepant accounts of pay system from workers and management 
 
In order to investigate how well workers understood the pay system under which they were 
governed in each factory, I cross-checked workers’ descriptions of the pay system with those 
provided by the management. In Factory F, workers generally said that they are clear about 
the composition of their monthly pay, and that the list of the pay components that they 
provided with was consistent with what was outlined by GF. Nevertheless, discrepancies 
between accounts by different individuals were often observed. They arose in different 
dimensions. One dimension was about the composition of the monthly pay. For instance, a 
line leader who had worked in Factory D for three years and was easily one of the most senior 
on the shop floor, claimed that there was no reward for seniority in the factory. (XXS, Factory 
D, April 2017) In Factory H, confusion occurred over the payment of food subsidies for night 
shift workers. On the job advertisement posted outside the factory, it was explicitly stated 
that workers who chose not to have a late night meal during night shifts would receive a cash 
payment of ¥20 per day. However, a worker told me that not only had the ¥20 not been paid, 
but workers were also charged ¥10 for each meal during night shifts, which was ‘even more 
expensive than eating outside the factory’. (TSY, Factory H, November 2016) 
 
In Factory H, another issue related to piece rates was observed. According to the 
management, the unit price of each product was evaluated and revised on a yearly basis. 
However, some workers ranted about the unit price having been lowered three times in the 
past year. As a result, even though there was not an explicit requirement to work faster, they 





The unexpected cut in unit prices circulated among a handful of expressive workers as gossip, 
but in Factories H and D an even more prevalent sentiment was given by a general sense of 
opacity on how the total monthly pay was calculated, or what was included in a monthly pay. 
For example, a worker from Factory D said,  
 
‘Formally speaking, higher temperature subsidy is not included in my monthly pay. Of course 
I know that the subsidy is only paid in certain months, and that it amounts to ¥150 per month. 
But how come I earn exactly the same amount in a month with the subsidy is supposedly paid 
as in another month when the subsidy is not paid? I don’t really get it.’ (XXS, Factory D, April 
2017) 
 
A vignette of workers’ casual conversation in Factory H illustrated the sentiment. One day, I 
attempted to converse with a group of workers, who were randomly gathered to do some 
polishing work on a half-processed product. They did not seem to know each other very well, 
and it was quiet throughout the time. No questions received responses of longer than five 
words. However, when asked whether they had been paid that month, workers started 
speaking up about their pay. They started sharing rumours about how other people were 
paid much more than themselves, as well as how they were unclear about how the others 
achieved this. ‘I heard that the guy over there got more than ¥4,500 last month. I don’t know 
how he managed.’ ‘I have no idea either. The amount is different for me every month. It is so 
confusing.’ ‘Does your pay fluctuate every month a lot?’ I asked. ‘Not really, sometimes it is 
more, sometimes it is less. I don’t really know how it happens. Nobody really bothers to give 
us an explanation, and no one makes the move to ask our leaders either.’ 
 
In Factory F, workers’ understanding of the pay system was even more ambiguous. Similar 
to workers in Factory D, workers in Factory F gave generally positive responses when asked 
about whether they knew about the components that constitute their monthly pay. 
Meanwhile, some of them also sounded perplexed by the causes of pay level fluctuation, 
although they were not necessarily concerned about the change. For example, one worker 
said he knew that his base pay had been raised once, ‘just because my leader told me about 
it. The problem is, I never know the exact level of my base pay.’ (TXS, Factory F, January 2017) 




paid every month, unless the difference was significant: ‘of course I will have to know what 
has happened if my pay this month is ¥500 short of normal.’ (TSX, Factory F, March 2017) 
 
5.4.2. Pathways towards different degrees of ignorance of pay systems 
 
The above examples show that the accounts of workers on how the pay system works in 
practice are not always consistent with those of the management. It certainly matters which 
of the parties is telling the truth, but it is out of the realm of this research to verify this issue. 
However, what stands out is the general sentiment of perplexity among workers from all 
three factories regarding the fluctuation of pay levels, regardless if their attitude towards the 
pay resulted in follow-up actions being taken. 
 
In the following section, I will trace back to the potential factors which result in the workers’ 
perplexity over pay levels. It is likely that workers have to navigate a pay system different 
from that in their previous job, given the variations of pay system in different companies. 
Therefore, I will trace back to the mechanisms which shaped (or prevented the shaping of) 
how workers learnt about the pay practices at the plant level throughout the different phases 
of their employment relationship. Then the channels from which they learnt about the pay 
system, as well as barriers that they had to overcome in the process of deepening and 
sustaining their knowledge, will be further delved into. 
 
5.4.2.1. The recruitment process 
 
Throughout the recruitment process, job advertisements provided the first glimpse of the 
pay system in a factory. All three factories carried out both open recruitment and internal 
referrals for new workers. As for open recruitment, there were a number of ways to publicise 
job openings. First, factories posted job advertisements on recruitment websites or on online 
forums. Some recruitment websites provided templates for employers to fill in the details 
for the job. Alternatively, employers were allowed to display job requirements by selecting 
from the list of options pre-set by the websites. Jobseekers registered on the websites could 




also actively approached jobseekers who created an online profile on the website but had 
not applied for jobs in Factory H. Second, factories recruited workers with the help of 
recruitment agencies. Factory H used this as one of the ways to recruit workers, while Factory 
D recruited basically all operators through one to two agencies. There were a number of 
independently run recruitment agencies in the industrial zone which recruited for auto parts 
factories. They put up posters at their storefront or street stalls for each job. Some agencies 
also ran a Wechat20 account which circulated job advertisements to people registered to it. 
The third way was the most primitive, in which factories posted job ads at the factory gate. 
Factory H did that, and quite a number of workers mentioned finding about the job opening 
when they ‘were wandering around the block’. GF from Factory F said that they did not do it 
at the factory gate but that they posted ads in nearby villages instead. 
 
A typical job advertisement included the name or description of the employer, job title, 
requirements, a laundry list of pay components and fringe benefits, as well as a rough range 
of pay levels rounded to thousands. Some factories also specifically mentioned the amount 
of base pay. However, the accuracy of information on the job advertisements was not 
guaranteed, no matter whether they were posted by official sources. Following observations 
at the recruitment agencies, recruiters were keen to elaborate on the pay package of each 
job when jobseekers approached them, but their elaboration was intertwined with rumours 
and sometimes false projections.  
 
There were different interpretations for who should be responsible for the inaccurate 
information on job advertisements. For instance, HQM from Factory D reckoned it the fault 
of the recruitment agencies. Workers who got a job via a recruitment agency had to pay a 
fee to the agency, while factories also needed to pay the agency for every worker whom they 
eventually hired through it. In other words, recruitment agencies earned a commission from 
both workers and employers for every successful job match. Hence, ‘they would say anything 
to get people sign up for the job.’ (HQM, Factory D, April 2017) Nevertheless, some believed 
 
20 Wechat is the most popular social media platform in China. The absolute majority of the factory 
workers interviewed used it on a daily basis for socialising and for online payments. It is also known 
that in Factories H, F and D, factory announcements and work schedules were announced in Wechat 




that it was a deliberate attempt of employers. NXC from J-Factory Y, who also recruited 
workers from agencies, mentioned that ‘of course you have to present the best scenario on 
the job ad, such as how much someone would earn in the maximum. Otherwise it would not 
look attractive to people.’ (NXC, J-Factory Y, March 2017) XXS from Factory D also said that 
‘our company told recruitment agencies that monthly pay here could go up to ¥4,000. […] No 
one in my shop earn that much, including myself.’ (XXS, Factory D, April 2017) Similarly, job 
advertisements at the front gate of Factory H stated that the monthly pay of operators ‘could 
reach ¥5,000’, but workers commented that the amount could only be reached under 
exceptional circumstances, which had not happened to any of them yet. 
 
Therefore, job advertisements could be taken as a reference, but the extent to which they 
were an honest presentation of the pay system was not guaranteed. More concrete 
information about the pay system was provided during HR orientation prior to the 
commencement of the job, or during pre-job training, when workers were given the 
opportunity to ask questions. Most workers in Factories H, F and D remembered being 
briefed about the pay system together with other rules and regulations that they had to 
observe in the factory in that occasion. Some workers, who were mostly from Factory F, also 
mentioned that the labour contract that they sign with the factory included a description of 
the composition of their monthly pay. 
 
Nevertheless, workers pointed out that the induction that took place before the job started 
was always brief. The memory of what was briefed at the beginning of the job also did not 
last long for workers, especially those who had worked in the factory for more than two 
years. For instance, most workers in Factory F recalled that they were briefed during pre-job 
training, but a number of them said that they remembered the components roughly but not 
much about the details. One said, ‘the HR officer explained that to us, but no one would try 
hard to remember them over time.’ (LYZ, Factory F, January 2017) 
 
It was heard that workers were issued an employee handbook, especially in assembly plants. 
The handbook would include the rules and regulations that workers needed to know, such 




updated copies of the handbook regularly. However, giving out employee handbooks was 
not heard of in Factories H, F and D. 
 
5.4.2.2. On pay day 
 
After starting work at a factory, the monthly pay day tended to be the most critical time 
juncture when workers learnt about how they were remunerated. It would also be the time 
in the month when workers were most likely to include the topic of pay in their daily 
conversation or agenda of concerns. In the following section, I will look at how workers were 
informed of the remuneration in tangible form, that is payslips; as well as in intangible forms, 
given by of verbal exchanges with factory management.  
 
Theoretically, workers could learn about the breakdown of their monthly pay from the 
payslip issued by the factory on pay day. Employers are required to issue payslips to workers 
by law. The Guangdong Wage Payment Regulation (2016) states that employers should 
provide workers with a list of wage items which their pay is based upon. Workers also have 
the right to make enquiries cross-checking their own pay records in the company payroll with 
their payslips. 
 
Albeit required by law, the issuance of payslips cannot be taken for granted. As in the case 
of other Japanese auto parts factories in Town S and other cities, payslips were issued in 
paper form when workers were paid monthly. From the payslips that one engineer from a 
Japanese auto parts factory showed me, the amount of each pay component was displayed 
up to two decimal places. However, Factories F and D did not issue payslips at all, not even 
in an electronic form. A similar situation was also observed in the Sino-European assembly 
plant. From what people shared on an online forum dedicated to the workers in the assembly 
plant, it emerged that the assembly plant did not issue payslips to workers regularly. During 
a gathering for HR professionals in Town S, a HR officer from a supplier factory of the 
assembly plant told me that workers had to check their own pay via a telephone hotline. 
‘They have to key in their employee ID first, then their pay breakdown will be read to them by 
via a chatbot.’ (NU, Factory U, January 2017) If workers did not make an enquiry, they would 




factories nowadays, including Factories H, F, D and the assembly plant, paid workers by bank 
transfer, instead of in cash. 21 
 
Among the three factories, only Factory H allegedly issued payslips to workers in paper form. 
However, LKX, another HR officer of Factory H, said that the payslips only show rough figures, 
as they could not afford to make payslips as rigorously as in Japanese factories. (LKX, Factory 
H, April 2017) Therefore, it was not surprising to hear about problems regarding payslips 
from workers. Some workers mentioned that payslips were only issued ‘every now and then’, 
while some had never received one. 
 
Even if a tangible form of proof of remuneration was not available, some workers would have 
still liked to receive some kind of intangible reassurance, such as a verbal explanation on the 
matter. Due to the variable components in their monthly pay packages, fluctuations of pay 
levels on a monthly basis were normal. However, without a proper breakdown of the total 
pay, it was difficult for workers to work out what caused their pay of a given month to be 
higher or lower than previously. Line management was mentioned as a first point of contact 
for workers to make enquiries regarding the amount of pay in a specific month. Line leaders 
would lay out the possible explanations of pay fluctuations or make some speculations of 
why workers managed to earn more or less than normal in a given month, such as cash 
penalties imposed for making mistakes at work, and the shortfall in pay due to less overtime 
work. If workers were not satisfied with the explanations, or the line management failed to 
figure out the reason behind the fluctuation, going to the HR department would be the next 
step to take. 
 
Workers could make an enquiry to the HR department in their factory, but the procedure to 
do so varied from factory to factory. In some factories such as Factory F, workers could reach 
the HR department directly. They could go to the office of the HR officer or the factory 
 
21 According to a news report, the non-issuance of payslips mostly happened in small- and micro-sized 
private companies, especially in the construction and service industries, in the municipality where 
Town S is located (Ouyang, 2018). Factories F and D did not fall into the usual category of companies 




manager22, and ask to check the payroll to see the breakdown of the monthly pay. The HR 
officer and workers said that it was possible only because Factory F had a small workforce, 
and they had already established rapport with each other. Some workers described the 
process to be ‘checking the payroll on the factory manager’s computer’. 
 
In contrast, the procedure in Factory D was more complex. Workers had to go through the 
standard procedure of reaching the HR department as in any other matters – contact their 
direct line leader, obtain permission level by level, make an appointment with the HR 
department, and then reach the HR officer. HQM said that this procedure was set in place to 
‘prevent chaos’, as ‘the HR office tended to be swarming with workers coming to ask about 
their pay after payday.’ (HQM, Factory D, February 2017) The enquiry had to be made by the 
workers concerned in person. As stated by a line leader LJM, ‘It is not in my position to ask 
the HR department on behalf of workers. After all, everyone’s situation is different.’ (LJM, 
Factory D, April 2017) 
 
Anyway, workers in Factories F and D could check their payroll on a spreadsheet displayed 
on the computer screen of the HR officer in charge (or sometimes the factory director in the 
case of Factory F). The spreadsheet literally showed the breakdown of their pay, but they 
were not allowed to take away any tangible proof of their pay breakdown. They were not 
given a printout or allowed to take a screenshot or photo of the spreadsheet. Some workers 
remained sceptical about how simply seeing their own payroll just on the screen could help 
clarify their doubts. Without knowing the general picture of how much people in other 
departments or positions earned, they remained unclear about whether they had earned the 
amount that they ought to. According to LDJ, a worker from Factory F,  
 
‘There are times when we should go and check it out. For example, if someone earned ¥100 
less than another person who works on the same line, he or she would go to the HR and check 
it. However, everyone knows that this wouldn’t clarify their doubts anyway. […] We all do the 
same job, but I don’t know how much people in each department earn, and how the earnings 
 
22 In Factory F, the factory manager, who is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the factory, 




at different jobs and ranks differ. I can just see my own payroll. After a few times of checking 
the payroll, I just feel… [Sigh]’ (LDJ, Factory F, March 2017) 
 
XXS from Factory D also described a situation, which illustrated how the information 
disclosed to them could be inaccurate or misleading:  
 
‘When I was at the HR office, someone checked my payroll and simply told me, “Yes, the high 
temperature subsidy is paid.” […] He simply showed me a printout which indicates the 
existence of an extra subsidy of ¥150 [for high temperature] in my monthly pay, but [the total 
amount] doesn't match my bank balance. That’s why I don’t get it. Isn’t this cheating?’ (XXS, 
Factory D, April 2017) 
 
Workers’ experiences of confronting the HR department were not necessarily positive. Not 
only was it related to the aforementioned unreliability of the pay information presented to 
them, but also how the HR officers dismissed their problems. DJW, a former worker from 
Factory D recalled,  
 
‘There were always people spotting something wrong with their pay after pay day and going 
to the HR office for enquiries. HR had all sorts of excuses for us to dismiss accusations of 
underpayment, be it cost for uniforms, unpaid leaves, or ongoing probation periods etc…. 
Sometimes we would make fun of each other, “guess what excuse you are going to get from 
the HR this time?”’ (DJW, Factory D, April 2017) 
 
The bureaucratic hurdles that workers had to overcome made the process of making an 
enquiry tedious, thus created a sense of fatigue for workers. As a result, they gradually lost 
patience in persistently seeking a response from the management, and eventually gave up. 
DJW commented,  
 
‘When I am shown the spreadsheet of my own account on the HR officer’s computer screen, 




the figures. In a way you are told something, but at the end you don’t seem to have learnt 
anything.’ (DJW, Factory D, April 2017) 
 
LDJ from Factory F said that she found checking the payroll ‘meaningless’. As she put it, ‘if 
the management just wanted to pay you a certain amount in total, knowing the breakdown 
[i.e. what contributed to the fluctuation] would not make any difference.’ (LDJ, Factory F, 
March 2017) 
 
Workers from Factory H spoke less about their experiences of making pay enquiries in the 
HR department, but some mentioned the existence of mental barriers blocking them from 
making a move. It was observed that frontline HR roles responsible for receiving workers in 
Factories H, F, D and auto parts factories were predominantly female. In the auto parts 
industry, the shop floor and senior management team were male-dominated, but it was 
common for women to take up mid- to low-ranking office roles. Given the social context in 
which clerical office work is highly gendered as a female job, having the role played by female 
staff deterred some male workers from confronting them for grievances. It was also more 
likely for young female HR staff to establish rapport with workers in daily settings, especially 
on the male-dominated shop floor or industry, blurring the line between the management 
and the managed. In Factory D, workers mentioned that the female HR clerk responsible for 
wage payment sometimes helped out on the shop floor during busy seasons. Interactions 
between them remained friendly, and workers worried about ‘bothering her’ by asking too 
much about pay. Moreover, workers’ perceptions on how approachable the frontline HR 
staff were also affected their judgement on whether to make enquiries or not. For example, 
TY worked as a shop floor supervisor in J-Factory T, a Japanese auto parts factory in 
Guangzhou. He mentioned a female HR officer in his factory, who was responsible for 
calculating and paying wages but ‘was notorious for being unresponsive and rude. […] When 
people went to her for something which doesn’t look right, she just drove people away. Other 
line managers who brought up problems in the pay calculations of their subordinates 
refrained from directly confronting her, and could only “get the issues sorted” via other 






5.4.2.3. Everyday life 
 
Apart from specific junctures, other occasions throughout the employment relationship 
which workers could take advantage of to learn about and discuss the pay system were also 
examined. In the section below, I will look at the moments which facilitated pay discussion 
collectively and individually. On the one hand, workers’ experience in utilising collective 
channels enabled by employee voice mechanisms and wage collective negotiations will be 
described. On the other hand, I will also delve into how workers accumulated their 




In a collective dimension, plant-level trade unions should facilitate a platform of pay 
information exchange. Although plant-level trade unions are often management-controlled 
and under the scrutiny of local governments, there are also cases when the unions were 
more prone to communicating workers’ grievances and demands in collective bargainings or 
negotiations (Chang, 2017). It is in the context of collective bargaining in all companies, 
rather than just those in the public sector, being promoted by the provincial governments 
and provincial branches of the ACFTU since 2010 with legislations and personnel training. It 
becomes more feasible for workers to learn about their rights and articulate demands for 
pay, which has been a focal point of collective bargaining, through participation in the plant-
level union in various ways (Deng, 2016).  
 
Unfortunately, the malfunction of trade unions in Factories H, F and D made this platform 
unavailable. In Factory H, the plant-level union nominally existed but remained inactive. YXY 
the HR manager told me that he was the union chair, and that TQ, one of the HR officers, 
was also a union committee member, but TQ claimed that she did not remember being 
involved in this. The union signboard was simply placed on the floor at a corner of the HR 





In Factories F and D, there was no trade union at the plant level. For Factory F, workers’ were 
covered by the trade union based at the regional headquarters. According to GF, a union had 
not been established in Factory F. She only maintained personal connections with the trade 
union at the regional headquarters. No one working in Factory F was known to be involved 
in the union committees. Even the shop floor manager, who had worked for the regional 
headquarters before being expatriated to Town S, and was the longest serving employee in 
the factory, had no knowledge of them.  
 
Existing contacts between workers in Factory F and the trade union at the regional 
headquarters were mostly carried out over Wechat. Some workers knew about the existence 
of the union by following the Wechat public account of the trade union, which notified its 
followers of the news on the company’s development and policies. One of them said, 
‘Wechat is really convenient these days. There is a column in the public account where 
workers can send feedback.’ (LXJ, Factory F, January 2017) However, he had never sent any 
feedback. When asked about how much he knew about the trade union in his company, he 
replied, ‘I don’t know much. I rarely have anything to do with the trade union, even when I 
was working in Guangzhou. This is probably because trade union matters are not really 
relevant to my job duties.’ (LXJ, Factory F, January 2017) A few other workers mentioned an 
annual questionnaire survey conducted over Wechat on how they felt about the company 
and about work in general, which included working conditions including pay. They could 
participate in anonymously, but only one of them had ever participated. The worker who 
participated was also unclear about whether the survey was actually conducted by the HR 
department or by the trade union.23 As a result, they were hardly aware of the degree to 
which the trade union actually mattered, and how relevant it was with regard to pay setting 
in the Factory F as well as in the regional headquarters. 
 
In Factory D, HQM said that the company was quite serious about formal institutions such as 
trade unions and party branches due to their state-owned background. At the plant level, 
notice boards regarding the trade union were visible on the shop floor. Yet, it did not operate 
locally in Town S. As mentioned by HQM, two employees of Factory D were in the union 
committee of the parent company, as ‘management thought that someone representing the 
 




voice of employees from the subsidiary would be sufficient’. (HQM, Factory D, February 
2017) Both of them were managers expatriated to Town S by the parent company. The union 
chair, which was a full-time position, was previously the HR department head of the parent 
company. 
 
In fact, some workers mentioned that they were encouraged to join the union in a recent 
initiative of the factory. When asked whether they had heard about the trade union, one 
said:  
 
‘Trade Union? I heard about it recently from a factory notice. But no one tells us what they 
do and why we should join the union all of a sudden. […] These days [the management] has 
also mentioned joining the factory branch of the Communist Party. […] There is no eligibility 
requirement. Maybe it is because of our factory background, but [joining the union and the 
party] does not mean much to us. It is just a very brief call for applications – “sign your name 
if you are interested, otherwise just don’t be bothered.”’ (LJM, Factory D, April 2017) 
 
YXS the engineer mentioned that his then section leader, who had left the factory, had 
encouraged new recruits to join the union when he first entered Factory D. He submitted a 
membership form, but had neither followed up the application nor heard from the union. 
 
As one of the most veteran workers in Factory D, YXS did not know who the union 
chairperson was, nor whether anyone was a union representative in his department. He said:  
 
‘I only know about the entertainment activities organised by the union, but nothing at all 
about other aspects. I think the trade union should collect workers’ opinions, but how a union 
exists in a company depends on the management’s attitude towards it. From what I see now, 
Factory D does not really care about trade unions that much.’ (YXS, Factory D, February 2017) 
 
Therefore, the participation of trade unions in pay setting at the plant level was hardly heard 




plant level. From the workers’ perspective in Factories H, F and D, even if they were aware 
of the existence of the union, its role in circulating pay information and articulating pay 
demands was limited. 
 
Intriguingly, some Japanese auto parts factories in Town S presented a different story of the 
plant-level union and its involvement in wage collective negotiations. The initiative of the 
provincial-level trade union to promote wage collective negotiation had primarily stemmed 
from a strike in a J-Factory B, which is a Japanese auto parts factory in Town S, back in 2010. 
Access to that particular factory was not obtained during the fieldwork, but a HR consultant, 
who had maintained close collaborations with its plant-level trade union, mentioned that 
‘[the factory] still conducts wage collective negotiation three times a year, although the 
frequency does not mean much since it is still by and large led by the management.’ (A, 
Consultancy Firm 1, December 2016) 
 
HR officers from some other Japanese auto parts factories in Town S also claimed that they 
did wage collective negotiations at least once a year. Some said that it was done between 
the management and the trade union. For example, the HR manager of J-Factory G described 
the procedure of negotiations in his factory:  
 
‘The management first make a proposal of pay adjustments according to a range of data, 
including the level of bonuses paid to workers in previous years, local GDP and consumer price 
index, wage guidelines and company performance. The proposal is then sent to the trade 
union, and the union committee raise a counter proposal […] We have been doing that for 
two years now. The process has always been quite smooth, probably because our boss is more 
assertive.’ (HBL, J-Factory G, March 2017) 
 
A HR officer of another Japanese factory J-Factory A also mentioned a similar process in his 
factory, where the collective bargaining agreement was signed by the management and 
trade union, under the witness of representatives from the municipal human resources and 





However, the degree to which frontline workers participated in the negotiation, or how they 
became aware of the process at least remains questionable. In J-Factory T, trade union 
committee members who negotiate on the workers’ behalf are mostly middle to senior 
management. TY from J-Factory T who had participated in wage collective negotiations, said:  
 
‘No operator participates in the negotiations. The representatives are all at least a shift or 
group leader. […] Workers’ representatives are elected by other workers, but it is hard for 
ordinary operators to be elected. Even if they were elected, they might not dare to attend the 
negotiation either.’ (TY, J-Factory T, October 2016) 
 
The low participation of frontline workers as negotiation representatives was also related to 
whether lower-ranking workers could get access to undisclosed data of the company for 
making a union proposal. He said,  
 
‘It is hard for us employees to get reliable information on the company’s operations. […] As 
line management we can get data on productivity and sales, but not on pay. […] We learn 
about pay levels and their adjustments in other factories through family members working in 
other factories. […] Even though our union chair is actually the head of the finance 
department, his position does not allow him to disclose key company data either.’ (TY, J-
Factory T, October 2016) 
 
Another HR consultant who worked with J-Factory B remarked that regardless of the track 
record of frontline operators being elected in the union to represent workers in wage 
negotiations in the factory, ‘workers prefer candidates from the management now because 
they have gradually realised that lower-ranking employees are not as capable and 
resourceful.’ (KC, Consultancy Firm 1, January 2017) 
 
The practice of wage collective negotiation and trade union involvement were confined to 
foreign-invested, particularly Japanese, factories in Town S. How meticulously the 
procedures of conducting wage collective negotiation were followed was also different from 




had wage collective bargaining, but ‘frankly speaking, this form of action is kind of 
meaningless, as it does not take place in the same way as in SOEs. […] It’s just a gesture.’ 
(ZJH, T-Factory H, April 2017) Among the group of auto parts factories surrounding the Sino-
European carmakers, ironically including those with connections to SOEs, wage collective 
negotiation and trade union involvement were non-existent. A HR officer from another 
factory right next to Factory D merely said that ‘it is on the agenda of the company, but there 





Without a publicly known or collective mechanism to facilitate pay discussions on the shop 
floor, workers in Factories H, F and D learnt about their pay and attempted to articulate wage 
demands on an individual basis in their personal capacity. Most of them recognised the 
inevitability to compare pay levels among each other. It was also common for them to share 
the sentiment that ‘nothing is more important than pay in a job’. Nonetheless, before 
opening up to talk about pay, some conditions had to be taken into consideration to identify 
an appropriate timing or occasion for discussion. 
 
The first condition was whether the workers actually had access to key information which 
helped them verify their pay. Theoretically, in Factory H where a piece wage system was 
implemented, workers could work out how much they should be paid for piecework as long 
as they kept a record of how many pieces and of what products they had made in a day, as 
well as the unit price of each product. However, in reality, the information was often 
withheld. The availability of the information was often subject to the attitude of individual 
line management and workers’ own awareness of keeping a record of their own work. For 
instance, TQ from Factory H claimed that workers were briefed with regard to which 
products they were assigned to work on in a day, and also the unit price that each product 
bore during a ten-minute shop meeting before each shift. There was also supposed to be a 
written document, detailing the specification and the unit price of each product, displayed 
for each work position so that the workers could refer to it by themselves. (TQ, Factory H, 




depends mostly on individual line leaders, as well as whether there were other prioritised 
items on the agenda. If there was not enough time the unit price briefing would be skipped. 
It was also observed that the written document was not available for each product on the 
shop floor; in the case of its existence, workers told me that it was outdated. Furthermore, 
workers had to bear the burden of making a record of the daily tasks that they completed in 
a day. Although they had to fill in a log sheet by the end of each shift, which was signed by 
the line leader for confirmation, they were not given a copy of this. When I asked workers 
whether they would keep track of what they have done in a month by themselves, they 
simply replied that there were too exhausted after work to be vigilant about it.  
 
The second condition was the capacity to establish a network of creditable sources and 
targets for pay discussion. The private nature of pay discussion that emerged on the shop 
floor resulted in the workers’ resort to personal networks or relationships to obtain pay 
information and learn about the pay system. In that regard, those individuals from the local 
region and occupying higher ranks in the factory were more capable of maintaining informal 
networks which enabled them to access information sources. For example, LJM from Factory 
D considered himself to have relatively clear ideas about the pay system, because he had 
been in the factory long enough (almost four years). He had worked as a line leader and 
befriended with a HR officer whom he often chatted with. He said it is easier for him to 
interact with the HR officer largely because they were both from Town S. He also recognised 
the HR officer as a trustworthy source of rules and regulations, as well as for ‘insider news’ 
in the factory. (LJM, Factory D, April 2017) 
 
On the contrary, ordinary production line workers, especially migrant workers who came to 
Town S just for work via pre-existing connections were less likely to develop this kind of 
network even within the factory. This was less of a problem in Factory F due to the smaller 
workforce, but more so in Factory H where the segregation of workers by shop and rank was 
clear. Among those workers whom I interviewed, their social circle was largely confined to 
fellow workers in the same shop, rank or social status, which meant that the information 
they could exchange was limited to their own experience. When something not right had 
been spotted, their network of acquaintances was not that extensive. That means they were 
not able to verify their pay or their understanding of the pay system with reliable sources as 




assigned to workers from different shops, did not appear to be a way out for inter-shop 
exchanges. A worker who shared a dormitory room with five other workers from different 
shops said that they rarely spoke to each other after a long day of work, not to mention 
about pay. When asked how he got along with his roommates in the factory, one worker 
replied, ‘everyone just looks at their phones, or watches DVDs in the case of an older guy. 
After a long working shift (twelve hours in Factory H), no one has the energy to talk to each 
other and share thoughts.’ The high turnover in Factory H also made it hard for workers to 
establish a more stable rapport among each other. 
 
The third condition was the perceived appropriateness of pay discussion among workers. 
Although rules of pay confidentiality were not implemented rigorously in Factories H, F and 
D, workers said that pay was commonly discussed in private. In Factories H and D, HR officers 
said that there was no explicit pay non-disclosure policy in the factory, but it was ‘an informal 
convention’ that workers should not share pay information with the others. The HR manager 
of Factory H described pay information as ‘part of one’s personal privacy’, and ‘people who 
care about their personal privacy should not let others know about their pay anyway.’ (YXY, 
Factory H, November 2016) In Factory F, there was an explicit requirement on pay non-
disclosure, which was briefed to workers during job orientation as part of the factory 
regulations. In all these cases, the circulation of pay information was, in principle, confined 
to not just within the factory, but also between workers and the management.  
 
A sanction for disclosing pay levels to a third party is rare. Even in Factory F where an explicit 
rule of pay non-disclosure rule was in place, GF acknowledged that pay discussion among 
workers were unavoidable, since quite a number of workers were married to each other and 
lived in the factory dorm room for couples. She found that ‘discussing pay among couples is 
unavoidable, but there is no way to stop them from doing so.’ (GF, Factory F, January 2017) 
During my interview with workers from Factory F, some of them were reluctant to tell me 
how much they earned exactly, but the others were willing to give a rough range, to give a 
hint or be explicit, subject to how strongly rapport was established in the conversation. 
 
Although there is little explicit penalty for circulating pay information to outsiders (within or 




Especially those who had been in the factory for an extended period of time, comparing their 
pay with the others in daily conversation did not sound appropriate to them. It could be 
driven by managerial concerns according to line leaders. For instance, YXS from Factory D 
said:  
 
‘I am not against issuing payslips, but the problem is how to keep [information on] payslips 
secure. Some people would just destroy their own [payslip], but it is unavoidable that some 
others would share it with the others. Sometimes pay differential is due to differences in 
personal capabilities. Comparing with each other all the time would bring negative effects to 
the team spirit.’ (YXS, Factory D, February 2017) 
 
Among lower-ranking workers, the majority of them in Factories F and D said that they did 
not intentionally pry into the pay level of other workers, but they would still like to know 
about it briefly to cross check whether their pay level was reasonable. Therefore, their 
colleagues’ pay level was still among their concerns. Yet, they tended to be self-restrained 
when wanting to enquire about other people’s pay levels. For example, DJW from Factory D 
commented, ‘of course I am curious about how much the others get in comparison to me, but 
it sounds a bit inappropriate to talk about this all the time.’ (DJW, Factory D, April 2017) In 
Factory D, it was observed that workers tended to suddenly lower their voice when we 
progressed into the topic of pay during interviews, regardless of the venue and whether 
there were other people around us. 
 
Consequently, a mental hurdle which restrained workers wanting to make enquiries or even 
raise the topic emerged. It was observed from workers’ daily conversations that they were 
fine with talking about pay and sharing rough figures of their pay levels if one of their peers 
initiated the topic first and showed a certain level of willingness to unveil his or her own 
situation. Once they sensed that the topic was acceptable among themselves in an occasion, 
it became easier for them to open up. Yet, it took time for the opportunity to occur and the 





The variety of practices used by the factory management to communicate the pay system 
and set boundaries to the circulation of pay information, which eventually led to potential 
ignorance of pay is summarised in Figure 3. It shows that the implementation of pay 
communication practices, may it be explicitly or tacitly encouraged, consequently 
contributed to sustaining workers’ ignorance of their own pay and made it difficult for them 
to conduct meaningful comparisons with each other. Whether or not pay non-disclosure 
policies were implemented became irrelevant, given that the amount of information that 
workers had access to and therefore were able to disclose was limited from the start. 
 
 
Figure 3: Pathways towards the ignorance of the pay system for workers in Factories H, F and D 







5.4.3. Workers’ frustration due to their perplexity towards pay  
 
Due to various barriers which deterred workers from learning about how their pay was 
calculated, workers found themselves being kept away from pay breakdowns. As a result, 
their knowledge on monthly pay was mostly limited to the total amount that they got every 
month. If they had stayed in a factory for an extended period of time, they would be able to 
give a rough range of fluctuations, but where their earnings would fall within the range was 
not entirely predictable.  
 
The lack of knowledge of pay breakdowns led to frustration under two circumstances, which 
resulted in them feeling treated unfairly and poorly managed. The first was when their 
earning did not correspond to the intensity of work done. This was especially apparent in 
Factory H where piece wage played a significant role in monthly pay. For example, the piece 
pay of workers in the same shop throughout the same shift could result in a drastically 
different amount because they were assigned tasks with different levels of unit price. In 
theory, the principle of ‘more pay for more work’ enshrined in the piece wage system 
enabled workers to earn more by working more intensively. Intuitively, workers expected 
the pay to be higher in a month when they had strong memory of hard work and long working 
hours. That said, as tasks were assigned to them by the line leader on the day, workers did 
not have control over what products they would make, nor much room to bargain for what 
to work on. They also did not tend to keep a meticulous record of what they had been 
assigned to do throughout the month. As a result, when they found themselves earning less 
than their colleagues on pay day, the impression of ‘having worked as many hours as the 
others do’ and perceived increase in dexterity overrode the fact that they worked on 
different repertoires of products which led to different levels of piece wage. 
 
The second circumstance was when they found an unexplained shortfall of the overall pay 
and the shortfall persistently pointed to the possibility that they were being taken advantage 
of by the management. Both workers and the HR officer in Factory D reflected on experiences 





‘I am not sure how to put it, but be it an unspoken rule or whatever, we always get a bit less 
than what it should be. […] The management always takes some money away from us. I don’t 
know exactly how much they take, but [the total amount of pay] is not very accurate every 
month anyway. The shortfall is not big, like ¥100-¥200 per head. What can you do? […] There 
are 24 workers in our shop. ¥100-¥200 per head almost equals to the cost of hiring one or 
two more workers.’ (XXS, Factory D, April 2017) 
 
HQM also raised an episode of workers’ overtime pay being withheld. According to her 
description, pay was sometimes miscalculated, but there was one time when management 
withheld overtime payment for all workers on purpose, in order to save costs. At that time 
some workers got a de facto pay cut of one-third, which was big enough for them to demand 
an explanation from the HR department. However, she was not surprised that the intentional 
withholding of small amounts happened in a piecemeal manner every now and then. 
 
5.4.4. Consequence of pay opacity: withdrawal from pay discussion 
 
From what is illustrated above, the insufficiency in the knowledge required to make sense of 
the calculation of their total monthly pay gave rise to workers’ frustration, which eventually 
led to the following patterns of withdrawal from taking ownership of the matter. 
 
First, they avoided enquiring about the nuances in pay levels month by month. Those who 
cared about the differences gradually lost their patience when persisting to seek for a 
response from the management in vain, and eventually gave up. For example, workers from 
Factories F and D who said that they had checked their pay before had eventually stopped 
caring about the matter monthly.  
 
Second, pay differentials which were in doubt tended to be internalised and considered 
inevitable. Regardless of the phenomenon, according to workers, that comparing pay with 
the others in an informal setting was not really uncommon, the comparison was not 
necessarily conclusive. LDJ from Factory F said, ‘what if you know about someone else who 




qualifications, you work in different ways… Everything counts. How can you compare?’ (LDJ, 
Factory F, March 2017) Another worker disagreed with how Factory F rewarded education 
qualifications. However, rather than challenging the rationale behind the pay system, he 
tended to believe that it was only his own problem: ‘When a university graduate starts 
working here, he or she knows nothing, and is taught by middle school leavers like me. I know 
more and work tenaciously but earn less than him or her. That’s why we always blame 
ourselves for not having studied hard enough before.’ (LSH, Factory F, January 2017) 
 
Third, workers simply quit the job. This was also associated with the negative sentiment 
towards the management in the process of wage payment, which contributed to their sense 
of organisational injustice within the factory, and the belief that earning higher pay simply 
by complying with what they were told or offered to do was not possible. It was especially 
the case in Factory H, where workers considered wage payment indicative of how poorly the 
factory was managed. One of them left the job after four months in Factory H. He described 
the factory as ‘unreliable’, since he had been paid exactly the same amount for four months, 
both during and after probation. (RGM, Factory H, May 2017) DJW also mentioned that pay 
was the major reason why workers left Factory D. ‘I am not saying that [the factory] can’t 




In this chapter, I investigated the pay systems adopted in auto parts factories in Town S. It 
was found that Factories H, F and D, which were similar in terms of development trajectories 
as the auto parts supplier of a Sino-European assembly plant in Town S, adopted different 
pay systems to remunerate workers at the factory level. There was a certain degree of 
overlap in the practices adopted, such as paying workers a combination of fixed and variable 
pay components instead of a fixed monthly pay, as well as placing a clear emphasis on 
performance and productivity in the pay system. Nevertheless, nuances on the parameters 
used to calculate each component in each factory were observed. 
 
The insufficiency in making the pay system transparent made it a common fate for workers 




accumulate knowledge about it largely in their own capacity. Workers’ experiences based on 
their accounts of the pay systems reflected a number of obstacles which they faced while 
learning about pay and identifying problems at different stages of the employment 
relationship. These obstacles, which essentially put workers in a disadvantaged position, 
were primarily fostered by the management. Be it out of inertia or an imperative to maintain 
control over information, these obstacles effectively discouraged the circulation and 
exchange of pay information, discussion of pay and contestation of the pay system. The 
frustration over the perplexity towards pay consequently contributed to workers’ 
withdrawal from the pay discussion. As a reflection of their frustration in response to the 
perplexity which the situation had generated, different reactions were taken by workers, 






6. Workers’ Reactions towards Factory-level Pay 





From what emerged in the previous chapter, it is clear that perplexity on pay was a common 
sentiment among workers in Factories H, F and D. There were some indications that workers 
felt rejected from participating in pay discussions, which resulted in turn in their withdrawal 
from contesting the pay. The next question to ask is what they could actually do about the 
situation, given that their personal and collective capacities in enquiries and contestation on 
the shop floor had already been constrained. With the dim process of equipping oneself with 
resources to counter-act pay opacity, what other means could workers adopt to protest 
against the management, and to create better career prospects for themselves? 
 
Therefore, this chapter will shed light on the impact of ignorance and perplexity generated 
from pay communication practices, as reflected in workers’ actions in response to pay. I will 
specifically focus on workers’ reactions regarding three aspects. First, by relying on the 
accounts of factory management and workers, I will delineate the phenomenon of labour 
turnover in the auto parts industry in Town S, in order to delve into exit as a strategy against 
the dissatisfaction over pay. Second, I will look into the compliance of some workers who 
were apparently more resilient to low pay and pay opacity and the drivers behind their 
decision of staying at the job or the lack of will to quit. Third, I will provide a glimpse of the 
potential of workers’ collective mobilisation by describing two episodes of collective 
resistance in Factory D.  
 
6.2. Exit as a strategy reflected in labour turnover 
 
For the automobile industry, which is by definition keen on adopting a lean production 




work systems and continuous improvement. While factories were affected by labour 
turnover to varying degrees, factory management commonly recognised the benefits of 
having a stable workforce in factory operations in general. Workers also supported this view 
by providing a counter-argument of what it would be like with new workers joining the 
factory every now and then. XXS from Factory D said, 
 
‘My personal view is that, it is better to retain senior workers, rather than relying on new 
workers. New workers need some time to be trained. During the training period the factory 
is destined to lose money on them. […] Yes, if the workforce is not stable, and the performance 
of new workers is also not stable, that is how it would go.’ (XXS, Factory D, April 2017) 
 
YXS, an engineer also from Factory D, mentioned that labour turnover in his own department 
did not worry him much, but the high labour turnover of operators on the shop floor affected 
his work:  
 
‘The input of production departments during the developmental stage of a new product is 
important, as production line workers can start being trained earlier for the new product. Yet 
the production departments are always running out of workers. If they start training workers 
only during the stage of mass production, it is difficult for us to improve product quality.’ (YXS, 
Factory D, February 2017) 
 
Despite the aspiration to have a stable workforce, labour turnover appeared to be an 
alarming issue which required attention, as emerged from conversations with HR 
professionals in the auto parts industry in Town S. In the manufacturing industry, the 
phenomenon of high labour turnover problem was certainly not new (Smith, 2003). In recent 
years, the issue was by no means peculiar to Town S; rather, it stemmed from an emerging 
trend of increasing labour turnover at the national level across different industries. The 
national average of voluntary labour turnover was around 5.3% to 6.6% between 2008 and 
2011 (Zhaopin.com, n.d.), but had risen to 16% in 2016 according to a survey conducted by 





The extent to which factory management was affected by high labour turnover varied, 
especially in the days when the cheap rural labour reserve was still considered abundant to 
fuel industrial development in labour-intensive and low-skilled industries. However, the 
systemic labour shortage caused by the labour supply hitting the Lewis Turning Point has led 
to the shrinking of cheap labour supply (Cai, 2010; Das and N’Diaye, 2013). This context 
resulted in ‘double obstacles’ which the automobile and auto parts factories in Town S would 
be exposed to in recruitment – on the one hand, they had to recruit workers in an 
environment where unskilled labour was less available than before; on the other hand, they 
did not just hire anybody available, but remained selective in picking the top-tiered ones in 
the existing labour supply, making the pool of workers that they could select even smaller. 
 
Therefore, in the following section, I will delve into the current state of labour turnover in 
Town S. First, I will look at how factory management described workforce stability on the 
shop floor and the costs that labour turnover had brought them. Second, I will make use of 
data from field observations and accounts from auto parts workers regarding their job 
seeking behaviour, in order to have a glimpse on workers’ intentions with regard to staying 
or leaving their current job.  
 
6.2.1. Impact of labour turnover on auto parts factories 
 
Across auto parts factories in Town S, frontline HR officers who were responsible for the day-
to-day recruitment activities felt the strongest about the labour turnover problem in Town 
S. Despite the unavailability of industry-level statistics on labour turnover, the HR 
practitioners provided an account of the situation of labour turnover in their respective 
factories. 
 
In Town S, labour turnover did not affect every factory to the same degree. Some factories 
were less concerned by labour turnover. For example, GF from Factory F said that they only 
had a handful of vacancies to fill every year, which implied a fairly stable workforce. (GF, 
Factory F, January 2017) In F-Factory A, one of the oldest Japanese auto parts factories in 
town with roughly 300 employees, the HR officer highlighted that the monthly labour 




resigning were shop floor workers. However, he was not particularly concerned by labour 
turnover, since a plan to downsize the workforce due to shop floor reorganisation was 
already under way in the factory.  
 
In contrast, labour turnover was more worrisome to management in other factories. For 
instance, the annual labour turnover rate in Factory H reached 50%. Across the shop floor 
and office, only a dozen workers had been in the factory for longer than two years. 
Meanwhile, the plan of Factory H to expand production also created more vacancies to fill. 
This resulted in the HR officers being fully occupied by recruitment and job orientation, since 
they always had to look for the replacement of workers who quit and also new candidates 
for unfilled vacancies. TQ, one of the HR officers, complained about the intensity of 
recruitment, sparing her little time to work on other areas of HR which she found more 
important in retaining workers. In D-Factory T, another auto parts factory supplying the Sino-
European assembly plant, the monthly turnover rate fluctuated between 1% to 9%, and was 
driven up during peak seasons in the beginning of year and mid-year. The HR officer said, 
‘We are always short-handed. Someone would leave right after we hire someone new. That’s 
why recruitment is always ongoing throughout the year. Even if we are fully staffed at one 
time, we still have to keep maintaining our talent pool.’ (ZJP, D-Factory S, April 2017) 
 
The usual problem of having to recruit a relatively big number of workers within a short 
timeframe after the Spring Festival, which is from late January to early February, did not go 
away either. Rather, it became even more challenging. The Spring Festival is conventionally 
the time when workers take the opportunity to quit their job before going home for the 
festival and find a new one afterwards (Wen, 2017). It is considered normal for factories not 
to see workers coming back to work after the Spring Festival and to have to recruit new ones. 
In Guangdong, a systemic labour shortage had been reported since 2004 (Choi and Peng, 
2015), which resulted in factories experiencing difficulties in filling vacancies after the Spring 
Festival. Recent development in inland provinces also generated alternative employment 
options for workers (Yang and Gallagher, 2017), meaning that coming to the coastal region 





Auto parts factories in Town S reported the occurrence of all of these difficulties. As a result, 
HR officers reflected that it took them longer than before to fill vacancies. It was observed 
that the time frame in which recruitment was most intensive in a year had gradually 
extended. According to HQM from Factory D, the workforce normally stabilised within a 
month after the Spring Festival, but recruitment activities continued throughout April, which 
was almost two months after the festival. (HQM, Factory D, April 2017). HR officers from 
other neighbouring auto parts factories also echoed this view. 
 
The instability of the workforce was not only due to the delay in filling vacancies, but also 
because newly recruited workers did not stay long. According to HQM, ‘it is not because we 
have not managed to hire anyone, but workers who we just hired left very soon. The whole 
procedure has to be repeated all over again.’ This view was supported also by another 
observation in Town S. I subscribed to Wechat accounts operated by recruitment agencies 
in Town S. The agencies posted job ads from auto parts factories in Town S regularly, with 
job description, requirements and the number of workers needed. Interested jobseekers 
would be encouraged to register and attend an interview on a certain date. However, 
throughout the two months after the Spring Festival, there were multiple episodes of job ads 
for positions in particular factories being taken down before and put back on again within 
weeks or even days. Details on the job ad were exactly the same but bore a postponed date 
for interview. Possible explanations included that the vacancies were never filled before the 
designated date, or they were filled at the time but became available again after a short time. 
In short, the challenge in recruitment during the Spring Festival became more acute, while 
the difficulty also extended to the rest of the year. 
 
6.2.2. Workers’ intentions to leave the job  
 
In principle, workers bear little consequence of their decision of leaving a job that they do 
not like, and their options of employment also extend beyond the automobile industry and 
Town S. Due to the commodification of labour in post-socialist China (Friedman and Lee, 
2010), there are few institutional barriers for workers to quit a job in China nowadays. It is 
especially so in the private sector, where less social welfare provisions are attached to the 




contract, a month‘s prior notice is legally required for resignation, and even less (seven days) 
during probation. Therefore, in principle, there is no restriction in terms of for who and how 
long a worker should work. Under normal circumstances, they do not have to quit a job at 
the expense of their legal rights.24 In Factory H where labour turnover was exceptionally high, 
some workers were even secretly in favour of a longer probation period, so that they would 
not have to wait for a whole month before they could formally leave the job. 
 
I observed that workers in the auto parts factories maintained a no-strings-attached 
relationship to the industry, since they did not build their previous work life in a particular 
industry. Auto parts factory workers, especially operators, were largely flexible with entry 
and exit to the industry, since prior industry experience was not required or heavily 
rewarded. An absolute majority of them had already had a variety of industry backgrounds, 
including metalwork, plastic, electronics, furniture and ceramics. Their skills and manual 
labour were transferrable across industries, which resulted in their disregard of the need to 
stay in the auto parts industry in order to progress to a job with better prospects. Among the 
employees in Factories H, F and D who I interviewed, only a handful of them had previous 
work experience in the automobile industry. Besides, all workers who I kept contact with 
after leaving Town S left the auto parts factories and worked in other industries instead.  
 
Apart from staying detached from a particular industry, some workers were not in favour of 
the idea of employment in general. To them, current employment was seen as a way to get 
out of employment in the future. On the one hand, they considered working in a factory as 
limited to people of a certain age. According to a female worker in her mid-30s in Factory F, 
‘I feel like at this age, […] I will work for a bit longer, but then I don’t think I will look for 
another job once I leave this factory. […] I won’t be working for anyone at all. Why should I 
keep doing this at this age?’ (LYZ, Factory F, January 2017) On the other hand, they also 
aspired to set up their own business. Another worker in Factory F said, ‘If I were to leave the 
 
24  Before the enactment of the Labour Contract Law, which came into effect in 2008, the practice of 
signing a labour contract was not legally enforced. Workers often had to worry about not getting paid 
for their last month of work if they left the job without formal resignation, or about the factory 




factory, it must be because I start my own business and working for myself.’ (TSX, Factory F, 
March 2017) 
 
The enthusiasm towards ‘working for oneself’ or entrepreneurship was fuelled by the 
lowering threshold of starting a business, thanks to the rapid development of e-commerce 
in China in recent years. A number of workers showed me retail businesses which they set 
up and ran just on their mobile phones. In some cases, workers managed their own inventory 
and reached out to friends and relatives to expand their clientele on Wechat. Others required 
much lower maintenance. A worker in Factory H who ran an online shop with his brother 
selling Korean-styled clothes said that they had never actually seen any of the items for sale 
in their shop in reality. From what he described, it was a virtual storefront of another online 
shop, which actually carried out the trade but would like more storefronts to maximise its 
visibility in the competitive online sales platform. In this case, the worker got a commission 
for selling for the contracting shop. He had not earned any money from the store yet as he 
blamed his lack of time to run the shop properly and a ‘bad business strategy’. His partner at 
work, who was more sceptical of running an online business, mentioned that he sold the 
same kind of clothing in a night market and an online shop at the same time before, but there 
were a lot more people buying from him in person than virtually. Nevertheless, the whole 
idea of setting up their own business was not totally dismissed, as they thought they just had 
not identified the right thing to sell and did not have the time to manage it more seriously.  
 
The above shows that very few workers, especially operators with a less deep-rooted 
connection with the auto parts industry, showed a strong will to stay at their job. As their 
position required few job- and industry-specific requirements in terms of skills and work 
experience, they were not required to invest much on skills in order to enter the industry in 
the first place. If they were to seek for alternative employment, their current position did not 
necessarily lead them to a better position; or alternatively, the possibility that they get a 
better job is not necessarily a direct result of having worked in an auto parts factory. 
Furthermore, workers also tended to regard entrepreneurship or self-employment more 
desirable than working in a salaried job, or they consider the latter just a necessary step to 





6.2.3. The significance of low pay and pay opacity in workers’ exit  
 
Given their shallow ties with the industry, it is hardly surprising to see workers leaving the 
job in auto parts factories out of materialistic concerns. From interviews with present and 
past workers in the auto parts factories, it is known that workers quit their job in the auto 
parts factories for a variety of reasons, among which dissatisfaction over pay played the 
biggest part. It was particularly obvious in Factories H and D, where workers explicitly 
mentioned dissatisfaction over pay as the major reason why they considered leaving the 
factory, or the major reason why their co-workers left. 
 
Dissatisfaction over pay could be differentiated into two dimensions, pay level and pay 
transparency. The first dimension was the pay level. When asked about comments on their 
pay level, workers in Factories H and D commonly described it as ‘low’, ‘not remarkable’ or 
‘below average’. In Factory H, some workers said that their pay was not proportionate to the 
efforts that they made at work. As mentioned in Chapter Five, workers in Factory H complied 
to the four-hour overtime work every day and sacrificed their rest breaks. This was because 
under the piecework system, they were fully aware that their pay was directly related to the 
number of pieces that they produced in a day. Long working hours certainly led to 
exhaustion, but what made workers angry was that given the long working hours and their 
effort in developing dexterity on products that they were assigned to work on, the prospect 
of hitting the target of earning what was promised before they started the job was still dim.  
 
Workers’ previous work experience helped them judge whether the linkages between efforts 
made and the pay level received were reasonable, albeit in an impressionistic manner. Some 
also said that their earnings were not much different from when they worked in much 
shorter shifts in their previous jobs. WDJ, an operator from Factory H in her mid-30s, said 
that she used to work in a furniture factory. ‘There were three eight-hour shifts in the factory. 
We rotated shifts every week. Work was as intensive as it is in Factory H. It was also very 
tiring to rotate shifts that frequently as well. But I feel that I was paid a bit better than here.’ 
(WDJ, Factory H, November 2016) To workers, it was not simply a matter of the difference in 




she also mentioned that it was hard to make a concrete judgement on that since she did not 
know what had gone wrong with the pay that she received in Factory H. 
 
Objectively speaking, pay levels in the auto parts factories did not stand out compared to 
other industries locally either. As introduced in Chapter Five, a majority of workers in 
Factories H, F and D reported earning a monthly earning below ¥5,000. In fact, Among the 
36 workers who eventually disclosed their average earnings, 47% of them claimed that they 
earn between ¥3,000 to ¥4,000 per month, while 44% of them earned between ¥4,000 to 
¥5,000. From district-level pay data, it is shown that the pay levels in Factories H, F and D 
were generally representative of the industrial norm, which is demonstrated by two sources 
of pay data.  
 
First, wage guidelines for jobs in the automobile industry gives a glimpse of the approximate 
earnings of factory workers. The average suggested pay levels for various jobs related to 
automobile manufacturing in 2016-2017 are listed in Figure 4: 
 
 
Figure 4: Suggested average pay levels per month (in ¥) for automobile jobs in Town S, 2016-2017 
























































It should be noted that wage guidelines are not legally binding, and employers are not 
obliged to follow or take the suggestions provided into strict consideration. From what 
factory management in Town S told me about how they decide on pay at the factory level, 
the impact of these state directives was insignificant. For instance, most auto parts factory 
management who I spoke to presented an ambiguous attitude towards the wage guidelines. 
The guidelines were mostly taken as ‘food for thought’, as neither the manager nor the HR 
officer I had interviewed considered them as playing a decisive role in determining pay levels 
in their own factory. YXY from Factory H explained that it was mainly due to the ‘problematic 
methodology used by the local government to compile wage guidelines’, as well as the 
intention of the wage guidelines to cover all districts in the city with varying degrees of 
industrial development. (YXY, Factory D, November 2016) They also criticised the wage 
guidelines for their user-unfriendliness. Indeed, the municipal government began specifying 
suggested pay levels for specific jobs and positions in the automobile industry only from 
2016. Before that, factory managers had to use suggested pay levels designated for other 
jobs at best as a reference for those in their factory. Therefore, most of them were aware of 
the guidelines but hardly took them as authoritative benchmarks. Yet, they did mention that 
it was within their package of references during pay adjustment and collective wage 
negotiations.  
 
Another data source which indicates the industrial norm are the statistics on pay levels by 
industry released by the municipal government in an ad hoc manner. According to a 
government report, which was the first of its kind, automobile and auto parts production line 
workers in the city where Town S was located in earned ¥4,828 monthly on average in 2017 
(Foshan Human Resources Public Service Centre, 2017). The report also included the 
statistics on pay levels of other industries, and the monthly average pay of automobile and 
auto parts workers were actually the fourth-worst-paid among the twelve major 
manufacturing industries in the municipality. It was also well below the average earning of 
all workers at the district level in 2016, which was at ¥5,494. In the report, assembly plant 
workers and auto parts workers were grouped into the same category. It is generally 
understood that assembly plant workers earn significantly more that auto parts workers 
(Zhang, 2015b). Therefore, it is reasonable to speculate that the earnings of assembly plants 
would have lifted the average earning in the whole group, meaning that auto parts workers 




industry, which was primarily concentrated in Town S within the municipality, did not show 
a significant advantage against other local industries in terms of pay levels.  
 
In comparison with the issue of low pay, some workers were more upset by the non-
transparency of pay, which left the shortfall in pay unexplained. In Factory D, there was the 
impression among workers that the factory would pay them as little as the management 
wished. As mentioned in Chapter Five, workers became frustrated by the unexplained 
shortfall of pay which often occurred over time. According to workers, the frustration 
gradually evolved into a widespread disapproval of the management style adopted in the 
factory. The negative sentiment related to the lack of pay transparency later generated the 
verdict that no matter how hard they worked, they would not be rewarded with better pay. 
DJW from Factory D said,  
 
‘Pay is all that we care about. We want the pay to be open to us, even when we are paid more 
than what we are entitled to. Some people would stay quiet if they were paid a few more 
hundred yuan (¥) more out of no reason, but I prefer not getting the extra bit and being told 
the truth about how I am paid. […] What is the point of working in a factory which tries to 
hide everything from you? Even if this factory pays us less but remains open and fair, I still 
think that it is worthwhile to stay here.’ (DJW, Factory D, April 2017) 
 
To what extent the factory management regarded pay as a key factor in retaining workers 
was to be questioned. Intriguingly, HR officers tended to relate low job quality to low pay. 
TQ, the HR officer from Factory H dealing with resignation procedures, attributed workers’ 
departure largely to pay and benefits, which workers ‘didn’t find to be good enough’. HR 
officers from at least three other supplier factories of the Sino-European assembly plant also 
shared a similar view. In contrast, ZK the general manager of Factory H evaluated job quality 
from a completely different perspective. He connected high labour turnover with workers’ 
dissatisfaction around the shortfall of workload. The business strategy of Factory H which is 





‘The risk of relying on one single client and their car models means that our interests become 
strongly tied with how the cars are built and sold. If car sales go down, auto parts factories 
cannot afford to run the machinery. Then workers would have less overtime work 
opportunities. This causes high labour turnover.’ (ZK, Factory H, September 2016) 
 
Factory management considered that the cause of labour turnover stemmed from the 
workers themselves. On the one hand, HR practitioners accepted that mobility was part of 
the nature of a workforce dominated by migrant labour. On the other hand, some managers 
believed that workers quit a job due to the lack of resilience at the personal level. ‘Low 
quality’ was commonly used by factory management to describe workers who quit a job 
lightly. YXY from Factory H, who used to work at the headquarter of PH and was relocated to 
southern China only after Factory H was established, considered it to be a prevalent problem 
in southern China:  
 
‘The mentality of workers in the south is problematic. Their understanding of material and 
spiritual pursuit is so different from that of the company. From the company’s perspective, 
these workers’ demands are just nonsense. Now our workforce consists of people from across 
the country, but they are not of high quality due to constraints in education, work experience 
and upbringing. Almost 60% of our employees are the only child at home, and they can’t 
endure hardship at all.’  
 
6.3. Compliance in face of low pay and pay opacity 
 
Given that a similar degree of meagre pay and pay opacity was observed across Factories H, 
F and D, Factory F apparently suffered less from labour turnover. Most of the shop floor 
workers who I interviewed in Factory F had been in the factory for at least two years. They 
also claimed that their team had been quite stable. Furthermore, regardless of the high 
labour turnover, there were still a small number of workers who had worked in Factories H 
and D for a relatively long period of time, or were more conservative regarding quitting the 
job. In the following section, I will illustrate the considerations taken by these workers 
regarding staying or quitting the job given low pay and difficulties in comprehending the pay, 




the lack of pay transparency on the shop floor showed little influence in the perception of 
job quality and the management style of this group of workers.  
 
6.3.1. Workers’ embeddedness to the factories  
 
Among the workers who I interviewed, a minority of them were apparently content with 
their current job and claimed to care less about pay. These workers did mention some sort 
of dissatisfaction about the pay system or the pay communication practices of their factory, 
but their complaints were not decisive to determine whether they would like to leave the 
job. They were mostly found in Factory F, and a handful of them in Factories H and D. In 
general, their decision of staying or of not quitting the job hastily was mainly driven by a 
number of factors. 
 
First, workers left where they originally were solely because of getting that job in Town S. It 
was that particular job opportunity which brought them to Town S, otherwise they would 
not have moved. This was most often the case of operators working in Factory F. A number 
of them said that they knew about the job opening from acquaintances in their hometown, 
which all happened to be in the northeast. The news about the job opening also came to 
them during the time when they were at the beginning of a new phase of life. For instance, 
one worker said that he had just graduated from high school when he heard from an 
acquaintance that Factory F in Town S was hiring. Two female workers mentioned that their 
children had grown up. Since their children no longer needed full-time attention, they could 
either stay with their grandparents at home or follow their parents to work away from home. 
Having never worked and been elsewhere before, they felt that it was about time for them 
to go out and work full-time rather than staying at home. Coincidentally, they were actually 
following their husbands, as both of their husbands had been recruited by Factory F at the 
same time. Once arrived, the couples stayed in dormitory rooms for couples.  
 
Second, the workers valued the stability of their current job, especially when it appeared to 
be a lot more stable than their previous job. Some of those with previous work experience 
before working in the current auto parts factory mentioned traumatic experiences in working 




insurance salesperson before working in the factory. He mentioned that it was not a pleasant 
experience since he was solely paid by commission and often failed to meet sales target 
regardless of working hard: ‘[It] was kind of unpredictable. It would be fine if you could 
convince the client, otherwise it was very insecure. I was still paid a base pay in the first three 
months, but could not bear it anymore when the base pay was eliminated and the 
commission was the only thing I received later.’ In comparison, a factory job enabled him to 
be paid ‘a wage of whatever size instead of nothing at all’ monthly. It also freed him from 
exploiting personal networks just to meet sales targets. Another worker from Factory F who 
used to work in a mechanical factory mentioned the working environment as an advantage 
of the current job over the previous one:  
 
‘As a mechanical worker, my hands were always dirty. I wanted to change to another working 
environment, so that I do not have to go home with both my hands and clothes dirty all the 
time. Honestly speaking, pay level here is more or less the same as in my previous job, or even 
less sometimes. Yet I feel a bit better as I am clean at work.’ (LSH, Factory F, January 2017) 
 
Third, the workers had developed a work history with the parent company of the factories. 
LXJ from Factory F is an example. After graduating from a polytechnic, he started working at 
PF as an operator on the production line and got promoted a few times given his education 
qualification and job performance. Later he was given the opportunity to move to Town S:  
 
‘In PF, I worked under the workshop supervisor, who later became the factory manager of 
Factory F. He knew me quite well. When he was about to be relocated to Town S, he asked 
whether I would like to follow him. This was how I got relocated to Town S. […] At the 
beginning I was his assistant. Later [due to changes at the work system] I was promoted to 
the position of workshop supervisor.’ (LXJ, Factory F, January 2017) 
 
LXJ considered working in this particular factory as an achievement due to his promising track 
record at work. He also strongly identified with the growth of the company, since it was the 
first and only company that he had worked for, and he had stayed long enough to see how 





Fourth, the workers felt valued by the factory, as they were rewarded in a non-monetary 
way that would not be available elsewhere. For example, YXS from Factory D held a 
vocational school qualification, but he managed to be hired by Factory D due to his relevant 
work experience, especially during the early stages when the factory was set up. He 
described his situation ‘exceptional’ in the department: 
 
‘Being recruited with prior work experience, I was paid more than some sectional leaders 
from the start. At the beginning, I was a die maintenance technician. Gradually I was 
promoted to the position of a section leader [equivalent to an engineer] in the product 
development department. The factory requires at least a polytechnic qualification for 
engineers. Now there are six engineers who I manage in the section. All of them, but one, are 
university graduates, and the only person who did not go to university went to a polytechnic. 
Polytechnic graduates are the only ones eligible for a place in our talent reserve.’  
 
Therefore, he believed that he had entered the factory at the right time. The career 
progression that he had experienced later in the factory also enabled him to feel that he was 
on the right track, as well as to stay optimistic about further progression. 
 
Fifth, the workers survived the process of selection and elimination of the workforce due to 
the industrial upgrading efforts by factory management. Automation was a phenomenal 
concept in Town S amidst the campaign of industrial upgrading initiated by the local and 
central governments. Factory managers in Town S were generally interested in automation 
for its potential in optimising the production process and reducing their reliance on manual 
labour. The development of an advanced equipment manufacturing industry was strongly 
encouraged by the local government, as it was considered a pull factor for other higher value-
added industries, so as to benefit the further advancement of the automobile industry. The 
management of Factories H and F explicitly mentioned recent attempts to introduce new 
equipment with the purpose of lowering the total headcount and making work less physically 
exhausting for the remaining workers. For instance, robotic arms were installed on top of 
existing machinery for an easier and speedier conveyance of finished products out of the 




different factories revealed different reasons for automation. Factories H and D emphasised 
the benefits of automation regarding the optimisation of production and occupational health 
and safety. The general manager of Factory H said that workers generally welcomed the 
installation of robotic arms, as it made their job easier. (ZK, Factory H, September 2016) 
Repetitive heavy-lifting tasks for products in various sizes done by machinery, instead of by 
humans also helped reduce occupational injuries.  
 
It was only in Factory F where a direct connection between automation and the reduction of 
headcount was known. According to LXJ from Factory F, the factory had plans to optimise 
the production line by improving facilities and the operational design:  
 
‘With our production optimised, we will not need as many workers as before. […] A few years 
ago, there were more than 60 workers in Factory F, but we managed to gradually cut the 
headcount down to below 40. Those no longer needed all left Factory F. […] Some of them 
were relocated to other factories of PF. Some resigned, and we did not recruit replacements 
after they left. This is how we optimise the workforce too.’ (LXJ, Factory F, January 2017) 
 
He emphasised that machinery could not fully replace humans at work, while humans 
outperform machinery in terms of flexibility, creativity and the ability to cope with abnormal 
situations. A fully automated workshop would also be unaffordable for the factory and they 
could only introduce automation in phases and within the budget approved by PF. 
Nevertheless, the reduction of the headcount apparently had brought some effect on 
workers who witnessed the process laid out in front of them. In Factory F, existing operators 
were those who had survived the reduction process. Nevertheless, it was still possible that 
one day their job would be replaced by another person or advanced machinery, due to the 
management’s attempt to automate the workshop in phases. For example, one worker said 
that her job was going to be replaced in the future anyway, be it by human or machine, as 
the job was ‘not difficult at all’. (SDJ, Factory F, January 2017) Therefore, they claimed that 





The workers who had little intention to leave the job showed less interests in obtaining an 
explanation of the pay system, nor were they interested in comparing their own pay with 
those in other factories. When asked about the impression of pay levels in their factory in 
comparison with neighbouring companies, a majority of them claimed that they had never 
actively sought for information, or they showed some cynicism as to why they should care 
about that, as ‘it was more or less the same everywhere’. 
 
6.3.2. Risks to exit without taking careful considerations 
 
Workers’ decision to stay or the lack of intention to leave also related to the risk of leaving 
the job without taking careful consideration about the next step. It is true that quitting 
without a new job offer secured, namely ‘naked resignation’, was not rare. However, it was 
often a privilege for workers who were less affected by family burdens or who could afford 
the time, money and sense of uncertainty during the transition period between jobs.  
 
When workers were in Town S on their own and when their lives were highly attached to the 
job, it was likely that they would fall into a period of uncertainty right after quitting the job. 
What happened to ZLP from Factory H demonstrates the logistical difficulties accompanied 
with changing jobs hastily. ZLP was my roommate in the factory dormitory. She started 
working in Factory H at the beginning of my participant observation in November 2016. 
Knowing that she would earn merely ¥2,000 in the first month upon arrival, she did not plan 
to stay in the factory long. Adding insult to injury, she also felt bullied at work. Therefore, 
she desperately wanted to quit the job in her first week. However, being originally from an 
inner province and having family problems at home, she had been working away from home 
for long, moving from dormitory to dormitory whenever she changed job. She also had no 
alternative shelter to turn to, as she said she had had a bad experience at her previous job 
and had made very few friends outside work. Eventually, ZLP resorted to skipping a day of 
work in Factory H to look for a job in nearby areas. For her, it was more important to find a 
job which provided her a shelter instantly than to be paid well, otherwise she would become 
homeless immediately. The incident of C was not to say that moving from one job to another 
is hard for workers in Town S. Rather, it is to illustrate that the urgency to have living 




next job if they were to quit the current one. Couples in Factory F who lived with their 
children in the factory dormitory faced a similar if not worse situation - if they leave the job 
without thinking about the risks and solutions to insecurity carefully, they would put the 
well-being of the whole family under threat. 
 
Putting family burdens aside, to what extent a new job would pay better than the current 
one remained uncertain. For factory jobs with similar requirements in terms of eligibility and 
qualifications, it would be difficult to judge whether one pays better than the other before 
starting the job due to the lack of reliable information about pay systems in a factory before 
the employment relationship commences. This led to some extreme strategies to spot good 
jobs. HQM from Factory D observed that after the Spring Festival, there was a larger-than-
normal number of workers who quit the job only after staying in the factory for a few days: 
‘They just wanted a taster of every factory in the industrial zone, so they got in for a few days 
just to see how they found working here, how much an average worker made, and then quit 
and went to another one.’ (HQM, Factory D, April 2017) She speculated that workers 
implemented the strategy in groups that exchanged information among each other. In fact, 
according to HQM, the factory preferred not to hire people who had previously worked in 
nearby auto parts factories together. They could not completely eliminate the possibility of 
hiring former workers of nearby factories at the moment simply because tracking their 
mobility and past work history was too much work for them. Still, workers would not be able 
to re-enter a factory where they had previously worked and left, even if they eventually 
found that the factory paid them the best terms.  
 
6.4. The potential of voice in collective resistance 
 
The high labour turnover in Factories H and D due to pay-related issues reflected the fact 
that workers resisted against the pay system and against pay opacity individually in the form 
of exit decisions. Given the relatively short history of Factories H, F and D, evidence on hand 
did not suffice to tell us whether exit was the only strategy that workers could use to 
demonstrate their dissent – after all workers who had voiced their concerns but not quit 
were very rare. The dysfunction or non-existence of collective voice mechanisms also 




other reactions cannot be completely ruled out, while signs of collective resistance regarding 
other demands were also referred to by workers. In fact, after the strike in J-Factory B in 
2010, both the provincial government and trade union emphasised the importance of 
cultivating ‘harmonious employment relations’ in order to prevent strikes of similar scale 
from happening. The strike and its aftermath were hardly mentioned by interviewees, partly 
because they had no memory of the incident – most workers in the auto parts factories 
nowadays were either too young to have learnt about it, or were not around to have 
experienced it first-hand. Even so, workers from Factory D did mention sporadic episodes of 
collective resistance in the factory, although there was no sign that they were inspired by 
previous collective actions.  
 
The first strike took place in 2015. XXS, a line leader who started working in the factory soon 
after it went into production, said that he was promised a monthly pay of at least ¥2,700 
before starting the job, but the promise was not fulfilled:  
 
‘In the first year, I received less than ¥2,700 every month. In the second year the situation 
persisted, so I initiated a strike with other people in my shop. A manager came to the shop 
floor and asked me what happened. I said, “Nothing special. We are asked to produce more 
every day, but are not paid more accordingly. Now I don’t want to work anymore.” He 
demanded me to go back to work first, and I said only if they increase the pay. […] How long 
of the stoppage could they afford? The assembly plant penalises their suppliers for ¥6,000 for 
every minute of stoppage. What do you think happened? […] The general manager invited 
me to the office for a chat. Later they had a discussion with the other managers and they 
quickly replied the next day, saying that they would lift the pay for ¥200 for everyone. It was 
only the year after that when I finally received ¥2,700 per month, […] the level which I was 
promised before starting the job. I just felt that I had wasted my time by choosing to work in 
this factory for an entire year.’  
 
XXS claimed that he was on the watch list of the factory, but continued to remain in the 
factory up until the time of my interview with him. ‘It simply proves that [the factory 
management] recognise my ability. It’s actually pretty straightforward. I only work as much 





The second strike was triggered by bad canteen food. All auto parts factories in the area 
provided in-house catering, but how the canteens were run varied. Factory H hired their own 
kitchen staff. The chef mentioned that they served more cuisines from the region of China 
where senior managers were from, but still tried to cater for workers from other parts of 
China, mainly from the south and inland, as well. Workers sometimes complained that the 
meat content of food during dinner, when shop floor workers stayed over for work but 
managers and office workers were mostly off, was significantly lower than that at lunchtime, 
when everyone in the factory was supposed to eat in the canteen. The canteen of Factory F 
was run by a contractor which had started only recently. Workers’ comments on the canteen 
food had yet to be heard. The canteen in Factory D was also run by a contractor, which 
according to workers was owned by ‘a friend of the boss who also runs a number of other 
factory canteens in the block’. It also catered primarily to the culinary preference of factory 
management from northern China, which was drastically different from those of workers 
predominantly from southern China: ‘The northerners are happy with noodles and buns, but 
we southerners cannot survive a day without rice as the staple’. (DJW, Factory D, April 2017) 
LJM from Factory D also said,  
 
‘The food does not meet the taste of us southerners at all. [Northerners] prefer cold dishes, 
and also something like fried chillies with chilli oil… Maybe you would like them, but we really 
don’t. […] The food is usually better during lunch when managers are also present, or when 
the canteen is occasionally under inspection. Otherwise they just cook whatever they please.’ 
(LJM, Factory D, April 2017) 
 
The breaking point of dissatisfaction of canteen food in Factory D occurred during an evening 
when workers found themselves served spoiled rice in the canteen and those who worked 
the late shift refused to eat and to go back to work. As DJW recalled,  
 
‘We were served steamed pork ribs, which were literally just ribs. Fine. What was worse, 
though, was that the rice had gone off. That’s why we went on strike that night. How could 
we be served such food? […] To be honest, how can you work after having bad food? […] We 




short while, managers who were already off from work came back and ordered takeaway 
food for us.’ (DJW, Factory D, April 2017) 
 
The incident strengthened his sense of being exploited. ‘Low pay is fine, if it is how much they 
can pay us, but no one could stand being mistreated in this way. How can one work with food 
like this?’ It drove him to think about quitting the job later, and he eventually did. 
 
Workers who talked about the strikes mentioned that the stoppage was a concern for the 
management, since there was a cost for the factory to have production suspended for 
whatever reason. Nevertheless, the workers did not consider the strikes as particularly 
successful, due to their short duration (‘just a while’) and the delay in seeing improvements 
made or the demands met. Whether the factory had to pay the penalty for production 
suspension and for the disrupting the operation of the assembly plant was also in doubt, as 
XXS said, ‘it totally depends on guanxi (relationships). The management told us that the 
factory would be penalised, but who knows? They might be able to get around it.’ (XXS, 
Factory D, April 2017) Neither XXS nor DJW mentioned any subsequent collective response 
regarding their respective issues after the strikes. XXS was the only one who had participated 




This chapter examined the consequences of pay perplexity and provided observations on 
workers’ reactions towards it. The findings showed that exit was adopted as an individual 
strategy of resistance against low pay and pay opacity. Pay in the auto parts factories and 
the industry in general did not look particularly remarkable when compared with other 
industries in town and were considered to be disproportionate to the efforts that workers 
made in their jobs. Workers’ dissatisfaction of low pay was understandable, but on top of 
that, the opacity of pay system further fuelled the belief that low pay was irrevocable. Exit 
appeared to be a direct response of workers against pay, but to what extent their move 
would be rewarded by better opportunities elsewhere was not known at the point when 
they made the decision to leave. The uncertainty was mainly due to the non-transparency of 




environment in Town S also led them to gamble for better conditions elsewhere with no 
turning back.  
 
However, regardless of the prevalent high labour turnover and workers’ intention to quit, 
the stability of the workforce of Factory F and a small number of workers from Factory D was 
also noticeable. Some of them weighed non-monetary rewards and career prospects higher 
than pay, while the others were more cautious of the option of leaving without considering 
the decision very carefully. It is speculated that their organisational and social 
embeddedness, which reflect the extent to which they rely on their job to support their living 
circumstances in Town S, contributed to their compliance in relation to pay issues. Finally, 
the last part of the chapter documented episodes of workers’ stoppages, which highlighted 






7. Discussion: the Role of Labour Process in 





In the preceding chapters, I studied the pay systems and pay communication practices of a 
group of auto parts factories located in Town S, China. Chapter Four introduced the recent 
development of Town S and introduction of the auto parts industry in this town, so as to 
contextualise pay practices deployed in these factories. Chapter Five introduced the pay 
system of Factories H, F and D respectively, and assessed the pathways through which 
workers could learn about the pay system in their factory. Chapter Six introduced the 
implications of the pay knowledge accumulated and how they were reflected in workers’ 
behaviour and decision to stay in the factory.  
 
The presentation of the findings is important for revisiting existing literature and the 
research questions laid out in the literature review chapter. How do the findings shed light 
on the examination of pay understanding formation in the workplace? This chapter will be 
dedicated to looking at the implications of the phenomena in Town S, how managerial 
control in manipulating the process of understanding the pay system is accepted and 
rationalised by workers, and the specific dimensions of pay knowledge which are 
underdeveloped due to the constraints at the workplace. Hence, this chapter will consist of 
six sections. First, I will discuss the complexity of the process involving managerial practices 
from workers’ perspectives. Second, I will discuss how social dynamics in the labour process 
affect workers’ capacity to navigate the system. Third, I will discuss the implications of 
workers’ pay understanding being undermined. Fourth, I will evaluate the consequential 
reactions of workers in response to their awareness of insufficient pay understanding. In 
particular, I will delve into different forms of reaction adopted by workers, mainly exit and 
voice, to see whether these strategies became their leverage in making pay demands and 
subsequently achieving better pay. It is followed by the fifth section, in which I discuss the 




sense of or challenging the pay system. In the last section, I will discuss how the adoption of 
a labour process approach would help understand workers’ circumstances in sustaining and 
legitimising the factory-level pay systems. 
 
7.2. The accumulation of knowledge on the pay system at the factory level 
 
In Chapter Two, I argued for the need to look at what contributes to workers’ ability to make 
sense of their own pay. Existing literature on pay communication establishes a direct link 
between what workers come to understand and what the management chooses to disclose 
about pay (e.g. Lee et al., 1999; Patten, 1978), without further questioning whether workers 
at the receiving end of the information flow actually accumulate knowledge about the pay 
system. That is why this research seeks to trace and make sense of the process that workers 
went through in the workplace to understand the pay system. It is evident that there is a 
remarkable variation of pay systems adopted in Factories H, F and D. The manner in which 
the factory management twisted labour regulations to make the pay system deviate from 
common sense demonstrates the necessity of examining factory-specific practices regarding 
remuneration. Not only did the phenomenon imply the possibility that workers had to 
navigate a new pay system for every job that they would land, but also that past working 
experience in other factories might not suffice for workers to make sense of what was going 
on at their current job. Practices applicable to other workplaces could not be taken for 
granted. 
 
The use of a mixture of fixed and variable components created fluctuations in workers’ total 
monthly pay. The fluctuations could be derived from factors both directly and indirectly 
related to a worker’s own effort. For instance, the ups and downs in pay related to company 
performance could be due to changes in the production schedule and product sales. 
However, fluctuation because of these factors could have a significant impact upon workers’ 
earning during a particular month. In the case of Factory F, work was suspended for a month 
during a traditionally slow sales season and there was a slowdown of work in the assembly 
plant. Under these circumstances, workers’ pay would be cut in half for that month, but it 
was not due to their slowdown of work or underperformance. Furthermore, in the case of 




directly cooperate with. Therefore, what they earned was also not a direct reflection of their 
effort, given the performance-emphasising tendency of the pay system. 
 
On this account, in Chapter Five, I provided a detailed description of how workers’ 
understanding of the factory-level pay systems was built up by tracing three periods of time 
throughout the duration of an employment relationship, namely upon recruitment, recurring 
pay days and other times at work. Recruitment and recurring pay days were highlighted as 
specific moments for the acquisition of pay knowledge, as they share the following common 
characteristics. First, during these times, pay information, irrespective of scope and depth, 
was offered by the management. For instance, job orientation was a rare occasion when 
employers would proactively raise the topic of the pay in their interaction with workers, as 
the pay system was considered part of the necessary information that workers should know 
before starting the job. On pay day, some forms of pay information, such as the amount of 
one’s pay, would naturally be unveiled to them. Second, the appropriate atmosphere for 
enquiring and discussing pay at the workplace was present during these occasions. Upon 
recruitment, it was considered completely legitimate for a worker to ask about the pay 
system and other employee benefits. It was also instinctive for them to contemplate the pay 
and be curious about it when the monetary reward was literally handed over to them on pay 
days. In short, these occasions were when workers could make use of the opportunity to 
acquire pay-related information in principle. 
 
Workers’ understanding of different aspects of the pay system, including pay system design, 
individual pay rates, pay differences and the mechanism of pay adjustment were examined 
in Chapter Five. It showed that the process of navigating the pay system was by no means 
straightforward for workers. The navigation could be complicated by the following factors. 
 
First, it could be difficult to squeeze pay information out of the management. Information 
such as pay components was relatively uncontroversial and easy to access, but the 
accessibility was conditional upon the timing when the information was disclosed or 
enquired about. When a direct and explicit source which provided workers with all they 
needed to know about the pay system was not in place, workers’ learning process was rarely 





Factory management was, unsurprisingly, selective in disclosing different categories of 
information. The pay system design, namely the composition of pay, was handled in a 
relatively undisputable and uncontroversial manner. Factory management were generally 
willing to tell workers the laundry list of elements in the total pay package upon recruitment, 
or even during the recruitment process. Most workers were aware of the existence of pay 
components which constituted their total pay package and the approximate proportion of 
each component, thanks to the voluntary disclosure to them by the management. 
 
Nevertheless, the parameter of each pay component and the possible range of each 
component was something workers had to discover by trial and error as time passed. It was 
especially the case for variable pay components such as piece rate, overtime pay and 
performance pay. In the example of Factory H, workers paid by piece had to be on the job 
long enough to estimate how much they could earn from piecework, due to the large variety 
of tasks, each with different rates, and also to become dexterous and learn about their 
capacity and limit. Similarly, in Factory F, the more senior workers there were, the more 
capable they were to grasp a clear picture of the production schedule and work intensity, 
which were directly associated with their overtime work (and pay) and performance pay (the 
category for meeting a daily production quota). However, they were not told the formula for 
calculating these components.  
 
The mechanisms which allowed workers to achieve higher pay were limited to those within 
the remit of the existing pay structure. In other words, workers were only allowed to enquire 
about conditions upon which they could achieve higher pay consistently according to the 
rules. Pay rises in the three factories were mainly achieved in two ways. One way was job 
promotion and the change of duties and responsibilities. This brought about the change of 
pay at a personal level which was noticeable by workers. This was because workers were 
informed by management about their promotion, or in the case of Factory H, shop floor 
workers became aware that they were working on more complicated tasks paying better 
rates. The other way involved changes in fixed components applicable to the workforce as a 
whole, such as an increase in the base pay for everyone. However, the mechanism delivering 




trade union did not necessarily fulfil the function of informing workers of the pay negotiation 
process, if there was any. Even in factories other than H, F and D where collective pay 
negotiations were held, the circulation of information and the procedures were exclusive to 
a limited population of the workforce, which was also unlikely to cover rank-and-file workers. 
 
Second, pay information was not presented in a tangible form, which hindered its circulation. 
Payslip did not appear to be an effective tool for workers to make sense of their pay level in 
Factories H, F and D. The non-issuance of payslips, which is in principle illegal, resulted in the 
lack of tangible and shareable proof to facilitate the circulation of information. Pay 
information was then most likely to be circulated by word of mouth, as most workers said 
that it was inevitable to be curious of other people’s pay levels. Without sufficient 
information about their own pay disclosed to themselves, it was also difficult for them to 
make sense of the significance of the pay difference – for example, whether the pay 
difference was due to normal rotation of work or wage theft.  
 
Third, the cultivation of privacy surrounding pay issues created barriers for the circulation of 
pay information. Without a tangible source of pay information, its circulation was likely to 
rely on informal exchange among workers, which enabled them to realise individual 
differences in pay levels. However, whether and how informal exchange took place 
depended on their self-awareness of how appropriate it was to discuss pay under a given 
circumstance. Although these factories under study did not have a code of pay confidentiality 
that was strictly adhered to, there were times when workers mentioned that they did not 
find it appropriate to ask around directly. 
 
Fourth, the institutions at the workplace which supposedly facilitated the understanding of 
pay did not favour workers by default, since the effectiveness of these institutions was highly 
dependent on the capacity of individuals to utilise them. In Chapter Two, I pointed out that 
the reliance on employers’ self-reporting (e.g. Lee et al., 1999; Scott, 2018) to examine the 
degree of pay transparency in existing pay communication literature was insufficient to 
capture the implementation and effectiveness of these practices. By looking at how the pay 
system was communicated to workers in practice, my research findings showed that 




obstacles in the process of navigating the pay system, particularly those laid down by 
frontline management which undermined their effort in making enquiries, even though the 
mechanisms did exist. It also left a disproportionate amount of burden on the workers to 
fact-check and make sure that they kept all records of their activities at the workplace, so 
that they could cross-check with the variable amount of pay for a given month. In the case 
of Factory H where shop floor workers were primarily paid by piece rate, and there was a 
different rate for every product which they were assigned to do in a random manner on the 
day, they would have to be meticulous in remembering what they had done, how many 
pieces they had produced, and the accurate rate for each piece on a daily basis. From what 
was observed on the shop floor, the shop floor management did not bear the responsibility 
of making sure that the information was available on the shop floor and easily accessible to 
workers. 
 
Without being informed of their own pay and the method of pay calculation, it was close to 
impossible to work out the exact level of pay by their existing knowledge and experience. In 
all three factories, workers were only formally told their own pay level but not the others, 
which should help form a contextualised understanding of their own pay, for the reasons of 
privacy and pay confidentiality. They were also not informed about the breakdown of 
individual pay components constituting their total pay. While some of the fixed pay 
components such as the base pay and fixed-rate subsidies are relatively obvious, it was more 
challenging for workers to work out the breakdown of other conditional or variable pay 
components.  
 
Gradually, a sense of perplexity towards the pay level emerged among workers. Instead of 
knowledge about the pay system, what was accumulated or strengthened throughout the 
employment relationship was indeed ignorance (Gross, 2007) about the pay system. The 
obstacles that they faced in making enquiries revealed the limits of their knowledge. Their 
pessimism towards ‘making thing clears’ also showed that they were aware of the 
unavailability of the means to overcome the limits and make sense of the system. The use of 
a variable pay system also complicates the relationship between pay transparency and pay 
comparison behaviour as suggested by Zenger (2016). With just the pay level but not 
knowledge of the formulation of pay level, the outcome of pay comparison would go either 





7.3. The role of the labour process in shaping pay understanding 
 
Given the difficulty in accumulating knowledge of the pay system, workers’ ignorance of the 
pay system was further sustained in the labour process in the workplace. It was mentioned 
in Chapter Two that the nature and form of managerial control executed at the workplace, 
as well as workers’ compliance with and resistance to employers’ domination, is embedded 
in the capital-labour relations on the shop floor (Burawoy, 1985; Nichols et al., 2004; 
Thompson and van den Broek, 2010). This research has certainly benefited from this 
approach. By delineating the way that work was organised to how social relations were 
fostered at work in Chapters Four to Six, I illustrated that the labour process not only 
contributed to shaping workers' knowledge of the pay system, but also shaped their attitude 
towards their own ignorance of the system. The influence of managerial control over the 
direction of workers’ understanding of their pay was most clearly manifested in the following 
areas. 
 
First, the shop floor hierarchy set the first hurdle for workers to make pay enquiries. In 
Factories H and D, line leaders were in the position of allocating tasks on the shop floor on a 
daily basis, managing workers’ attendance, thus becoming the first contact point that other 
workers turned to for any questions regarding pay. On the one hand, they essentially served 
as the gatekeeper for the HR department in case workers made pay-related enquiries. 
Therefore, it is speculated that the way that line managers understood or framed the issues, 
as well as their initial explanations for the issues that workers raised would determine the 
extent to which the queries could reach beyond the shop floor. It was only when line leaders 
considered an enquiry legitimate, the issue would eventually reach the HR department. In 
other words, line leaders could either make the enquiry serious enough to demand an 
explanation from the management, or simply trivialise workers’ queries. On the other hand, 
line leaders were also the frontline provider of day-to-day pay information by conveying 
piece rates, production quotas, work schedules etc., which helped workers make sense of 
their monthly pay. How informed workers became about pay depended on whether line 
leaders took the task of providing information seriously and the manner in which they 
handled queries. Likewise, the resourcefulness of line leaders might also enable them to 




more favourable to the mobilisation of fellow workers to challenge or contest the pay system 
by reminding them of the presence or absence of pay information and components. Under 
this circumstance, the power relations between line leaders and other workers (especially 
operators) or social cohesiveness on the shop floor determined how the initial stage of 
knowledge accumulation would take shape. This corresponds to a pluralist frame of 
reference regarding the relationship between management and workers (Edwards, 2003). 
Since their interests are by no means uniform by default, assuming that communication 
practices were delivered via middle management without conflict or struggle would make us 
overlook the role of power dynamics in determining the impact of managerial practices in 
opening or restricting pay information. 
 
Second, the way that work was organised on the shop floor shaped how workers evaluated 
the merit of a pay system. Regardless of how workers thought the pay system was 
implemented on the shop floor, they did display preferences on pay systems as such. How 
they came up with these judgements could be influenced by the type of work that they are 
responsible for and how they considered their relationships with their colleagues in the same 
shop. In the example of Factory H, the working day and week are stretched to an extreme 
and workers on the shop floor are paid by piece for different tasks largely unrelated to the 
others’ work. This made workers sympathetic to the individualistic rhetoric of more work for 
more pay, as the extraordinarily long working hours allowed these workers to produce more 
pieces. Hence, it helped divert dissatisfaction away from the pay system itself for being 
exploitative and providing little pay security, and towards the fluctuation of piece rate. In 
contrast, work organised in a continuous production line in Factory F demonstrated that 
effort from both an individual and the collective, not just the former, was required to 
assemble a piece. This helped workers rationalise that fact that base pay, which rewarded 
their personal competencies, made up a smaller proportion of their total pay than 
performance pay. 
 
Third, the managerial attempt to cultivate employee silence over pay as a way to control the 
circulation of pay information drove pay discussion underground. An example of this was pay 
confidentiality requirements imposed on workers. There was no evidence from the three 
factories that pay confidentiality requirements (if any) were rigorously executed, but its very 




pay chats were inevitable but mostly done in private, it implied an atmosphere in the 
workplace that suggested that pay could only be discussed informally in order not to attract 
unwanted attention. However, to what extent they could carry out private pay chats 
successfully and extensively depended on their capacity to identify the appropriate occasion 
to open up and the right people with whom they could talk with, as well as luck. A shop floor 
with high labour turnover was unfavourable to the establishment of social connections and 
rapport as prerequisites to enable these networking opportunities. 
 
Factory-level management also shaped the scope of pay discussion on the shop floor by 
indicating that pay decisions were made beyond the factory. Factories F and D as subsidiaries 
of their parent company had little discretion in making their own pay decisions. In Factory F, 
there were occasions when workers were invited to give opinions on pay, but the invitation 
was from the trade union branch at an upper level of the company, which they had little 
knowledge of its composition and functions. It created an impression that pay decisions are 
made 'elsewhere' beyond the reach of workers. Plant-level management also became 
complacent or irresponsive in resolving doubts surrounding pay, as they did not find 
themselves having the discretion to change decisions made by their superiors anyway. In 
that case, workers were driven to the speculation that these issues could not be solved at 
the company level but had to involve other parties that were out of their reach. They would 
also realise the remit of issues that could be settled or challenged at the plant level and those 
that could not, in which the latter included pay. The fact that an issue could not be resolved 
on the spot but had to involve unknown or unfamiliar parties set the boundary for what could 
be discussed or dealt with within reach of workers. Hence, if workers stopped going deep 
into the issue, it was hardly a personal choice. Rather, it may even be fair to say that they 
sleepwalked into the status quo which the management desired for and acted to bring about. 
In other words, it manifested the dominance of managerial control over the contested 
terrain of pay in employee silence literature (Donaghey et al., 2011). 
 
Fourth, rules of the internal labour market visible to workers drove them to align their own 
interests with the rationale of the pay system. On the one hand, it was clear to them that 
those on the higher end of the shop floor hierarchy were rewarded with opportunities to get 
closer to information sources. For example, in Factory D and other Japanese auto parts 




directly to the management (for themselves or on behalf of their subordinates) or have the 
privilege to participate in collective wage negotiations. To learn more about the pay system, 
excelling in the internal labour market and following the bureaucratic procedures laid down 
by the internal state to deal with dissatisfaction and perplexity were unavoidable. On the 
other hand, the conveyance of the composition of pay and the principle by which each 
component was determined made workers aware of the kind of qualities which the pay 
system would reward. For example, the dominance of productivity- and performance-related 
pay in Factories H and D were obvious enough to convince workers that their individual effort 
would contribute to the pay, and the performance of the company as a whole would benefit 
them in monetary terms, although the extent was not necessarily clear to them. The 
existence of pay differentials due to qualification and competencies were also made known 
to workers. Knowing that the differentials did exist in the internal pay structure, workers 
were convinced that there was a legitimate reason behind working more. As demonstrated 
in examples from Factory H, workers were willing to work for long hours in a working day 
due to the belief that the extended working day actually gave them more time to produce 
more pieces leading to higher pay. In other words, succeeding in the internal labour market, 
if it was known to them, was a prerequisite for workers to gain exposure to more pay 
information. They would first have to be a 'good' and ‘productive’ worker in order to climb 
up the career ladder in the factory, in which perplexity towards pay would be part and parcel 
of the process. In this way, the moment when workers realised that they needed to make 
sense of the system for their own favour could be delayed. 
 
In sum, managerial effort, be it intentional or unintentional, set the agenda by which workers 
evaluate the pay system, limited the quantity and quality of information that workers could 
possess and shaped the direction of pay enquiries. This essentially drove workers to 
temporarily consent with the principles of the pay system before challenging it. Clearing the 
bureaucratic hurdles to deepen their understanding of the pay system put workers in a 
disadvantaged position, as they would have to find their way to break through the power 
structure on the shop floor. Therefore, it is conceivable that the enthusiasm to make sense 
of the system might gradually die down among workers, while those who took action, which 
will be discussed later in the chapter, recognised that little could be changed within the scope 





7.4. Implications of pay understanding undermined 
 
In existing pay communication literature, an underlying paradox that employers face 
regarding pay transparency is that on the one hand, sacrificing some control over the 
availability of pay information may earn them higher job and pay satisfaction from workers 
(Thompson and Pronsky, 1975; Futrell and Jenkins, 1978; Greiner et al., 2011). It also reduces 
labour turnover by eliminating pay comparison (Danziger and Katz, 1997; Bergh et al., 2019). 
On the other hand, the symmetry of information may provide workers with leverage to 
challenge their authority (Danziger and Katz, 1997). My research findings showed that the 
management maintained control over the availability of pay information, and workers 
indeed responded with signs of low pay satisfaction and challenges to the management by 
means of resistance, mainly by exit. The high labour turnover in the factories illustrated that 
employers did not seem to have maintained control over workers through the employment 
relationship, but it did work in the sense that workers were not necessarily better off by 
quitting either. The phenomenon was related to the process of how the pay system was 
conveyed to workers, which pay communication literature tends to overlook. 
 
Workers’ dissatisfaction towards pay in the factories with high labour turnover was evident. 
Low pay was the primary reason behind the dissatisfaction, but pay opacity tended to 
accelerate the dissatisfaction, especially when workers realised that the pay level in the auto 
parts factories did not seem particularly competitive in comparison with previous jobs that 
they had. In other words, managerial effort in reducing pay comparison by making the pay 
system opaque did not control labour turnover but accelerated it in this context of low pay. 
Since receiving monetary reward to make a living was indeed the main (and perhaps only) 
reason behind workers taking up a job in these factories, managerial control over other 
aspects of work such as discipline did not bother them as much as not getting reasonably 
compensated. While other managerial practices for controlling them at the workplace could 
be tolerated, pay was the area which workers wanted to compromise the least. Under this 
circumstance, although workers were exposed to various frontiers of control in their working 
life, pay remained the biggest deal and the game-changer regarding their perception towards 
the management. This finding also provides further elaboration of workers’ conception of 
organisational justice in relation to pay communication as suggested by Marasi and Bennett 




organisational justice, and ultimately affected workers’ attitudes towards managerial 
practices in other aspects as well.  
 
Social networks do not serve as a powerful tool for workers to mitigate their issues with pay. 
Among the auto parts workers in Town S, both strong ties and weak ties as conceptualised 
by Granovetter (1973, 1983) were observed for their importance. On the one hand, there 
were strong ties, such as the personal connections that pulled migrant workers to Town S or 
the local connections that kept local workers in Town S. On the other hand, there were also 
networks of ‘weak ties’ or acquaintances, which workers managed to establish under the 
given work and living arrangements. 
 
Strong ties for both migrant and local workers may be established on similar grounds, but 
the circumstances which those ties were based on determined their strength. For migrant 
workers, strong ties played an important role in their job mobility and opportunity, given 
that the majority of them set foot in Town S due to pre-existing relationships. These 
relationships led them to Town S, which had yet to establish its reputation nationwide as an 
employment hub, and to the subsequent job opportunities in town. However, these ties 
were not necessarily favourable to the accumulation of pay knowledge due to the necessary 
workplace-specific nature in the auto parts industry.  
 
Without trade unions or other collective bodies serving as a solidarity-building platform (Lee, 
2011; Fantasia, 1988; Doellgast et al., 2018), the shop floor environment and living 
arrangements in the factories and in the surrounding community still contributed to 
fostering weak ties to a certain extent, but information circulation and pay knowledge 
accumulation through these channels were both overshadowed by managerial efforts in 
obscuring the pay system from workers and silencing them from the pay discussion. Even 
though communications between individuals were still possible, it was mostly likely that 
rather than concrete information, they exchanged ignorance, confusion or sentiments 
among each other. Under these circumstances, to what extent pay information circulated in 






Consequently, the dissatisfaction led to workers’ resistance but in the specific form of exit. 
As a reaction derived from pay dissatisfaction, workers’ resistance primarily exhibited in the 
form of exit is demonstrated by the high labour turnover in the factories. Chapter Six 
demonstrated that Factories H and D were particularly affected by the problem. The HR 
practitioners at the factory level had to work at full capacity to satisfy the immediate need 
of filling vacancy by continuous recruitment activities, while leaving limited room for 
designing and implementing practices to upskill and retain workers, which could possibly 
include improving the pay administration. What should be noted is that although the 
adoption of exit as a strategy of resistance was prevalent, it neither gave workers more 
leverage nor did them good. This is due to the risks of quitting, including future job insecurity 
as well as jobs with a similar level of pay opacity. I do not intend to suggest that that exit as 
a strategy did not pose a threat to the factory management at all. It is true that workers may 
not be better off after quitting the factory, but it does not mean that employers did not 
suffer. From the constant and intensive recruitment activities conducted by factory HR and 
the burden they bore in filling the short-term headcount, exit had definitely created 
inconvenience for the management. From this perspective, exit did have an effect in making 
the management aware of workers’ dissatisfaction. There is just a lack of evidence on 
whether the management realised that pay and pay transparency were actually root causes 
of workers’ departure, and whether and how they delivered active measures to cope with 
the dissatisfaction. 
 
The low level of pay transparency contained and undermined workers’ capacity to raise 
demands via formal channels of employee voice and collective resistance. On the one hand, 
formal channels of employee voice such as workplace-level trade unions did not favour 
workers who are in a disadvantaged position to accumulate knowledge of the pay system. In 
order to participate in the voice mechanisms, they would first have to excel in the internal 
labour market, in which understanding of the rationale behind the pay system and rules of 
the game are essential. Even if those whose dissatisfaction and demands were based on 
impression were eventually given a place in the platform to negotiate, they would lack the 
resources to do so, not to mention the likelihood that their interests would only be 
represented indirectly, as shown in the underrepresentation of rank-and-file workers in key 
platforms on which contention regarding pay take place, such as collective wage negotiation. 
The situation in Factories H, F and D put workers in an even more disadvantaged position as 




unions from an upper level at some point, the scope of pay discussion was confined to 
revealing one’s attitude towards the pay level, while providing no other means to deliver 
suggestions or demands proactively. 
 
Furthermore, the aggregation of anger and demands for collective resistance was 
overshadowed by the low transparency of the pay system. Information circulated by word 
of mouth under informal circumstances made it difficult for pay comparison to result in more 
assertive voice and demands. The potential of collective resistance is by no means negated, 
as strikes did happen, as documented in Chapter Six. These episodes demonstrated the 
possibility of initiating or taking collective actions on the shop floor. However, the potential 
for collective action should be considered with caution, according to the specific contexts of 
the episodes. One is the initiation or organisation of the strike. The strike about pay was 
initiated by a line leader, whose position authorised him to know about the pay of everyone 
else under him in the shop. As Kelly (2002) suggested, the leadership enabled him to be fully 
informed, to identify problems, as well as to mobilise others to delve into the issue. For 
ordinary workers whose pay was hidden from each other and a full picture of the pay system 
hidden from themselves, it would require extra effort for them to achieve what the line 
leader had. Another factor is the nature of the grievance. In the second strike in Factory D, 
bad food as a concern shared among workers later became acute enough to trigger instant 
collective action. Indeed, improving the quality of food was a demand ‘which can unite rather 
than divide’ (Hyman, 1999:4) workers largely due to its visibility, since workers ate in the 
same canteen at the same time and were served the same food. How it benefited an 
exclusive group of people, namely those without a southern culinary preference and could 
afford to eat elsewhere, but remained a problem for the unfortunate others could also be 
observed on a daily basis. In comparison with food, pay was swept under the carpet as an 
individualised issue unspeakable in public, making its potential to unite workers more 
ambiguous.  
 
7.5. Factors mitigating the dissent derived from pay opacity 
 
An examination of the environment in which the auto parts factories were situated, as well 




how political and social institutions external to the workplace, namely the system, society 
and dominance effects (Smith and Meiksins, 1995) contribute to shaping managerial control 
over workers. In particular, it sheds light on how these institutions equipped workers with 
the resources to make sense of or challenge the understanding of the pay system, and also 
mitigated dissent derived from the non-understanding of pay. 
 
In existing literature, it is identified that living arrangements of workers are closely connected 
to the aggregation of demands and formation of solidarity (Smith and Pun, 2006). Recent 
observations of employers loosening up control over labour within specific physical premises 
in China also opens up room for migrant workers to establish networks based on pre-existing 
relationships unrelated to work, which gave them more leverage in terms of mobility in cities 
(Siu, 2015). Nevertheless, the extent to which these kind of opportunities could be developed 
outside the factories in greenfield sites such as the auto parts industrial zone in Town S 
remains questionable, at least during the time when my fieldwork was conducted. Unlike 
more established industrial cities such as Shenzhen, the major pull factor of labour inflow 
into the auto parts factories are still pre-existing relationships, rather than the reputation as 
a land of job opportunities. The locality itself had yet to become appealing for workers as a 
destination for work. In these circumstances, it became a place where workers came because 
of a specific personal connection, otherwise they would not be there at all. Once arriving at 
Town S, the remoteness of the locality determined their way of living as a worker, namely 
that they would be juggling long working hours and moderate pay with settling in a new town 
in which basic facilities were only half-completed. Therefore, in spite of the alternative of 
living elsewhere in nearby villages, staying in the factory dormitory, if available, appeared to 
be a sound and convenient option for workers. 
 
The manner in which working life was confined within the factory floor was relevant to 
workers’ understanding of pay in the following ways. First, it tied workers to the employment 
relationship. Those who came to Town S purposefully for a particular job or for family 
(re)union demonstrated a stronger attachment to the job and the industry, in terms of living 
arrangements and career development. How they established their life outside work around 
the factory, or the degree to which the factory supported the reproduction of their labour 
power determined their reliance on the job as a raison d'être to stay in Town S. To them, 




status was considered more important than other aspects of job quality such as pay, work 
intensity and skills upgrading, their intention or willingness to delve into the discrepancy 
between their expected pay and pay received would be less prioritised. Otherwise, when 
they adopted exit as a strategy against pay opacity, they would have to simultaneously 
contemplate the logistical arrangements for their transition. Workers would also be exposed 
to the question of whether they would like to stay in the industry or to stay in the town, 
which might be mutually exclusive. If they preferred staying in town, they would have to look 
for a job in other industries with less promising prospect, as auto parts factories refrain from 
hiring former workers of other companies. Likewise, they would have to go somewhere else 
if they would like to continue working in the auto industry. 
 
Second, the confinement of working life within the factory floor determined how workers 
coped with dissatisfaction. This point is related to the previous one, as the fact that workers 
came to Town S just because of that job and the pre-existing relationships to which they 
were tied determined how they would tolerate or adapt to dissatisfaction. When workers 
realised that raising concerns over pay without substantial reasons would cost them their 
job security, their motivation to delve into the pay system to seek an explanation would be 
lowered. This was seen with some workers in Factory F, albeit a small proportion in the pool 
of interviewees, who were more immune to pay opacity in the sense that they were not 
concerned by the obscurity of the pay system, despite fully recognising that it was hidden 
from them. Questioning the managerial practices and bearing the risks of enquiring would 
be an issue not just for them, but also for the relationships to which they were tied. 
 
Third, the scope of pay comparison was defined by the range of colleagues against which 
workers could measure their pay level. Since the factory premises were self-contained and 
workers had limited occasions to network with the others in similar jobs and positions, their 
social networks were confined to people whom they met on the shop floor. If workers’ social 
network in a locality was closely knitted with the workplace, the immediate subject of pay 
comparison would be their colleagues. Their judgement of whether pay was good or fair in 
the workplace would be relative to the visible work intensity and individual competencies on 
the shop floor, rather than the context of the labour market in general. That means it would 
be hard for them to make an informed judgement of whether they were receiving pay 




In some cases in Factory F, workers who stayed in the factory dormitory and lacked prior 
working experience were relatively less interested in knowing what was going on outside the 
factory. As a result, their incentive and capacity to obtain a bigger picture of pay trends at 
the local and industrial levels would potentially be undermined, leading to a lower sense of 
pay comparison. 
 
In contrast, workers who were not so strongly attached to the job displayed more explicit 
dissatisfaction about the fact that they could not understand the pay system. This was 
especially the case for two types of workers. The first type includes those who came and 
worked in Town S without much job and industry attachment, or those who could afford the 
‘luxury of uncertainty’ – such as those with the financial security and social capital required 
for carrying out logistical arrangements during transitional periods. The room for taking a 
break between jobs made them more resilient to short-term unemployment in the town 
after resignation, which enabled them to buy time in searching for a new job and make sure 
that it would provide a better prospect than the previous one. Otherwise, quitting the 
existing job in haste would put themselves in a difficult situation.  
 
The second type includes local workers who were protected by their local household 
registration status and local embeddedness. The local identity apparently served as a 
backstop in case of uncertainties. Permanent residence in the local area and familial support 
available locally provided these workers with the security to withstand the uncertainty 
derived from temporary unemployment. With daily provisions less tied to the job, there was 
less for them to worry about under the circumstance of temporary unemployment. The 
social capital that they established in the past was also helpful for gathering information 
about the local labour market, so that they could identify and locate better employment 
alternatives more accurately. 
 
Meanwhile, their local networks and knowledge enabled them to be more accurately 
informed of what had gone wrong in the factory and of other opportunities outside the 
factory, thus giving them more resilience to resist. For example, local workers in Factory D 
tended to be more advantaged in establishing rapport with the frontline HR officer, who was 




bonding enabled them to secure informal but reliable sources of information within the 
factory. These sources did not only include official accounts of the pay system and pay 
decisions, but also unofficial ones involving insiders’ judgement. It is not to make an assertion 
that local people were naturally cohesive among themselves. However, given that the 
factories were primarily governed by management dispatched from other parts of the 
country speaking a different dialect, and the workforce was also dominated by migrant 
workers, a tacit understanding among locals emerged as a form of resistance by the minority 
against the majority. The same may also apply to those workers who shared a similar 
geographical and occupational background as the upper management, although further 
evidence is required. 
 
7.6. Contribution of the labour process approach to the study of pay understanding 
 
Before discussing the merits of studying the process of forming pay knowledge as a 
prerequisite of making pay demands in a labour process approach, it is worth restating that 
the influence of economic laws of pay setting according to labour demand and supply was 
equivocal in the auto parts factories in Town S, as suggested by previous industrial relations 
literature such as Brown and Sisson (1975) and Nolan and Brown (1983). On the one hand, 
the shortage in labour supply and persistent labour demand did not seem to have pushed up 
pay levels. The meagre pay levels for operators, which still constituted an absolute majority 
of the labour force of individual factories, were not compatible with the persisting labour 
demands. There was no observable pay margin which suggested that employers were willing 
to pay higher than the market equilibrium to cope with the difficulty in recruitment and 
retention. If there really was an opportunity cost that workers forgo when they leave the job 
in the auto parts factory, higher pay on the job was not likely to be one. 
 
On the other hand, despite the modest pay levels, some components in a pay system may 
have appeared to resemble an efficiency wage following the shirking model (Calvo, 1979; 
Eaton and White, 1982; Stoft, 1982; Miyazaki, 1984; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Bowles, 1985; 
Gintis and Ishikawa, 1987). In face of workers' shirking behaviour, instead of imposing an 
'efficiency wage' by providing a pay level above market equilibrium, factories implemented 




pay, the management set themselves a condition under which they would have to pay more 
to reward workers' effort in not shirking, while whether they had to pay eventually would 
depend on workers' own effort in achieving it. The piece wage, alongside other variable 
components of similar functions such as bonuses, functioned to provide the promise of an 
efficiency wage without guaranteeing its actual payment. This was because their fluctuation 
could be manipulated by the management – in the case of piece wages, their level would 
differ not only because of workers paying more effort or less, but it was also due to the 
fluctuation of piece rates and the changing pattern of task allocation under managerial 
control. Following my critique of the notion of efficiency wage in the literature review, 
employers see the need to impose an efficiency wage, but at the end of the day it could be 
sustained only when workers realise its existence and deliver the effect that the 
management expect to see. With the devil in the detail, the extent to which these quasi-
efficiency-wage pay components have managed to serve their purpose would depend on 
how workers form an accurate understanding of the pay system on the shop floor and 
evaluate its efficacy according to their own circumstances. 
 
In this context, I proposed that a labour process approach would be useful for examining 
how workers get to understand the pay system, from how information becomes available to 
them, to how they make use of the information to comprehend the pay system. Drawing 
from the literature on labour process which documented social dynamics in a workplace 
revolving around control, consent and resistance (Thompson and van den Broek, 2010; 
Thompson and Vincent, 2010), I evaluated my research findings regarding how workers were 
driven to comply with the existing channels of pay communication and system 
implementation, and then to accept the managerial version of the pay system. From the 
pathways towards workers’ perplexity over pay in Factories H, F and D, it is clear that 
managerial practices were key at critical times (i.e. recruitment times and pay days) to set 
the foundation of workers’ knowledge. However, on a day-to-day basis, it was the shop floor 
dynamics embedded in a wider socio-economic context which mattered in determining 
workers’ acquisition and accumulation of knowledge about the pay system, the 
transformation of their pay understanding into pay demands, as well as the forms of 
manifestation of these demands. In this way, the conveyance of pay information was indeed 






In Chapter Two, I elaborated on how Burawoy’s (1979, 1985) conceptualisation of a 
hegemonic production regime would shed light on the role of managerial control in shaping 
workers’ understanding of pay. It was speculated that the obscuration of the extraction of 
surplus value would be enabled by more knowledge of the pay system. Workers’ awareness 
of the pay system being something within their own control, albeit in an illusionary way, 
would facilitate the creation of consent.  
 
The research findings showed that workers in the three factories were perplexed over how 
the pay systems worked. What should be noted is that in different types of production 
regime, the management showed different preferences in terms of the means to obscure 
the pay system. In Factories H and D where the labour regime was more despotic, workers 
were deterred from better understanding the pay system by coercive measures. For 
instance, the piece wage system in Factory H and the administrative barriers to enquire 
about pay in Factory D simply exhausted workers’ willpower to make sense of pay-related 
issues. In contrast, in Factory F, the management gained workers’ cooperation by drawing 
them into game playing which required collective effort, as well as by presenting them with 
the prospect of upward mobility through the internal labour market. Demonstrating more 
inclination towards a hegemonic production regime here, consent was cultivated in Factory 
F to align workers’ interests with the management, so that they would contest the pay 
system less or would not find the need to do so.  
 
Therefore, it is fair to say that the fact that the pay system was sustained and legitimised, 
although not conveyed in a straightforward and linear manner, is indeed an outcome of 
managerial control manifested in various forms, subject to the type of production regime in 
a workplace. In the Chinese context, internal state did not happen to be a key mechanism in 
shaping the understanding of pay of workers even in a hegemonic production regime. In 
Factories H, F and D (and Japanese auto parts factories in a lesser degree), the malfunction 
or absence of collective representation and bargaining mechanisms pampered by the state 
showed that the definition of the set of employment practices embedded in the internal 
state and their arbitration at the factory level remained largely under the control of the 




individualised and fragmented, leading to workers’ exposure to the individualised pathways 




In this chapter, I revisited the research findings in order to examine factors in the labour 
process in Factories H, F and D which affected workers’ accumulation of knowledge regarding 
the pay system and evaluated workers’ strategies in reacting to the opacity of the pay 
system.  
 
I argued that the process of learning about the pay system was not linear and straightforward 
for workers. It was due to how the management controlled the availability and circulation of 
pay information and set up barriers for workers to obtain a comprehensive understanding of 
the pay system. There was also an atmosphere cultivated on the shop floor which prevented 
workers from discussing and making enquiries. Inevitably feeling perplexed, it became 
essential for workers to navigate shop floor dynamics in the labour process to alleviate the 
impact of bureaucratic and administrative hurdles set up by the management. Nevertheless, 
in the factories studied, managerial effort still prevailed in directing workers’ evaluation of 
the pay system and enquiries to nowhere, leading to a sense of fatigue among workers and 
a hesitance to delve into the system. 
 
A perpetual lack of understanding of the pay system in the context of uncompetitive pay 
resulted in increasing pay dissatisfaction among workers, as manifested in workers’ actions 
in terms of exit and voice. The actions did paralyse part of the business operation to a certain 
degree, but consequently workers bore more burden in quitting due to the social constraints 
that they faced, especially those which tied their life outside work with the employment 
relationship. 
 
The research findings illustrated that economic laws are insufficient in explaining how and 
why employers are complicit in maintaining certain pay levels without elaborating on the 




Therefore, I also argued that a labour process approach is beneficial for looking into the 
formation of pay demands derived from understandings of the pay system in different types 
of production regimes. This research not only examined how a pay system is legitimatised 
and sustained on the shop floor, but also revealed obstacles that workers face when 
challenging it. Taking the social institutions external to the workplace into consideration also 
helps in situating workers in a wider context, so that their interests and leverage in the 










This concluding chapter will provide some concluding remarks for this research project. 
Before this research began, I was intrigued by how workers’ experiences in the workplace 
contributed to their understanding of pay – the main and probably only reason for them to 
work as migrant factory workers away from home. The research has provided an opportunity 
to explore how workers’ understanding of pay was shaped by the management-labour 
relations which bound them to a particular space and time, and the extent to which 
managerial control had an upper hand in the Chinese context.  Bearing the constraints faced 
during the data collection process in mind, the scope of the research will also be evaluated 
in order to pave the way for future research to enrich our understanding of workers’ pay 
understanding at the workplace level. 
 
This chapter will thus consist of four sections. First, I will summarise key findings in the 
preceding chapters. Second, I will discuss the empirical and theoretical contributions that 
this research sheds light on. Third, I will examine the limitations of the research. The chapter 
will conclude with some suggestions on future research directions. 
 
8.2. Summary of key findings 
 
Before delving into the development of workers' pay understanding, I reviewed the 
economics literature on pay determination, especially the notion of efficiency wage, to show 
that a sociological perspective to study workers' bargaining effort is complementary to 
existing approaches to examine forces of different actors behind pay setting. Then I turned 
the focus to workers' circumstances in understanding the pay system, which actually enable 





Against this background, the central theme of this research is to understand how workers' 
understanding of the pay system is shaped in the workplace. I critiqued the literature on pay 
communication which considers managerial effort in facilitating the circulation of pay 
information of paramount importance in workers' acquisition of pay knowledge. In this 
research, I argued that the understanding of pay system at the factory level is an outcome of 
social dynamics embedded in the labour process. The realm of pay knowledge resulted from 
the contestation between workers and the management with conflicting interests. 
 
Adopting a labour process approach, the research site in China facilitated the examination 
of workplace relations under a wider context of system and social influences, so that factors 
external to the workplace which shape perspectives and actions of organisational actors 
could also be taken into consideration. Using the extended case method, I studied auto parts 
factories in Town S in southern China. Multiple data collection methods including interview, 
participant observation and document review were used to collect perspectives from 
different actors in the employment relationship. 
 
The research findings were presented in Chapters Four to Six, which will be summarised 
below. Chapter Four delineated the industrial and urban development of Town S since the 
mid-2000s. Strongly supported by local governments, the rapid growth of the automobile 
industry had contributed significantly to the infrastructure and labour market outlook of the 
area in recent years. However, the urban transformation in the making had yet to make Town 
S appealing to high-skilled workers as the local governments had wished. Pre-existing 
relationships remained an important pull factor for labour inflow in face of the growth and 
changing nature of labour demand. 
 
Chapter Five proceeded to look at pay practices in some auto parts factories, particularly 
Factories H, F and D. These factories shared some exogenous characteristics, such as serving 
the same client, being recently established, similar size and similar requirements on the 
workforce. Intriguingly, the commonalities were accompanied by a divergence in pay 
practices, since the pay system adopted in each factory involved different methods of 
calculating pay, demonstrating different rationales for rewarding workers. Nevertheless, 




which they were governed, due to the barriers that they faced at work to obtain a 
comprehensive picture of the pay system. The barriers involved blocking the circulation of 
pay information, setting up bureaucratic hurdles for making pay enquiries, controlling 
platforms for the articulation of pay demands, and normalising the fluctuation of pay using 
the variable pay components. The managerial effort in deterring workers from learning 
about the pay system resulted in workers' frustration over the perplexity towards pay and 
withdrawal from pay discussion (un)willingly. 
 
Chapter Six illustrated the consequences of pay non-transparency and the perpetual failure 
in acquiring knowledge about the pay system. They were reflected in workers' reactions in 
terms of the exit, voice and compliance. However, the environment of Town S and the social 
institutions which bound workers to the employment relationship created costs for them to 
employ either of the strategies. 
 
With the aid of empirical findings, I revealed that the accumulation of non-knowledge and 
ignorance towards the pay system was indeed an outcome of managerial control and 
workers' compliance with the managerial interests regarding reward management. 
Managerial control was manifested in different forms under despotic and hegemonic 
production regimes respectively, which resulted in varying processes in which the pay system 
was obscured from the pay system in different factories. Apart from the success of 
managerial control, factors external to the workplace also contributed to suppressing 




This research made the following empirical and theoretical contributions. First of all, it 
demonstrated the empirical novelty in the variety of pay systems in Chinese companies of 
various capital sources. Despite being established under the same state initiative to develop 
the automobile industry in Town S, different capital sources including state-owned, foreign 
and domestic capital were involved in the process. The various hierarchies and managerial 




practices, overriding a general industrial norm. The fact that they belonged to a common 
supplier network did not result in a convergence of employment practices in this regard. 
 
Literature on the variety of pay systems in Chinese companies focuses on the public and 
private sectoral divide, implying more flexibility in pay system design and a stronger focus on 
individual and corporate performances in private companies (e.g. Cooke, 2005). Among the 
three factories closely studied, Factory F as a domestic-invested company met our current 
understanding of companies in the Chinese private sector (Wei and Rowley, 2009), as 
performance pay constituted a substantial proportion of the pay package. Nevertheless, 
Factory H was technically 100% state-owned but it reflected a strong inclination towards 
flexibility and pragmatism from its domestic-invested background. It also formed a stark 
contrast with Factory D, of which state-owned capital only constituted 50% but the factory 
adopted a pay system very similar to those in SOEs. It revealed the diversity among SOEs and 
the potential factors which influenced the deployment of managerial practices, including 
company history and the dynamics between state-owned capital and other external 
investors of different backgrounds. Furthermore, despite fitting the general expectation of 
private companies, Factory F demonstrated a more paternalistic managerial approach than 
other foreign-invested companies. On the one hand, it had a strong emphasis on rewarding 
desirable performance; on the other hand, it also tended to restrain workers from platforms 
on which they could formally voice, showing a drastic difference from their Japanese 
counterparts. The hybrid characteristics of the three factories implied a more complex 
developmental trajectory of managerial practices and perspectives regarding employee 
reward within a company.  
 
Second, this research examined workers’ circumstances outside well-established industrial 
cities in China. While a wave of industrial relocation from coastal to inland regions has been 
observed in recent years (Chang et al., 2013), this research set in Town S illustrated the living 
experience of workers in the inland industrial zones recently developed by local governments 
in receipt of the influx of capital. It was a story of how a primarily rural locality transformed 
into an industrial area within a short period of time under strong state support. The 
formation of the labour market also went through this period of ‘shock development’. 
Workers were certainly attracted, but how well they settled in a newly urbanised area where 




questionable. Derived from these concerns, this research shed light on how migrant workers 
managed to settle down in the industrial zone still in the making; and also the resources and 
opportunities that they had or did not have in comparison with their counterparts in big cities 
in order to develop potential to form a collective voice. 
 
Third, it contributed to the understanding of pay communication practices in China, which 
are empirically under-researched. In contrast with existing literature which examines the 
motivational function of pay communication, this research took pay communication as a 
means of micro control over workers on the shop floor and examined its role in constructing 
a hegemonic-leaning factory regime. The findings of this research fit into the debate within 
Chinese labour studies on the nature of labour regimes constructed in different workplaces,  
and the extent to which different regime types co-exist (Smith and Liu, 2016). The findings 
supported the notion of a contested labour regime which takes the influence of state 
regulations, managerial practices and workers struggle into consideration (Chan, 2010), 
while looking at pay as a dimension of management-labour contestation in the workplace. 
 
Fourth, this research introduced a labour process approach to the study of pay 
communication, which was contextualised at the workplace and throughout the duration of 
an employment relationship. I explored how pay information was circulated as a result of 
workplace dynamics at various phases of an employment relationship, which in turn affected 
how workers’ understanding of pay and how their incentive to learn about it developed or 
diminished over time. It was argued that the degree of pay transparency or secrecy was 
actualised through day-to-day social interactions between workers and the management, 
and also among workers in the labour process. The flow of information was organically 
determined by social relations, especially in the informal sphere. Therefore, apart from 
investigating the end result of a set of pay communication practices, unveiling the process of 
their implementation is equally important. In sum, this research contributed to reviving a 
sociological understanding of pay determination and pay communication, which had 









In Chapter Three, I elaborated on the process of collecting data. Many circumstances were 
not foreseen at the preparatory stage of the fieldwork. Despite attempts to mitigate the 
insufficiency of data collection strategies, the research still displays the following limitations. 
 
The first limitation surrounds the discounted quality of data due to difficulties in gaining 
access to factories and time pressures to bring the fieldwork to a close. This resulted in a 
contingent approach to case selection and data collection practices in each factory, 
depending on the availability and accommodation of the factory management. The time 
constraint also led to a small-sized sample, although perspectives of representatives from 
more factories in the local area were also considered. Otherwise a more uniform approach 
and consistency in the duration of fieldwork in each factory could have been adopted.  
 
The fact that the case factories were selected by snowballing at the end also made prior 
consideration of more rigorous comparison regarding pay communication infeasible. For 
instance, pay slips and platforms of collective negotiation were taken as two main channels 
for employers to communicate pay with employees at the individual and collective levels 
respectively. In retrospect, more effort could have been expended to specifically target 
factories that possessed these two qualities. If rigour in selecting ‘typical cases’ to compare 
pay communication practices did not give way to securing cases for the essential amount of 
data, a two-by-two comparison of the practices and labour processes in various factories 
could have been developed. 
 
The second limitation relates to the lack of attention paid to certain dimensions of pay 
systems and workers’ lives. A key area is the potential of social media to shape workers’ 
understanding of the pay system and to facilitate pay discussion. It is known that work-
related discussion and social networking on the shop floor relied heavily on social media, but 
the extent to which social media benefited workers, or merely served an extension of micro 





Another area is the relationship between the factory-level pay practices and other state 
redistributive institutions, including tax and social insurance. In China, two items are 
deducted from workers’ monthly pay before they receive the pay. One item is income tax 
contribution. According to the tax law, workers with a monthly pay level (changed to yearly 
starting from 2019) exceeding an income tax threshold would have their income tax 
deducted monthly from their pay package by the employer on behalf of the tax 
administration, and then the employer pays income tax as a proxy for workers. Similarly, 
workers’ contribution to their social insurance accounts should also be deducted by their 
employer from their monthly pay. The employer should then pay the social insurance 
administration their own contribution, as well as workers’ contribution on behalf of them.  
 
Without a payslip and an effective mechanism for workers to cross-check their contribution 
to these redistributive institutions, disputes may arise related to confusion among workers 
of the actual amount that they should be paid, incidents of wage theft, and the extent to 
which they would benefit from non-wage rewards conditional to their contribution. 
However, whether workers would like to have a significant proportion of their pay deducted, 
especially when their pay is already meagre, is another matter (Bieler and Lee, 2017). There 
is documentation about how employers and workers evade these contributions. For 
example, it is a known practice to pay wages in cash to keep the declared income below the 
income tax threshold (The Economist, 2018). After a strike involving 60,000 shoe factory 
workers in 2014 demanding social insurance payment from the employer’s side, some 
workers complained about the decrease in cash that they received due to the deduction of 
social insurance payments (Schmalz et al., 2017). This leads to unsolved queries regarding 
how workers understand employers’ behaviour relating to pay and its deduction adhering to 
labour laws and regulations, and the extent to which factory-level pay practices are 
conditioned or shaped by this kind of understanding.  
 
8.5. Future research directions 
 
The examination of pay communication practices in Chinese factories in this research has 




Considering the limitations that this research faces, there are a number of areas that could 
be further explored in the future. 
 
The first area concerns intra-organisational relations in Chinese companies. The parent 
companies of Factories H, F and D decided to set up the subsidiaries in a similar context. They 
demonstrated different traits for keeping control over decisions made at the factory level, 
and maintaining the consistency in pay practices among subsidiaries in their remit. 
Therefore, further study into the considerations taken by Chinese companies of various 
forms in the delegation of authority in making pay decisions would strengthen our 
understanding of intra-organisational relations. 
 
Second, I suggest delving into the concept of privacy over pay in collective-oriented societies 
such as China. During the socialist era, workers’ pay information was regarded as public 
information, at least within their respective work unit. There was reportedly room for 
discretion for non-wage benefits and subsidies, but the pay policies and rates on which 
workers’ remuneration were based were supposedly open to all in the work unit. However, 
since the market reform it is no longer taken for granted, as pay information becomes 
increasingly individualised. How workers rationalise the non-disclosure of pay throughout 
the transition period from a centrally-planned economy to a marketised economy relates to 
their preferences regarding pay communication strategies. With a stronger sense that pay is 
part of their personal privacy instead of public information, workers’ attitude towards 
adhering to pay disclosure rules and sharing pay information may be affected. 
 
The third area relates to the application of pay communication practices across different 
sectors and forms of employment. In this research, pay communication was studied in a 
spatially-fixed workplace, which allows face-to-face interaction between workers and the 
management. Nevertheless, the transformation of workplaces in the age of digitalisation 
may create a different form of power dynamic. Technologies enable employers to 
increasingly digitalise work procedures and assign jobs by algorithms, resulting in new forms 
of managerial control (Moore et al., 2018). Hence, how the creation of workers’ consent in 
these new workplaces takes place, and how it is related to the manipulation of the pay 
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Work history in the company 
• Could you briefly introduce your work experience in the company (e.g. seniority, past 
positions held)? 
• How was the outlook of the company when you became the general manager? 
• What were the burning questions or issues that you had to deal with upon arrival? 
 
Current state of the automobile industry 
• What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese automobile 
companies? 
• In comparison with foreign companies, what are the characteristics or advantages of 
state-owned and domestic-invested enterprises? 
• In comparison with other localities, what is the development of the automobile 
industry in Town S like? Any peculiarities? 
• Can you briefly describe the relationship between the assembly plant and your 
company? 
• When you negotiate with the assembly plant, what are the areas in which you find it 
hard to come to an agreement? 
• To what extent decisions made in the subsidiary are influenced by the parent 
company? 
• How does the market competition that the company faces affect managerial 
practices within the company? 
 
Labour cost 
• Do you think the company is sensitive to increases in labour cost? 
• Where do you think the pressure of controlling labour costs for the company comes 
from? 
• How does the company cope with rising labour costs?  
• To what extent do you think there is room for pay adjustment in the company? 
 
Human resource management 
• What are the conditions under which companies recruit and retain workers 
successfully? 




• In comparison to foreign-invested companies, what do you think are the strengths 
of pay and benefits packages in domestic-invested or state-owned enterprises? 
• How do these various practices emerge? What do you think about the prospect of 
convergence? 
• What are the challenges that the HR department in the company face? How is the 
coordination between the HR department and other production departments? 
• What do you ask from workers in terms of competencies and performance? 
• What do you think motivates workers in the company? 
 
Shop floor management 
• What are the duties of shop floor management in terms of personnel management 
and work allocation? 
• What do you think motivates shop floor management to carry out supervision on the 
shop floor? 
• How does the HR department coordinate with other departmental management 
regarding the placement of workers and the organisation of their work?  
 
Decision making structure 
• What is the process of evaluating and adjusting the pay and benefits system like in 
the company? 
• Which parties are involved in the decision making process regarding pay 
adjustment? 
• What factors do different parties recognise as more important? 
• To what extent can you make final decisions on determining pay levels and making 




The development of the pay system 
• How long have you been working in this position? Do you have any prior working 
experience in human resource management? 
• Can you briefly introduce the pay and benefits system used in this company? 
• What does the company allocate resources for with regard to human resource 
management at the moment? 
• Has the pay system undergone any change since the establishment of the company? 
What are the changes that you have observed so far? 
• What is the pay system design based on? 
• Which qualities or competencies of employees are more rewarded in the current pay 




• What are the challenges in implementing the pay system? Are there any particular 
factors which are difficult to anticipate? 
• What views do workers have on the pay system? 
 
Recruitment 
• Do you find recruitment challenging at the moment? Why? 
• In your opinion, what aspects of the current pay system appeal or do not appeal to 
job seekers? 
• To what extent do you agree with these views? 
• With regard to the shortcomings of the pay system from jobseekers’ perspective, to 
what extent do you think the company could do something to improve them, and 
how? 
 
References for pay setting 
• What do you think about the level of labour cost borne by the company at the 
moment? 
• Where do you think the pressure of controlling labour cost for the company comes 
from? 
• To what extent do you think there is room for pay and benefits adjustment in the 
company at the moment? 
• What does the company use as references or benchmarks for pay setting? 
• How does the company get access to pay information as a reference? Do you think 
it is sufficient, and why? 
 
Decision making structure in the company 
• What is the process of evaluating and adjusting the pay and benefits system like in 
the company? 
• Which parties are involved in the decision making process regarding pay 
adjustment? 
• What factors do you consider regarding pay adjustment? 
• What are the specific roles or duties of yourself or of the HR department in the pay 
setting process? 
• During the pay setting process, which other parties do you have to engage with? 
• Which party do you think is the most difficult to cooperate and communicate with? 
Why? 
 
Shop floor management 
• What are the duties of shop floor management in terms of personnel management 




• What do you think motivates shop floor management to carry out supervision on the 
shop floor? 
• How does the HR department coordinate with other departmental management 




Experience with the automobile industry 
• How did you and your company begin to collaborate with clients from this particular 
industry? 
• What kind of clients do you usually work with? 
• What kind of services do you provide? 
• What departments in your client companies do you usually communicate with? 
 
Relationship between consultancy firms and automobile companies 
• Why do automobile companies need services from a consultancy firm? 
• What is the relationship between a consultancy firm and its automobile client like?  
• To what extent are the companies’ expectations towards consultancy firms 
reasonable? If not, how do you deal with it? 
• What obstacles deter the companies from implementing your suggestions? 
 
Priorities of automobile companies 
• What do you think are the strength and weaknesses of Chinese automobile 
companies (especially joint ventures with foreign carmakers)? 
• What do automobile companies spend on the development of human capital and 
human resource management? 
 
Concerns with labour cost 
• What are your observations on employees’ views on pay and benefits? 
• To what extent do you think your client is sensitive to the increase of labour costs? 
• What impacts do the rising labour cosst have on automobile companies? 
• How do your clients cope with rising labour costs? According to your understanding, 
does this work well? 
• To what extent do you think there is room for pay adjustment in automobile 
companies? 
 




• To what extent do automobile companies take employer branding seriously to 
recruit and retain employees? 
• To what extent do you think pay level is important in the employer branding 
strategies of automobile companies? 
• Apart from the HR department, what is your experience in working with other 





• How long have you been working in the automobile industry? What other jobs have 
you done before? 
• How did you start working in this factory? 
• During the recruitment phase, what were the job requirements for this position? 
• How did you feel about the company at that time? 
 
Working conditions 
• What are your main job duties? 
• How is working in this company like? 
• To what extent do you think your job is important to the production in general? 
Why? 
• Do you pay attention to the development and performance of the company? How? 
• What do you think about the direction of company development? 
• Is there a high turnover among your colleagues? To what extent is your work affected 
by this? 
 
Understanding of the pay system 
• What does your pay package consist of? 
• Which pay component do you think is the most important? Why? 
• Does the monthly pay level fluctuate throughout the year? If so, what causes the 
difference? 
• Under what circumstances will your pay be higher than what you get usually? 
• What are the strengths and weaknesses of the pay system in this company? 
• Have you observed any changes to the pay system while you are here? If yes, what 
are the changes? 
• What would you do if you have questions about the pay system, or if you find the 






• Do you think the company prioritise personal or collective competencies? How can 
you see that? 
• Do you find anything in your personal competencies which needs improvement? 
• What motivates you to work hard in the company? 
 
Pay comparison 
• Taking companies nearby or in the same industry into consideration, what do you 
think about the working conditions and pay level in this company? 
• What do you think about your own pay level? 
• On what basis do you normally judge whether you are paid well enough? 
• How do you know how other companies pay workers? Do you think this kind of 
information is useful for you? How? 
• If the pay level stays like this, is it acceptable for you? 
• Do you chat with your colleagues about pay? What aspects or issues of pay do you 
talk about? 
 
Expectation on pay adjustment 
• To what extent pay is an important factor to keep you in the company? 
• Do you think there is room for adjustment for your own pay? 
• What are the circumstances in which you may receive a pay rise? 
• If you quit the company now, is it easy for you to look for other jobs which pay more 
or less the same, or even higher? Why and how? 
• Is it feasible to demand for a pay rise? Why? 




• Can you briefly describe the corporate culture and atmosphere in this company? 
• Do you cooperate or compete more with your colleagues? What do you think about 
that? 
• How do workers participate in the decision making of working conditions, work 
arrangement and pay levels in this company? 
• Do you know how the company-level trade union is involved in the annual pay 






• What do you spend money on every month? 
• With the current pay level, how is your living standard like? 
• Do you have other income sources if the pay is not enough to support your spending? 




Information sheet for interviewees 
 
 
Agreeing on the Wage: 
The Contestation and Negotiation of Wage Levels in Chinese Factories 
 
 
Researcher: Fuk Ying TSE (phd14ft@mail.wbs.ac.uk) 
Supervisors: Guglielmo Meardi (guglielmo.meardi@wbs.ac.uk) 




You are invited to act as research participant for the above project. Your participation in this 
project is entirely voluntary. You may withdraw from participating in this project at any time, 
with no negative consequence to yourself or the factory for which you work. 
 
This is a research project investigating how wages are determined in the factory, and how 
people think of the wage system.   
 
The project covers 4 factories in the automobile industry. Your involvement in this project 
will help understand how working in the factory is like, and to what extent it will change 
people’s view on how much they earn or would like to earn. 
 
Participation in this project will involve being interviewed by the above named researcher 
on the theme of working conditions, wage demands and prospects. If you are a manager, 
you will also be asked about your role in setting wages and the decision making structure in 
the factory concerning wages.  
 
It is not expected that you will experience any risks through participating in this project. Data 
will be anonymised from the start, with no name or specific position recorded as part of the 
interview material. Your consent form will be stored in a locked office at the University of 
Warwick, and transcripts of interview data will be anonymised before being printed and 
stored in the same place. The transcripts will also be stored electronically on the researcher’s 
password-protected laptop. All the consent forms will be destroyed after 10 years from the 
completion of the research. Data collected will only be used for academic publications in the 
future. You can request a copy of the publication from the researcher. 
 
Should you have any further questions about this research, please contact Fuk Ying TSE at 
phd14ft@mail.wbs.ac.uk. You may also contact the WBS Research Office should you have 






Consent form for interviewees 
 
 






Title of Project: Agreeing on the Wage: the Contestation and Negotiation of 
Wage Levels in Chinese Factories 
Name of Researcher: Fuk Ying TSE 
Name of Lead Supervisor: Guglielmo Meardi 
Date:  
 
Please initial box 
1. I confirm I have read and understand the information sheet dated 
____________ for the above study.  I have had the opportunity to 
consider the information, ask questions about the researcher and 
the research, and have had these answered satisfactorily.   
︡ 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time without giving any reason. 
 
3. I understand that that my information will be held and processed 
for the following purposes: to be analysed by the researcher for 
the purposes of completing her PhD research, and future 
publications derived from the research. 
 
4. I agree to take part in the above named study and I am willing to 




      
Name of Participant  Date  Signature  
 
      






List of research participants  
 
 
Interviewees and subjects of participant observation quoted in the thesis (in alphabetical 
order of codename): 
 
Category Codename Company Gender Date of first interview 
Other A Consultancy Firm-1 F December 2016 
Worker DJW Factory D M 30 April 2017 
Manager/HR GF Factory F F 6 January 2017 
Manager/HR GQC D-Factory C M 12 April 2017 
Manager/HR HBL J-Factory G M 24 March 2017 
Manager/HR HQM Factory D F 19 February 2017 
Manager/HR JYJ Factory F M 27 September 2016 
Other KC Consultancy Firm-1 F January 2017 
Worker LDJ Factory F F 20 March 2017 
Worker LJM Factory D M 30 April 2017 
Manager/HR LKH Factory H F 16 November 2016 
Worker LSH Factory F M 9 January 2017 
Worker LXJ Factory F M 11 January 2017 
Worker LYZ Factory F F 11 January 2017 
Manager/HR NU Factory U M January 2017 
Manager/HR NXC J-Factory Y M 23 March 2017 
Worker RGM Factory H M 15 November 2016 
Worker SDJ Factory F F 9 January 2017 
Manager/HR TH Factory H F 9 November 2016 
Manager/HR TQ Factory H M 18 November 2016 
Worker TSX Factory F M 20 March 2017 
Worker TSY Factory H F 28 November 2016 
Worker TXS Factory F M 11 January 2017 
Worker TY J-Factory T M 13 October 2016 
Worker WDJ Factory H F 10 November 2016 
Worker XXS Factory D M 8 April 2017 
Worker YXS Factory D M 25 February 2017 
Manager/HR YXY Factory H M 9 November 2016 
Worker ZGB Factory D M 25 February 2017 
Manager/HR ZHT J-Factory A M 27 April 2017 
Manager/HR ZJH T-Factory H M 27 April 2017 
Manager/HR ZJP D-Factory S F 27 April 2017 
Manager/HR ZK Factory H M 27 September 2016 




Manager/HR ZTX J-Factory P M 27 December 2016 
 
Other interviewees (order by first interview date): 
 
Category Codename Company Gender Date of first interview 
Manager/HR PT-1 C-1 F 21 May 2016 
Worker PT-2 C-2 M 22 May 2016 
Worker PT-3 C-3 F 27 May 2016 
Worker PT-4 C-4 M 27 May 2016 
Worker PT-5 C-4 M 27 May 2016 
Other PT-6 Consultancy Firm-2 M 7 June 2016 
Worker PT-7 C-5 M 22 June 2016 
Manager/HR PT-8 C-6 M 7 August 2016 
Worker PT-9 C-7 M 9 August 2016 
Worker PT-10 C-8 M 16 August 2016 
Worker PT-11 C-9 M 19 August 2016 
Worker PT-12 C-10 M 10 September 2016 
Worker PT-13 C-11 M 12 September 2016 
Worker PT-14 C-5 M 24 September 2016 
Manager/HR PT-15 C-12 M 27 September 2016 
Manager/HR PT-16 C-13 M 27 September 2016 
Worker PT-17 Factory H M 11 November 2016 
Worker PT-18 Factory H M 16 November 2016 
Worker PT-19 Factory H F 16 November 2016 
Worker PT-20 Factory H M 16 November 2016 
Worker PT-21 Factory H M 16 November 2016 
Worker PT-22 Factory H M 18 November 2016 
Worker PT-23 Factory H M 18 November 2016 
Worker PT-24 Factory H F 19 November 2016 
Worker PT-25 Factory H F 22 November 2016 
Worker PT-26 Factory H F 23 November 2016 
Worker PT-27 Factory H M 24 November 2016 
Worker PT-28 Factory H M 27 November 2016 
Manager/HR PT-29 Factory H M 27 November 2016 
Worker PT-30 Factory H F 27 November 2016 
Worker PT-31 Factory H M 28 November 2016 
Worker PT-32 Factory H M 29 November 2016 
Other PT-33 Consultancy Firm-1 F December 2016 
Manager/HR PT-34 C-14 M 8 December 2016 
Manager/HR PT-35 C-15 F 22 December 2016 




Worker PT-37 Factory F M 9 January 2017 
Worker PT-38 Factory F M 9 January 2017 
Worker PT-39 Factory F M 10 January 2017 
Worker PT-40 Factory F M 11 January 2017 
Worker PT-41 Factory D M 25 February 2017 
Worker PT-42 Factory D M 25 February 2017 
Worker PT-43 Factory D F 25 February 2017 
Worker PT-44 Factory F M 20 March 2017 
Worker PT-45 Factory F M 20 March 2017 
Worker PT-46 Factory F M 20 March 2017 
Other PT-47 C-16 F April 2017 
Other PT-48 
 
M April 2017 
Other PT-49 
 
M April 2017 
Manager/HR PT-50 C-17 F 26 April 2017 
Manager/HR PT-51 C-18 F 26 April 2017 






Data codes generated during open coding 
 
 
Name of code Description Files References 
Additional job 
requirements 
Qualifications for workers to deliver 
extra duties on the job 
6 7 
Advantage of working 
here 





Part-time jobs, other options for work, 
other income sources 
17 25 
Becoming skilled How to become skilled, how being skilled 
affects productivity 
17 36 





What the interviewee understands as the 
capital source of the company 
15 20 
Career progression in 
the company 
Path of career progression, prospect 23 39 
Change in HR system in 
the company over time 
Changes that interviewees saw during 
employment 
5 9 
Clientele of the 
company 
Descriptions of the product market and 
requirements from clients 
20 32 
Collecting opinions on 
pay 
How workers’ opinions of pay were 
gathered 
13 18 
Collective resistance Descriptions of workers’ collective 




Observations of automation 




Comments and gossips about colleagues 3 8 
Comments on company 
performance 





Comments on management style and 
dynamics at the upper management level 
22 46 
Comments on the 
current pay system 
Its strengths and weaknesses, 
interviewees’ personal preferences and 
perceptions of the justice and fairness of 
the pay system 
34 90 
Comments on the 
workforce 
Comments on the characteristics, quality 






Name of code Description Files References 
Comments on workload Descriptions and comments on work 
schedule and intensity 
16 28 
Comparing pay level 
with colleagues 
Episodes of pay comparison with 
colleagues 
9 15 
Comparing pay level 
with other companies 
Episodes of comparing pay with other 
companies 
41 70 
Control of labour cost Factory needs to control labour cost, 
measures taken by the factories to 
control labour cost and difficulties in 
execution 
10 12 
Current pay level How much interviewees said they earned 36 67 
Difficulties in 
recruitment 
Complaints about difficulties in filling 
vacancies 
11 22 
Discussing pay with 
colleagues 
Episodes of pay discussion among 
workers, including why they did not 
discuss 
18 19 
Enquiry on pay Episodes and comments on making pay-
related enquiries 
15 18 
Environment in Town S Infrastructure, public services and living 
conditions in Town S 
17 28 
Expectation on pay 
system 
Expected earnings under the current pay 
system, to what extent the expectation 
was met 
24 48 
Expectation on the 
factory 
Initial impression on the factory, whether 
it fits their experience during 
employment 
14 18 
Family background What interviewees told about their 
family 
13 32 
Financial needs What interviewees said they needed to 
spend their money on 
14 25 
Fines Situations in which workers were fined in 
the factory 
6 6 
Gender discrimination Observations of employment practices 
which discriminated against female 
workers 
1 2 
HR deviation from 
related companies 
Interviewees’ observations of different 
HR practices among companies and 
within the company 
15 25 





Background and past working 





Name of code Description Files References 
Ideal composition of 
employee rewards 
Managerial perspective on what the pay 
package should cover 
2 2 
Industry characteristics Descriptions and analysis of the Chinese 
automobile industries 
6 9 
Influence on HR system 
from related companies 
How parent companies influence factory-
level practices 
4 6 
Info dispersion and 
support within the 
locality 
Channels of information circulation 
among factories in Town S 
11 18 
Intervention in labour 
costs by clients 
What clients did to control labour costs 
for the factory 
4 4 
Interviewees' 
impression of me 
Personal interactions with interviewees 
during the establishment of rapport 
1 15 
Involvement of 
authorities on HR 
practices 
Government intervention in shaping the 
labour market and HR practices 
4 7 
Job searching methods How interviewees knew about this job 
and applied; methods that HR used to 
recruit workers 
38 71 
Kaizen Factory requirements on workers’ 
contribution to Kaizen; workers’ 




Workers’ knowledge on how to increase 
productivity on the job 
2 2 
Knowledge on pay 
adjustment 
Knowledge of how pay had been 
adjusted in the factory and for how much 
22 33 
Knowledge on pay 
calculation 
Workers’ understanding on how their 
pay was calculated 
15 43 
Knowledge on practices 
in other companies 
What interviewees heard about 




To what extent workers know about how 
much they have worked; Whether the 
knowledge is shared by the management 
8 9 
Labour shortage on the 
shop floor 
Labour reserve required, consequences 
of labour shortage 
12 19 
Labour turnover in the 
company 





How workers knew about development 
and performance of the factory 
5 9 
Linkage of pay between 
workers and line 
manager 
To what extent the pay of line managers 






Name of code Description Files References 
Living provisions Anything about food, accommodation 
and amenities 
25 76 
Loopholes in the pay 
system 
How workers found loopholes in the pay 
system and took advantage of them, so 




Involvement of the parent company in 





Description of the labour contract and 
dispatch status from workers 
16 27 
Measures to retain 
workers 
Managerial practices of retention 19 21 
Method of payment 
calculation 
Official accounts of pay calculation 
methods 
21 35 
Non-wage benefits in 
the company 
Including social insurance, 
accommodation and other non-monetary 
subsidies and welfare items 
18 23 
Noticing fluctuation in 
pay 
When interviewees realised that their 




Cost increase for factories and their 
coping strategies 
3 4 
Opinion on wage 
guidelines 
To what extent interviewees found wage 





Mismatch of perspectives from 




Different ways to achieve a pay rise in a 
variable pay system 
15 24 
Pay components Pay components in interviewees’ pay 
package 
29 57 
Pay equity To what extent interviewees’ thought 
their colleagues were paid at a similar 
level than they were 
10 16 
Payscale Description of pay grades and how they 
are dispersed in the factory 
8 8 
Perceived replaceability Workers’ perception of whether their job 





Description of performance assessment 
practices in the factory 
12 14 
Personnel structure on 
the shop floor 
Ranks and positions of workers in 





Name of code Description Files References 
Practices on pay 
communication 
How workers were told about pay during 




Workers’ past working experience 31 59 
Principles of HR system What interviewees thought about the 
qualities that the HR system particularly 
rewarded 
34 56 
Procedure of pay 
adjustment 
Descriptions of pay adjustment and 
bonus allocation in the factory 
22 41 
Process of being 
employed 
How the interviewees got into this 
company 
19 24 
Reasons for quitting the 
job 
Reasons for quitting, or reasons why they 










Description of the process of 
recruitment, from screening, training and 




Descriptions of the factory requirements 




Measures taken by the factory 
management to sustain the relationship 




Descriptions of interviewees’ relationship 
with their colleagues 
13 23 
Reluctance to hire 
people who worked 
nearby 
Factories’ reluctance in hiring people 
who worked in neighbouring factories 
6 6 
Seniority How long interviewees had been working 
in the company or industry 
35 63 
Shop floor conflicts Conflicts observed and how they were 
resolved 
4 13 
Shop floor discipline Managerial practices to supervise 
workers on the shop floor and penalise 
them for breaking the rules 
11 25 
Shop floor environment Description of the working environment 8 13 
Shop floor facilities Description of facilities on the shop floor; 
automation 
9 21 
Skill training Skill training available to workers 25 34 




Name of code Description Files References 
information for 
comparison 
in other companies 
Staffing Number of workers on a production line, 
in a shop and in the factory 
33 65 
Union presence Whether there was a union in the 
factory, what the union did, whether it 
mattered in the pay setting process 
21 31 
Variation in pay 
calculation method 
intra-shop floor 
Differences in pay calculation methods 
within the company, between different 
production lines and departments 
7 10 
Voicing pay demands Interviewees’ past efforts in making pay 
demands, or ways which they knew 
could be used for pay demands 
14 16 
Work and motion study Description of how work and motion 
study was conducted in the company 
3 3 
Work descriptions Descriptions of duties and tasks in the 
production line 
26 78 
Work intensity Descriptions of how fast or intensively 
work was required to be 
21 50 
Workforce composition Demographic descriptions of the 
workforce 
29 60 
Working time Descriptions of working hours and work 
schedules 
34 87 
Worries of breaking the 
law 
To what extent interviewees thought 
practices in the factory were compatible 
with labour laws and regulations 
8 11 
 
